@article{Guerriero:12204,
      recid = {12204},
      author = {Guerriero, Carmine},
      title = {Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and  Evidence},
      address = {2006},
      number = {836-2016-55594},
      series = {PRCG Nota di Lavoro 109.2006},
      pages = {49},
      year = {2006},
      abstract = {This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors' (i.e.,  regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices.  A checks and balances regulatory review process strengthens  the role of the judicial power and election increases the  populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election  arises when the risk related to expropriation of sunk  investments and the inter-party distance are lower.  Employing U.S. electric power market's data, the empirical  evidence strongly confirms these predictions. Indeed, when  treated as endogenous, only the election of administrative  law judges and not the one of regulators significantly  lowers the level of electricity rates. Moreover a more  effective supervision technology shows a marginal negative  effect on regulated rates as well.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12204},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.12204},
}