@article{Lahiri:12167,
      recid = {12167},
      author = {Lahiri, Somdeb},
      title = {A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems},
      address = {2006},
      number = {826-2016-55150},
      series = {CTN Nota di Lavoro 19 - 2006},
      pages = {10},
      year = {2006},
      abstract = {In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set  of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents  has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose  from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The  main result of this paper states that every contract choice  problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set. The need for   such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than  the core arises, since it is well known that even for very  simple contract choice problems, the core may be empty. We  also show by means of an example that the bargaining set  due to Mas-Colell (1989), as well as a weaker version of  it, may be empty for contract choice problems, thereby  implying that the weakening we suggest is in some ways  'tight'},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12167},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.12167},
}