@article{Norris:11798,
      recid = {11798},
      author = {Norris, Patricia E. and Brown, Elaine M. and Batie, Sandra  S.},
      title = {AN ANALYSIS OF SITUATION, STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND  PERFORMANCE IN AIR EMISSION AND WATERSHED EFFLUENT MARKETS},
      address = {2002},
      number = {1099-2016-89263},
      series = {Staff Paper 2002-06},
      pages = {35},
      year = {2002},
      abstract = {After much debate and many legislative proposals, the  Clean Air Act was amended in 1990 to allow more flexibility  in meeting emissions standards for SO2. Specifically, an  SO2 emissions allowance trading program was implemented.   Firms can meet emission standards by any pollution control  method, including buying emission allowances from other  firms. Analysts have concluded that, with the changes in  the Clean Air Act, SO2 emissions have been reduced by 50  percent and at an estimated $7 billion less than the  anticipated cost of the regulatory command-and-control  system.  	Not surprisingly, policy analysts have explored  the opportunities for implementing similar market-based  systems for water pollution control.  Because much of the  on-going impairment of surface water has been attributed to  nonpoint sources of pollution, trading programs which  incorporate both point and nonpoint discharges are of  particular interest.  However, despite as many as six  efforts across the nation to implement point-nonpoint  effluent credit trading programs to reduce nutrient  discharges to water, there have been few trades to date.   	This research was undertaken to answer the following  question: Do current barriers to effluent credit trading  programs arise because of fundamental differences between  air and water media or because of differences between  institutions affecting air and water use, such as the Clean  Air Act and the Clean Water Act?   	Economic theory offers  the situation, structure, conduct, and performance (SSCP)  framework, developed by industrial organization economists  and extended by institutional and environmental economists,  within which to address this research question.  In the  language of the SSCP framework, the research question can  be reframed as: are there fundamental differences in the  situation and structure of emission allowance markets and  effluent credit markets which result in conduct and  performance differences? 	 	A comparative analysis of  situation and structure suggests that barriers to effective  nutrient discharge credit markets are not a result of  fundamental differences in the air and water media or the  materials being discharged into air and water.  Rather, the  barriers exist because of structural differences -  differences in institutional structure, program design and  program implementation.  Many of the structural barriers  result from the Clean Water Act and its implementation.   More flexibility in water pollution prevention would  effectively remove many of these barriers.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/11798},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.11798},
}