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Urban water demand with fixed volumetric charging in a large municipality: the case of Brisbane, Australia*

Mark Hoffmann, Andrew Worthington and Helen Higgs[†]

This paper uses suburb-level quarterly data to model residential water demand in Brisbane, Australia, from 1998 to 2003. In this system, residential consumption is charged using a fixed annual service fee with no water entitlement followed by a fixed volumetric charge per kilolitre. Water demand is specified as average quarterly household water consumption and the demand characteristics include the marginal price of water, household income and size, and the number of rainy and warm days. The findings not only confirm residential water as price and income inelastic, but also that the price and income elasticity of demand in owner-occupied households is higher than in rented households. The results also show that weather, particularly summer months and the number of rainy days, exerts a strong influence on residential water consumption.

Key words: water management and policy, demand analysis, utility regulation and pricing.

1. Introduction

Water supply efficiency and demand management are increasingly important issues for residential water supply authorities throughout the world. Population growth, coupled with the reduction in freshwater supplies, has prompted suppliers to place renewed emphasis on demand management through pricing structures and other strategies. In the USA, for example, Ipe and Bhagwat (2002) found that water sources in Chicago are reaching exhaustion, whereas population and per capita water use is increasing. In Israel, Klawitter (2003) concluded that the Tel Aviv water utility is economically unsustainable because water is overconsumed as the price does not send appropriate welfare signals to users. Lastly, Dalhuisen *et al.* (2001) summarises the trend in most OECD

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[†] Mark Hoffmann (email: mark.hoffman@student.qut.edu.au) is an Honours graduate of the School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. Andrew Worthington (email: andreww@uow.edu.au) is Professor, School of Accounting and Finance, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia. Helen Higgs (email: h.higgs@griffith.edu.au) is Senior Lecturer, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Griffith University, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.

(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) economies towards metering, increasing block prices, and reduced subsidies for residential water supply.

In Australia, too, there have been longstanding efforts to improve residential water demand management. These have received renewed impetus with the sustained drought in the eastern states and the critical level of water reservoirs supplying large urban centres. As far back as 1994, *The Strategic Framework for the Efficient and Sustainable Reform of the Australian Water Industry* was endorsed at the meeting of the Council of Australian Governments. This framework required councils to introduce two-part tariffs for water pricing (where cost-effective to do so), with fully transparent community subsidies (if any) and the minimal free allocation of water. In practice, these two-part tariff systems generally consist of a fixed annual service or access charge, with or without a 'free' water entitlement, and a volumetric component or user-pays charge with a single block (flat rate).

Clearly, the introduction of two-part tariffs throughout Australia may have affected residential water consumption. In Tasmania, the Government Prices Oversight Commission (2003a) suggested that a 15 per cent fall in consumption could be anticipated following the introduction of two-part tariffs. In Queensland, Marsden Jacob Associates (1997) provided anecdotal evidence of a 20 per cent reduction in per capita consumption in the first year of implementing two-part tariffs. Work of a similar nature includes Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) of New South Wales (2003), Essential Services Commission of Victoria (2004) and Government Prices Oversight Commission Tasmania (2003b). But apart from these, remarkably little empirical effort has been directed at the modelling of residential water demand in Australia (for exceptions, see Barkatullah 1996; Creedy *et al.* 1998; Higgs and Worthington 2001).

The purpose of this paper is to address this imbalance. A key objective is to provide estimates of the price and income elasticity of residential water demand. These provide key inputs into optimal tariff design and demand-side management strategies. For example, while economists generally agree that prices are a way of reducing demand during periods of limited water supply, others argue that water demand is price inelastic, and therefore an ineffective tool for regulating consumption. Supporters of this viewpoint would perhaps suggest that more appropriate mechanisms for regulating residential water consumption are non-price strategies, encompassing public education campaigns, rationing, water restrictions, and subsidisation of programs aimed at adopting water-efficient technologies.

The paper itself is organised as follows. The second section discusses the environmental and institutional context of the empirical analysis. The third section presents the model for estimation of water demand and the set of independent variables included. A brief descriptive analysis is provided in the fourth section. The fifth section presents the results of the estimation. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks.

2. Data context

The information for the demand estimation is obtained from the Brisbane City Council, Australia's largest local government. Brisbane, the capital city of the state of Queensland, is a moderately sized city covering an area of 1367 km² with approximately 950 000 residents. The city has a subtropical climate, lying as it does 27.5° south of the equator. Centred on the Brisbane River, 15 km inland from the Pacific Ocean, Brisbane has mild dry winters and hot wet summers: the average daily maximum temperature is 26.3 °C, the average daily minimum temperature is 15.3 °C and average daily rainfall is 2.69 mm. In line with high population growth in the rest of south-eastern Queensland, the city has grown steadily since the mid-1990s, with population increasing by 9.4 per cent and residential dwellings by 12.3 per cent. As a result, the average household size, currently 2.57 persons, has fallen by 2.6 per cent.

Brisbane's water was supplied under a fixed-access charge until 1993. In 1995–1996, water meters and optional volumetric pricing were first introduced (see Higgs and Worthington 2001 for an analysis of this policy change) with two-part tariffs made compulsory in July 1997. Since then, all residential consumption has been charged using a fixed annual service fee with no free entitlement and a fixed (or flat) volumetric charge per kilolitre. Over the period 1997–1998 to 2003–2004, residential water has been billed quarterly with an annual access charge of \$A100 and a volumetric rate rising from \$A0.60 in 1997–1998, \$A0.70 from 1998–1999 to 1999–2000, \$A0.80 from 2000–2001 to 2001–2002, \$A0.82 in 2002–2003, and \$A0.84 in 2003–2004. In addition, the council has imposed outdoor water-use restrictions in the form of alternate fixed sprinkling days for more than 20 years, as well as a high publicity 'Water Wise' education campaign. Brisbane, however, has generally less severe water restrictions than other Australian state capitals. For example, Sydney Water (responsible for the greater Sydney metropolitan, suburban, and satellite area) has standing prohibitions on fixed garden irrigation systems and hosing of 'hard surfaces' (including cars, footpaths, paving, and buildings).

3. Demand estimation and model specification

Water demand equations generally take a form where the quantity of water demanded (more likely consumed) is expressed as a function of price, income, and other demand factors. The specification actually employed depends heavily on the data available and whether these are available at the household level or higher. Unfortunately, and in common with most previous studies of water demand, there are limited data available at the micro level in Australia (see Arbués *et al.* 2003 for a useful survey of water demand estimation). Accordingly, in this study, a suburb-level model is specified where the average quantity of water consumed per household per quarter in each suburb is specified as the dependent variable in a regression (expected sign of the estimated coefficient in brackets) against the marginal price of water per kilolitre (-), average

household income in dollars for each suburb (+), the average size of each suburb's households (+), the number of rainy (–) and warm (+) days per quarter and whether the quarter is in summer (+) or otherwise.

Starting with the dependent variable, the quantity of water demanded (*DMD*) can be measured either at the household level via user metering or by the main line meter at the water substation. If measurement is at the bulk meter, system losses and other consumption such as industrial, commercial, community, and rural use must be accounted for prior to estimation. The Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines provided quarterly residential water consumption data by suburb. The data comprise two separate records: 'Tariff 02' records, which pertain to water supplied to all residential premises rated as owner occupied, and 'Tariff 70' records, which relate to water supplied to all residential premises rated as non-owner occupied (tenanted or rented). Under the Queensland *Residential Tenancies Act 1994*, tenants are entitled to a free allocation of a 'reasonable' amount of water by their landlords so it can be expected that renting households may be less price-sensitive than owner-occupied households. Data for both renting and owner-occupied households are collected quarterly from September 1998 to June 2003 and include the total number of bills and total billed water consumption for each suburb. With this information in hand, average household water consumption for owner-occupied and rental housing in the 53 Brisbane suburbs is calculated for the sample period of 20 quarters.

The first independent variable specified is the marginal price (*PCE*) of water in Brisbane. A key feature of demand-side management policies is the pricing structure and a variety of alternative forms have been employed in Australia and elsewhere (Dinar and Subramanian 1998; Bartoszczuk and Nakamori 2004). These include (i) a fixed charge invariant to the level of consumption, (ii) a fixed charge with a free allowance followed by some excess charge for consumption over a particular level, (iii) a two-part tariff consisting of a fixed access charge, (iv) and a cost per unit based on the volume of water consumed (as in Brisbane) or a cost per unit that varies when consumption reaches certain thresholds, in such a way that the tariff consists of sequence of marginal prices for different consumption blocks. In turn, block prices can increase or decrease with each successive block of water use.

Different pricing structures can complicate the calculation of a marginal price, as reflected by the variation in pricing specification in the literature. For example, Nieswiadomy (1992) and García and Reynaud (2003) specify marginal prices, Barkatullah (1996) and Renwick *et al.* (1998) use the marginal price less the difference between what the typical consumer actually pays for water and what would be paid if all the water were purchased at the marginal rate (or Nordin's (1976) difference), Gaudin *et al.* (2001) includes the average price, Pashardes and Hajispyrou (2002) specify the marginal price in the highest tariff block, and Martínez-Espíñeira (2003) employs the average marginal price. Fortunately, in Brisbane there is a single fixed price per kilolitre with no free water allowance at all levels of consumption. This means the price

specification is relatively straightforward. Pricing information is provided by the Brisbane City Council. This variable changes over time, but not across suburbs.

The second independent variable is lagged demand (*LAG*) in each suburb. In the case of water consumption, it is reasonable to assume that the current period's water use will be related to the previous period. Therefore, the inclusion of the previous quarter's consumption should capture any unobservable determinants, including past changes in water-saving behaviour and technology. By including a lagged term for consumption, the model is effectively estimating the long-run price elasticity (Dandy *et al.* 1997). The third independent variable is each suburb's average household income (*INC*). One consideration is that water consumption, as a normal good, should be positively related to income. This is especially so as income is also positively related to many water-using goods, including swimming pools, in-ground irrigation systems, and dishwashing machines. A second consideration is that income, through its positive relationship with education, may be reflective of water conservation measures taken by the household through the purchase of water-conserving appliances and planting of drought-tolerant gardens. A negative coefficient would then be hypothesised. Regardless, most studies have found that the income elasticity of demand is in fact positive (Agthe and Billings 1987; Thomas and Syme 1988; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Rietveld *et al.* 2000). The data on household income are sourced from the Australian Taxation Office, which provides mean incomes by post-code area (corresponding roughly to suburbs). Although there is inevitably some bias with this information – individuals without group certificates are not obliged to lodge returns, taxable income is less than total income because of tax deductions, etc. – it is generally acceptable. This variable changes over time and across suburbs.

The fourth independent variable is each suburb's average household size (*SZE*). The basic argument is water consumption is positively related to the number of household members. But Arbués *et al.* (2000) found that water use is less than proportional to the increase in household size or population because of economies of scale in discretionary and non-discretionary water usage, including cooking, cleaning, car washing, and gardening. Höglund (1999) also found that if the average number of persons per household increases from two to three in a community, demand for water per person declines by some 27–35 per cent. The average size of households is taken from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001 Census. This information is grouped by Statistical Local Area, which again corresponds roughly to suburbs. As a result, the household size variable is fixed over time but varies by suburb.

The next three independent variables are weather-related factors. These have been shown to affect residential water use in a number of ways. The amount of rainfall, for example, has an influence on garden watering, and also on other activities such as washing cars, laundry, and topping-up swimming pools. Temperature has also been shown to influence water consumption, with hotter days implying higher consumption through increased garden

watering and topping-up of swimming pools. Daily weather information is sourced from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology. To include weather and temperature factors, variables are specified for the number of rainy days in each quarter (where rainfall exceeds 0 mm) (*RNY*) and the number of warm days in each quarter (those with a daily maximum in the uppermost quartile of all daily temperatures) (*WRM*). For warm days, the effective cut-off is temperatures greater than 28.5 °C. The final variable specified takes a value of 1 for summer; otherwise 0 (*SUM*). All weather variables are fixed across suburbs, but vary over time.

The estimation of the urban demand equations for water in Brisbane comprises two forms: a linear and a non-linear (or log–log) model. Billings and Agthe (1980) and Miaou (1990) also specified linear and log–log models, whereas Foster and Beattie (1981) and Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) employed a log–log transformation. These functional forms are applied to three separate groups: all households, owner-occupied households, and rental households. For i suburbs, the linear model is:

$$DMD_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PCE_t + \alpha_2 LAG_t + \alpha_3 INC_t + \alpha_4 SZE_t + \alpha_5 RNY_t + \alpha_6 WRM_t + \alpha_7 SUM_t \quad (1)$$

And the log–log model is:

$$\ln DMD_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln PCE_t + \beta_2 \ln LAG_t + \beta_3 \ln INC_t + \beta_4 \ln SZE_t + \beta_5 \ln RNY_t + \beta_6 \ln WRM_t + \beta_7 SUM_t \quad (2)$$

where t is the time period and all other variables are as previously defined. For the linear model, the short-run elasticities are calculated at the means, with the exception of the lagged demand term. The lagged demand coefficient is used to determine the long-run price elasticity of demand of $\alpha_1/(1 - \alpha_2)$ at the mean. The short-run elasticity for the log–log model is simply the value of the estimated coefficient with the long-run price elasticity of demand as $\beta_1/(1 - \beta_2)$.

4. Descriptive statistics

Table 1 presents a summary of descriptive statistics across the 53 Brisbane suburbs from September 1998 to June 2003. Sample means, maximums, minimums, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis are reported. Also included are decompositions of these variables into their mean, seasonal, and time-series components. As shown, household quarterly water consumption averaged 73.11 kL with owner-occupied households averaging 75.36 kL and renter households averaging 65.45 kL. There is clearly a strong seasonal component with household water consumption being 17.91 kL higher in the December quarter and 4.49 kL lower in the June quarter. Consumption per quarter has also trended upwards over the entire sample period by 0.58 kL across all households: 0.35 kL in renter households and 0.67 kL in owner-occupied

Table 1 Descriptive statistics

	All consumption (kL)	Owner-occupied consumption (kL)	Rental consumption (kL)	Water price (\$A/kL)	Household income (\$A)	Rainy days (n)	Warm days (n)
Central tendency and distribution							
Mean	73.11	75.36	65.45	0.76	12 495.35	33.70	22.65
SD	21.46	22.41	18.68	0.05	3 241.51	9.98	21.84
Minimum	23.31	7.75	13.75	0.70	7 531.14	15.00	0.00
Maximum	211.91	214.47	302.36	0.82	24 992.42	51.00	72.00
Kurtosis	9.91	9.35	33.50	1.21	4.36	2.28	2.34
Skewness	1.99	1.83	3.70	-0.35	1.17	-0.40	0.67
Seasonal and time decomposition							
Intercept	67.06	68.36	61.79	0.68	11 191.00	41.50	37.89
Time trend	0.58	0.67	0.35	0.01	124.00	-0.74	0.32
March quarter	2.90	3.57	1.72	0.09	1 379.00	-2.70	9.80
June quarter	-4.49	-4.23	-4.46	0.09	1 528.00	-4.90	-38.55
September quarter	7.88	9.22	3.94	0.09	1 081.00	-15.70	-14.31
December quarter	17.91	19.41	13.44	0.09	1 230.00	-7.90	0.32

SD, standard deviation.

households. Across all suburbs and quarters, the marginal water price averages 76 cents per kL, the average household income is \$A12 495 and the number of rainy and warm days per quarter are 34 days (37 per cent) and 23 days (25 per cent), respectively. Of course, there is a wide seasonal variation in these variables, with fewer rainy days in the September quarter and more in the March quarter, and more warm days in the March quarter and fewer in the June quarter.

5. Empirical results

Table 2 provides the estimated coefficients, standard errors and *P*-values of the null hypotheses that the individual coefficients are equal to zero and the short- and long-run elasticities (at the means) of the parameters detailed in Equation (1). As the cross-sections (i.e., suburbs) are drawn from a small geographical region with many socioeconomic commonalities (i.e., Brisbane), cross-sectional variation in demand is likely to be small and identifiers for each suburb are regarded as unnecessary: a common effects panel data model is used. The results of six separate regressions are presented. The upper panel includes the estimated results of a linear form and the lower panel a non-linear form with log–log transformation. The three sets of estimated results for the linear and non-linear forms are for all households, owner-occupied household, and rental households, respectively.

Also included in Table 2 are statistics for R^2 and adjusted R^2 and *F*-statistics and *P*-values for joint hypothesis tests that all slope coefficients are zero. The R^2 for the linear models include Gujarati's (2003, p. 221) adjustment to allow direct comparison with the R^2 from the log–log models. Typically for panel data, the R^2 of all six regressions have relatively high explanatory power, ranging from 0.648 to 0.704 for the linear models and 0.698 and 0.776 for the non-linear models. To test for multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) are calculated (not shown). As a rule of thumb, a VIF greater than 10 indicates the presence of harmful collinearity. Among the independent variables, the highest VIFs are for lagged demand (3.002), rainy days (2.016), and household income (2.089). This suggests that multicollinearity, although present, will not bias the estimated coefficients. In terms of the residuals, White's chi-squared test of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected (Chi-squared statistic = 203.827, *P* = 0.000), so the standard errors and *P*-values in Table 2 all incorporate White's corrections for heteroskedasticity of an unknown form.

The models first discussed are those employing a linear specification. For all households, the estimated coefficients for all parameters are significant at the 1 per cent level of significance or lower and conform to a priori expectations. Using the *F*-statistic the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are jointly zero is also rejected at the 1 per cent level. The largest effects on water consumption are clearly the water price and lagged demand. The short-run price elasticity of demand at the mean is -0.588 (inelastic) indicating that a 10 per cent increase in the price of water is associated with a 5.88 per cent decrease in the

Table 2 Estimated linear and non-linear regression models

Variable	All households				Owner-occupied households				Renter households			
	Coefficient	SE	P-value	Elasticity	Coefficient	SE	P-value	Elasticity	Coefficient	SE	P-value	Elasticity
Linear demand equation												
Constant	50.469	8.546	0.000	—	56.542	6.786	0.000	—	24.313	18.211	0.182	—
Water price (\$A/kL)	-56.256	8.537	0.000	-0.588	-59.888	7.377	0.000	-0.607	-34.165	16.278	0.036	-0.399
Lagged demand (kL)	0.592	0.059	0.000	-1.442	0.616	0.055	0.000	-1.579	0.393	0.144	0.006	-0.658
Household income (\$A)	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.239	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.234	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.276
Household size (<i>n</i>)	6.129	1.540	0.000	0.212	5.030	1.317	0.000	0.169	10.685	3.457	0.002	0.414
Rainy days (<i>n</i>)	-0.567	0.046	0.000	-0.259	-0.617	0.046	0.000	-0.273	-0.348	0.063	0.000	-0.177
Warm days (<i>n</i>)	0.031	0.019	0.106	0.009	0.022	0.019	0.264	0.006	0.089	0.034	0.009	0.030
Summer	15.751	0.713	0.000	—	16.574	0.745	0.000	—	12.493	0.884	0.000	—
<i>R</i> ²	0.745	—	—	—	0.703	—	—	—	0.648	—	—	—
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.744	—	—	—	0.703	—	—	—	0.647	—	—	—
<i>F</i> -statistic	451.889	—	0.000	—	479.039	—	0.000	—	200.718	—	0.000	—
Non-linear demand equation												
Constant	-0.077	0.183	0.676	—	-0.258	0.226	0.254	—	0.310	0.178	0.083	—
Water price (\$A/kL)	-0.507	0.073	0.000	-0.507	-0.455	0.084	0.000	-0.455	-0.391	0.099	0.000	-0.391
Lagged demand (kL)	0.566	0.048	0.000	-1.167	0.486	0.083	0.000	-0.884	0.502	0.078	0.000	-0.785
Household income (\$A)	0.235	0.029	0.000	0.235	0.298	0.048	0.000	0.298	0.191	0.033	0.000	0.191
Household size (<i>n</i>)	0.211	0.046	0.000	0.211	0.210	0.053	0.000	0.210	0.327	0.074	0.000	0.327
Rainy days (<i>n</i>)	-0.218	0.014	0.000	-0.218	-0.234	0.019	0.000	-0.234	-0.168	0.017	0.000	-0.168
Warm days (<i>n</i>)	0.020	0.004	0.000	0.020	0.027	0.006	0.000	0.027	0.025	0.005	0.000	0.025
Summer	0.197	0.010	0.000	—	0.193	0.013	0.000	—	0.166	0.011	0.000	—
<i>R</i> ²	0.776	—	—	—	0.720	—	—	—	0.698	—	—	—
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.775	—	—	—	0.718	—	—	—	0.696	—	—	—
<i>F</i> -statistic	494.829	—	0.000	—	366.181	—	0.000	—	329.254	—	0.000	—

SE, standard error; —, not applicable.

quantity demanded in the short run. Long-run price elasticity at the means of -1.442 suggests a 10 per cent increase in price will reduce consumption by 14.42 per cent implying the price elasticity of demand is more elastic in the long run than in the short run. The income elasticity of 0.239 (inelastic) indicates that a 10 per cent increase in income is associated with a 2.39 per cent increase in the quantity of water demanded. By way of comparison, Agthe and Billings (1987) calculated a price elasticity of -0.56 and an income elasticity of 0.46 , Barkatullah (1996) -0.21 and 0.07 , Dandy *et al.* (1997) -0.78 and 0.38 , García and Renaud (2003) -0.25 and 0.00 , and Gaudin *et al.* (2001) -0.47 and 0.19 .

The impact on water demand of changes in the number of rainy and warm days are significantly negative and positive, respectively. The elasticities indicate that a 10 per cent increase in rainy days is associated with a 2.59 per cent fall in water consumption for the quarter; whereas a 10 per cent increase in warm days is associated with a 0.01 per cent increase in water consumption for the quarter. There is broad agreement between the separate regressions for owner-occupied and rental households, with the exception that for owner-occupied households the price elasticity is higher (-0.607 compared to -0.399) and income elasticity is lower (0.234 compared to 0.276).

The lower panel in Table 2 presented the estimated coefficients, standard errors and *P*-values of the null hypothesis that the individual parameters are equal to zero and the short- and long-run elasticities for the non-linear models. On the basis of R^2 the non-linear models are preferred, accounting for up to 78 per cent of the variation in the quantity of water demanded. All of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level of significance and conform to *a priori* expectations. The short-run price elasticity of demand across all households is -0.507 indicating that a 10 per cent increase in the price of water is associated with a 5.07 per cent decrease in the quantity of water demanded, whereas the long-run price elasticity of demand is -1.167 suggesting a 10 per cent increase in price is associated with an 11.67 per cent decrease in the quantity of water demanded. The long-run price elasticity of demand is again more elastic than the short-run. The income elasticity of demand of 0.235 suggests that a 10 per cent increase in income is associated with a 2.35 per cent increase in the quantity of water demanded.

The price and income elasticities of demand are again lower for renter households when compared to that of owner-occupied households. The difference in price elasticity between owner-occupied and renter households is unsurprising. Under the Queensland *Residential Tenancies Act 1994*, tenants are entitled to a free allocation of a 'reasonable' amount of water by their landlords, after which negotiations are necessary to resolve payment. In practice, the benchmark for reasonableness set by the Brisbane City Council is 90 kL per quarter, well above the average household consumption. As the transaction and enforcement costs of negotiation is likely to be large relative to the benefits (the variable component of water bills for rental households in the sample averaged just \$A49.74), the potential reimbursement of 'unreasonable' water expense is unlikely.

6. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations

The present study uses linear and non-linear regression techniques to model household residential water demand. The data are drawn from the Brisbane City Council, Australia's largest local government area, where two-part tariffs consisting of a fixed access charge with no free entitlement of water and a constant volumetric charge per kilolitre are in place. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first attempt to derive formal models of household water demand in Queensland, and one of few conducted in Australia. This represents a sizeable advance over projects of a similar nature conducted in Australia, including IPART (2003), Essential Services Commission of Victoria (2004), and Government Prices Oversight Commission Tasmania (2003a,b), which have tended to rely on relatively simple comparisons between changes in water-pricing structures and changes in water consumption to formulate policy.

The most important finding is that the short-run price elasticity of demand, although inelastic, is larger than previously thought. The price elasticity of demand is also more elastic in the long run than in the short run. This implies that the price mechanism can be an effective tool for managing the demand and consumption of residential water. It also suggests that there is a lag between changes in water prices and their eventual impact on the quantity demanded. Depending upon the model specified, a 10 per cent increase in the price of water is associated with a reduction in the quantity demanded of about 5 per cent. In other terms, a price rise of just \$0.08 per kilolitre would have prevented Brisbane household water consumption trending upwards by 580 L per household over the period 1998–2003. This would amount to water saving of 789 000 kL per year across Brisbane.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to comment on the effectiveness of price relative to non-price controls, including public education campaigns and water restrictions, as most programs of this type had been in place and unchanged during the period under consideration. However, evidence elsewhere suggests that constraints placed on discretionary water use (gardening, car washing, filling/topping up of swimming pools) can have an equal, if not more sizeable, impact on water demand. In the current analysis, the number of rainy days has a major impact on residential water demand through discretionary consumption (i.e., garden irrigation) and this implies that restrictions on irrigation and outside use are likely to be effective demand management strategies. A second finding is that the price elasticity of demand is lower for renter households than owner-occupied households. One likely reason is that under current tenancy legislation renter households in Queensland are only obliged to pay for 'excess' water usage and this obscures, contrary to all economic principles regarding pricing transparency, the marginal cost of water consumption in these households. This is a clear omission in the legislation.

The final finding is that factors beyond the control of water authorities also have an influence on residential water demand. That is, there is a significant increase in water demand in summer months, this is only partially moderated

by a fall on rainy days, and made worse with a rise on warm days. When combined with strong population growth and the continuing fall in average household size in south-eastern Queensland, the (in-sample) trending upwards of warm days (by 1 day per quarter every 16 years) and downwards in rainy days (by 1 day per quarter every 3 years) suggests that residential water demand in Brisbane will continue to grow. This highlights the need for efficient and effective demand-side management strategies in conjunction with improvements in water-related infrastructure.

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