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## NE. 165

## PRIVATE STRATEGIES, PUBLIC POLICIES \& FOOD SYSTEM PERFORMANCE $\lrcorner$

Estimating Brand Level Demand Elasticities and Measurin
Market Power for Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks

## by

Glenn E. Langan* and Ronald W. Cotterill*

## WP - 42

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## WORKING PAPER SERIES

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# Estimating Brand Level Demand Elasticities and Measuring Market Power for Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks 

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#### Abstract

This paper reports econometric estimation of brand level demand (AIDS) elasticities for regular carbonated soft drinks using Information Resources, Inc. panel data. Own and cross price elasticities are used to measure actual and hypothetical market power that would arise from potential mergers or collusive pricing arrangements.


## Introduction

Industrial organization economists have long appreciated the fact that brand level elasticities of demand have something to say about market power in differentiated product industries. The first major empirical effort in this area were the papers by Baker and Bresnahan during the 1980s (Baker and Bresnahan 1985, 1987). Baker and Bresnahan proposed a residual demand analysis framework. Within that framework they estimated residual demand elasticities for particular products in a differentiated product industry (beer). They were thus able to analyze own and cross price elasticities between two or three key products of interest, in this case Anheuser-Busch, Coors and Pabst beer, to determine the impact of a hypothetical merger upon prices and profits.

In this paper we propose to go beyond the residual demand framework to estimate the complete set of brand level demand own and cross price elasticities. Using Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) data for regular carbonated soft drinks for the period 1988 through 1990 we are able to construct a balanced panel data set that allows us to estimate own and cross price elasticities for eight carbonated soft drink brands and private label soft drinks. The demand framework that we will use is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). This framework is particularly useful for researchers with an industrial organization perspective because it uses as a dependent variable market share. The hypothesis within the demand framework is that there is a negative relationship between market share and price and this, in fact, measures a demand relationship ${ }^{1}$.

[^0]The next section of this paper briefly presents the AIDS model that is used in the analysis. The third section discusses the variables used, relevant econometric issues, and empirical results. The fourth section, a discussion of related market power issues, is followed by conclusions.

## The AIDS Model and Description of Data

The AIDS was developed by Deaton and Muellbauer out of a desire to increase the quality and ease of modeling consumer demand. The AIDS uses the following expenditure function:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log c(u, p)=(1-u) \log a(p)+u \log b(p), \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $u$ and $p$ represent utility and prices, respectively. This expenditure function indirectly (via duality) represents a class of price-independent, generalized linear preferences (PIGLOG) which allow for exact aggregation over consumers. Flexible functional forms are chosen for log $a(\boldsymbol{p})$ and $\log b(\boldsymbol{p})$ such that the expenditure function can be written as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log c(u, p)=\alpha_{0}+\sum_{k} \alpha_{k} \log p_{k}+\frac{1}{2} \sum_{k} \sum_{j} \gamma_{k j}^{*} \log p_{k} \log p_{j}+u \beta_{0} \prod_{k} p_{k}^{\beta_{k}} . \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Equation (2) is homogeneous of degree 1 in $\mathbf{p}$, as theory requires, as long as

$$
\sum_{i} \alpha_{i}=1, \sum_{j} \gamma_{k j}^{*}=\sum_{k} \gamma_{k j}^{*}=\sum_{j} \beta_{j}=0 .
$$

Taking the logarithmic differentiation of (2), applying Shepherd's lemma, and substituting for $\mathbf{u}$ in terms of $\mathbf{p}$ and expenditures ( $\mathbf{x}$ ) results in the following AIDS demand functions:

$$
\begin{equation*}
w_{i}=\alpha_{i}+\sum_{j} \gamma_{i j} \log p_{j}+\beta_{i} \log (x / P) \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $w_{i}$ represents budget shares and $\log \mathrm{P}$ equals

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log P=\alpha_{0}+\sum_{k} \alpha_{k} \log p_{k}+\frac{1}{2} \sum_{j} \sum_{k} \gamma_{k j} \log p_{k} \log p_{j} . \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

In most applications linearly approximated AIDS models (LA/AIDS) are used (e.g., Wessels and Wilen, 1992) in which the log of the price index is approximated by summing the products of budget shares and respective logged prices as represented by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log P=\sum_{i} w_{i} \log p_{i} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

The AIDS model conveniently allows for imposition of restrictions; namely, adding-up,

$$
\sum_{i} \alpha_{i}=1, \quad \sum_{i} \gamma_{i j}=0, \quad \sum_{i} \beta_{i}=0
$$

homogeneity,

$$
\sum_{j} \gamma_{i j}=0
$$

and symmetry,

$$
\gamma_{i j}=\gamma_{j i}
$$

The adding-up restriction is guaranteed by construction of the data, i.e. the sum of the budget shares of all the goods must equal one. Homogeneity and symmetry can both be tested by comparing the results of the restricted model with that of the unrestricted model. Restrictions cannot be imposed to guarantee the remaining general restriction of demand equations, i.e. nonpositivity of the substitution effect, but this can be checked by examining the eigenvalues of the Slutsky matrix (Deaton and Muellbauer).

The estimated coefficients on the price variables indicate the effect on budget shares (multiplied by 100 ) of a one percent change in the price of a given good, assuming $(\mathrm{x} / \mathrm{P})$ is held constant. The effect of changes in real expenditures on budget shares is indicated by the
coefficient on ( $\mathrm{x} / \mathrm{P}$ ). A coefficient greater than zero implies a luxury good, whereas necessities are associated with a negative coefficient.

## Econometric Estimation and Empirical Results

The demand for nine regular carbonated soft drink groups, namely Coca Cola, Pepsi, RC, Sprite, 7 Up, Dr. Pepper, and Mountain Dew, a combined "All Other" brand, and a combined private label brand is analyzed using the LA/AIDS. Data on prices, quantities sold, and some promotional activities were obtained through IRI. IRI collects data by electronically recording the food purchases of customers at several thousand supermarket stores across the nation over time. The data is then averaged for a given geographic market. Data used in this paper is on a quarterly basis for the years 1988 through 1990 for 45 metropolitan areas. IRI data is supplemented with relevant data (e.g. population, temperature) for these same marketing areas from other sources.

In order to account for the panel structure of our data an error components or random effects model was used for econometric estimation (Judge, et al. p. 475; SHAZAM). The error components approach used for the study allows the disturbance term to consist of random and cross sectional components. A plot of residuals over time suggested no clear pattern. Hence, time binaries were not factored into the error components computations. The error components approach incorporates information from cross section binaries into the final parameter estimates but are not reported in the final regressions, thus economizing on variables and making the interpretation of regression results more manageable.

Brand prices are endogenous variables in a differentiated product industry. Therefore, a three-stage least squares estimation technique was used to reflect this endogeneity and to take advantage of information in the error variance-covariance matrix of the system of equations.

A system of 17 equations are estimated in which the first eight equations are the AIDS share equations and the remaining nine equations regress brand prices on a host of variables, including other brand prices. An illustration of the system of equations is provided in figure 1. Tables 1 and 2 provide a list of variables and descriptive statistics for variables used in the study.

Coke, Pepsi and All Other brands dominate the budget shares with each having approximately a quarter of total share. Dr. Pepper and Mountain Dew are at the high end of the price range, whereas Private Label, as expected, and RC are at the low end. The larger share soft drinks are associated with moderate prices. Private label brands have noticeably higher units per volume than other brands, suggesting that they market primarily small containers (probably 12 ounce cans).

The percent of volume sold associated with Sunday newspaper feature ads ranges from 6.44 percent (RC) to 13.95 percent (Mountain Dew). A much greater percent of volume sold is associated with supermarket aisle displays with a range between 29.6 percent (All Other) to 68.56 percent (Coke). Coke and Pepsi apparently flex their marketing muscles in this form of promotional activity. These two brands also dominate in terms of national advertising. The leading nationally advertised brand was either Coke or Pepsi in each time period of the study.

Temperature, Supermarket to Grocery Sales ratio, Market CR4, Sweetner, and Population are all variables that do not vary by brand but generally vary by cross section and over time. The captivity variables reflect whether the Coca Cola or Pepsi companies own the bottling company for their brands in a given market. Other than the Coca Cola and Pepsi brands this variable is only relevant for Sprite (Coca Cola Co.) and Mountain Dew (Pepsi Co.).

The All Other brand was not included in the initial estimation in order to avoid a singular matrix problem. This problem occurs because of the relationship between the adding-
up feature of budget shares and the constant term. The coefficients for "All Other" are obtained after estimation by using the adding-up conditions.

Regression results are presented in table 3. Own price coefficients are significantly negative for most brands. Cross price coefficients are symmetric due to the imposition of symmetry restrictions. In the Coke equation we observe a positive cross price effect with Sprite. The result for the Sprite brand, owned by the Coca Cola company, may be due to complementary positioning of this brand vis $a$ vis the Coke brand. This complementary positioning does not occur in the case of Pepsi and Mountain Dew (both owned by PepsiCo, Inc.). Positive cross price effects on Pepsi shares are found for all brands.

Own and cross price elasticities are presented in table 4. For each brand the own price elasticities are negative and significant. Cross price elasticities suggest the presence of both substitution and complementarity among soft drinks.

## Measuring Market Power

The data found in table 4 is a rich source of information for economic analysis. For example, one can estimate the impact of market power and collusive pricing among firms by examining own and cross price elasticities. Let us use 1988 data (IRI) for Coke as an example. At an average price of $\$ 3.73$ Coca Cola sold 338.7 million 192-ounce units of Coke nationwide. The Coca Cola company profit margin was 12.4 percent in 1988 (Tollison et al. p. 34). Assuming that rate holds for the Coke brand profits in 1988 are $\$ 155.8$ million. This is shown as areas A and B in figure 2a. If Coke raises its price by ten percent to $\$ 4.10$ the quantity demanded decreases, ceteris paribus, by 14.96 percent ( 50.7 million units) as suggested by Coke's own price elasticity figure of -1.496 . Coke's profit is now $\$ 239.0$ million and appears as areas A and C. In this case Coke exhibits power underneath its demand curve because higher prices lead to higher profits.

If we consider a hypothesized fully collusive pricing arrangement between Coke and Pepsi (each raise price 10 percent) we must now factor in the cross price elasticity between Coke and Pepsi which is 0.355 . The impact of the joint pricing arrangement will decrease Coke's elasticity measure by the amount of the positive cross price elasticity, from -1.496 to -1.141 . A ten percent price increase will result in a quantity demanded of 300.1 million units as compared to 288.0 million. Coca Cola's demand curve becomes steeper and its profitability (area D in figure 2 b ) increases to $\$ 249.1$ million as a result of the collusive arrangement.

The Coke demand curve becomes steeper as more Coke substitutes are included in the collusive pricing arrangement. If Coke colludes on price with all non-Coca Cola brands the net elasticity for Coke is -1.073 . A ten percent price increase results in 302.4 million units demanded and profitability of $\$ 251.0$ million (area E in figure 2 c ).

The change in profitability between collusive and noncollusive pricing arrangements is not as large as one might expect. It suggests that nearly all of Coke's market power is unilateral and not coordinated market power. We should also note that the calculated profitability change is only with respect to Coke's profits and does not include the changes in the other brands' profits. Tacit collusion may benefit less dominant brands more than Coke. Finally, we continue to explore the sensitivity of our results to model specification.

Table 5 indicates that many soft drink prices, especially Coke and Pepsi prices, are highly correlated. These high correlations do not confirm the existence of collusive pricing but do suggest that the possibility exists and points to a need for further investigation.

## Conclusions

IRI data and demand theory provide powerful insights into the marketing strategies of individual branded products. One can estimate demand elasticities and use these to measure
actual market power and hypothetical market power that would arise from particular mergers, collusive pricing or other marketing strategies.

As research limitations, such as availability of brand level data and theoretical shortcomings, are reduced greater insights will be achieved. Equipped with better tools industrial organization economists will better understand how markets work.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Shr } r_{\text {Coke }}=\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1} P_{\text {Coke }}+\alpha_{2} P_{\text {Pepsi }}+\alpha_{3} P_{R C}+\alpha_{4} P_{\text {Sprite }}+\alpha_{5} P_{7 U_{p}}+\alpha_{6} P_{\text {DrPep }} \\
& +\alpha_{7} P_{\text {MtDew }}+\alpha_{8} P_{\text {PrivLab }}+\alpha_{9} P_{\text {Allother }}+\alpha_{10} \text { ExpenditureX }+\alpha_{11} \text { Feature }_{\text {Coke }} \\
& +\alpha_{12} \text { Display }_{\text {Coke }}+\alpha_{13} \text { RelTVAdv }_{\text {Coke }}+\alpha_{14} \text { Temperature } \\
& \text { Shr } r_{\text {Pepsi }}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} P_{\text {Coke }}+\beta_{2} P_{\text {Pepsi }}+\beta_{3} P_{R C}+\beta_{4} P_{\text {Sprite }}+\beta_{5} P_{7 U_{P}}+\beta_{6} P_{\text {DrPep }} \\
& +\beta_{7} P_{\text {MtDew }}+\beta_{8} P_{\text {PrivLab }}+\beta_{9} P_{\text {Allother }}+\beta_{10} \text { ExpenditureX }+\beta_{11} \text { Feature }_{\text {Pepsi }} \\
& +\beta_{12} \text { Display }_{\text {Pepsi }}+\beta_{13} \text { RelTVAdv }_{\text {Pepsi }}+\beta_{14} \text { Temperature } \\
& \text { Shr } r_{R C}=\gamma_{0}+\gamma_{1} P_{\text {Coke }}+\gamma_{2} P_{\text {Pepsi }}+\gamma_{3} P_{R C}+\gamma_{4} P_{\text {Sprite }}+\gamma_{5} P_{\text {7Up }}+\gamma_{6} P_{\text {DrPep }} \\
& +\gamma_{7} P_{\text {MtDew }}+\gamma_{8} P_{\text {PrivLab }}+\gamma_{9} P_{\text {Allother }}+\gamma_{10} \text { ExpenditureX }+\gamma_{11} \text { Feature }_{R C} \\
& +\gamma_{12} \text { Display }_{R C}+\gamma_{13} \text { RelTVAd }_{R C}+\gamma_{14} \text { Temperature }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& {\left[\text { Shr }{ }_{\text {Allother }}=\delta_{0}+\delta_{1} P_{\text {Coke }}+\delta_{2} P_{\text {Pepsi }}+\delta_{3} P_{R C}+\delta_{4} P_{\text {Sprite }}+\delta_{5} P_{\text {7UP }}+\delta_{6} P_{\text {DrPep }}\right.} \\
& +\delta_{7} P_{\text {MiDew }}+\delta_{8} P_{\text {PrivLab }}+\delta_{9} P_{\text {Allother }}+\delta_{10} \text { ExpenditureX }+\delta_{11} \text { Feature }_{\text {Allother }} \\
& \left.+\delta_{12} \text { Display }_{\text {Allother }}+\delta_{13} \text { RelTVAdv }_{\text {Allother }}+\delta_{14} \text { Temperature }\right] \\
& P_{\text {Coke }}=\kappa_{0}+\kappa_{1} S h r_{\text {Coke }}+\kappa_{2} P_{\text {Pepsi }}+\kappa_{3} P_{R C}+\kappa_{4} P_{\text {Sprite }}+\kappa_{5} P_{7 U_{p}}+\kappa_{6} P_{\text {DrPep }}+\kappa_{7} P_{\text {MtDew }} \\
& +\kappa_{8} P_{\text {PrivLab }}+\kappa_{9} P_{\text {Allother }}+\kappa_{10} \text { ExpenditureX }+\kappa_{11} \text { Temperature }+\kappa_{12} \text { Feature }_{\text {Coke }} \\
& +\kappa_{13} \text { Display }{ }_{\text {Coke }}+\kappa_{14} \text { Unit/Vol } \text { Coke }+\kappa_{15} \text { RelTVAdv }{ }_{\text {Coke }}+\kappa_{16} \text { SupMkt/GrocSale } \\
& +\kappa_{17} \text { MktCR4 }+\kappa_{18} \text { Population }+\kappa_{19} \text { Sweetner }+\kappa_{20} \text { CokeCaptive }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
P_{\text {Pepsi }}=\lambda_{0} & +\lambda_{1} \text { Shr } r_{\text {Pepsi }}+\lambda_{2} P_{\text {Coke }}+\lambda_{3} P_{R C}+\lambda_{4} P_{\text {Sprite }}+\lambda_{5} P_{7 U_{p}}+\lambda_{6} P_{\text {DrPep }}+\lambda_{7} P_{\text {MtDew }} \\
& +\lambda_{8} P_{\text {PrivLab }}+\lambda_{9} P_{\text {Allother }}+\lambda_{10} \text { ExpenditureX }+\lambda_{11} \text { Temperature }+\lambda_{12} \text { Feature }_{\text {Pepsi }} \\
& +\lambda_{13} \text { Display } \\
& +\lambda_{17} \text { MktCepsi }+\lambda_{14} \text { Unit/Vol } 4+\lambda_{18} \text { Population }+\lambda_{\text {Pepsi }}+\lambda_{15} \text { RelTVeetner }+\lambda_{20} \text { PepsiCaptive }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{R C}=\psi_{0}+\psi_{1} S h r_{R C}+\psi_{2} P_{\text {Coke }}+\psi_{3} P_{\text {Pepsi }}+\psi_{4} P_{\text {Sprite }}+\psi_{5} P_{7 U_{p}}+\psi_{6} P_{\text {DrPep }}+\psi_{7} P_{M t D e w} \\
& +\psi_{8} P_{\text {PrivLab }}+\psi_{9} P_{\text {Allother }}+\psi_{10} \text { ExpenditureX }+\psi_{11} \text { Temperature }+\psi_{12} \text { Feature }_{R C} \\
& +\psi_{13} \text { Display }_{R C}+\psi_{14} \text { Unit/Vol }_{R C}+\psi_{15} \text { RelTVAdv }_{R C}+\psi_{16} \text { SupMkt/GrocSale } \\
& +\Psi_{17} \text { MktCR } 4+\Psi_{18} \text { Population }+\psi_{19} \text { Sweetner }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
P_{\text {Allother }}=\omega_{0} & +\omega_{1} \text { Shr }_{\text {Allother }}+\omega_{2} P_{\text {Coke }}+\omega_{3} P_{\text {Pepsi }}+\omega_{4} P_{R C}+\omega_{5} P_{\text {Sprite }}+\omega_{6} P_{7 U_{p}}+\omega_{7} P_{\text {DrPep }} \\
& +\omega_{8} P_{\text {MtDew }}+\omega_{9} P_{\text {PrivLab }}+\omega_{10} \text { ExpenditureX }+\omega_{11} \text { Temperature }+\omega_{12} \text { Feature }_{\text {Allother }} \\
& +\omega_{13} \text { Display } \\
& +\omega_{17} \text { MktILther }+\omega_{14} \text { Unit/Vol } 4+\omega_{18} \text { Populhation }+\omega_{19} \text { Sweetner }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Table 1. Description of Variables and Related Notes

| $S h r_{\text {Coke }}$ | the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on Coca Cola |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $S h r_{\text {Pepsi }}$ | $"$ | $"$ | $"$ | Pepsi |
| $S h r_{\text {RC }}$ | $"$ | $"$ | $"$ | RC |
| $S h r_{\text {Sprite }}$ | $"$ | $"$ | $"$ | Sprite |
| $S h r_{\text {IUP }}$ | $"$ | $"$ | $"$ | 7 Up |
| $S h r_{\text {Drpep }}$ | $"$ | $"$ | $"$ | Dr Pepper |
| $S h r_{\text {MLDew }}$ | $"$ | $"$ | $"$ | Mountain Dew |
| $S h r_{\text {PrivLab }}$ | $"$ | $"$ | $"$ | Private Label |
| $S h r_{\text {Aloother }}$ | $"$ | $"$ | All Other Brands |  |

P-
natural $\log$ of price of $\qquad$ brand

ExpenditureX natural $\log$ of (regular carbonated soft drink expenditures divided by a price index*)
Feature _ percent of ___brand's volume sold with feature advertising
Display_ percent of brand's volume sold with displays and point of purchase promotions Unit/Vol_ number of units of __brand divided by the volume sold of __ brand RelTVA _ _ _ brand's national TV advertising as a percent of the leader

Temperature mean temperature in local market for a given quarter
SupMkt/GrocSale the percentage of all grocery sales in local market made by supermarkets MktCR4 percentage of all grocery sales in local market made by top 4 grocery chains Sweetner price of most frequently used sweetner during study period (high fructose corn syrup) Population CokeCaptive population in local market PepsiCaptive binary variable to indicate a Pepsi Co.-owned bottler for the local market

[^1]Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | Mean | St.Dev. | Variance | Min | Max | Variable | Mean | St.Dev. | Variance | Min | Max |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Share: |  |  |  |  |  | Displays: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coke | 0.249 | 0.0831 | 0.0069 | 0.104 | 0.496 | Coke | 68.56 | 10.725 | 115.03 | 33.70 | 92.29 |
| Pepsi | 0.244 | 0.0616 | 0.0038 | 0.089 | 0.386 | Pepsi | 68.43 | 10.238 | 104.81 | 32.27 | 91.95 |
| RC | 0.020 | 0.0148 | 0.0002 | 0.001 | 0.085 | RC | 44.86 | 20.404 | 416.32 | 0.00 | 88.42 |
| Sprite | 0.040 | 0.0138 | 0.0002 | 0.015 | 0.095 | Sprite | 54.61 | 14.141 | 199.97 | 12.64 | 89.75 |
| 7-Up | 0.052 | 0.0248 | 0.0006 | 0.015 | 0.141 | 7-Up | 46.55 | 15.084 | 227.54 | 4.58 | 80.63 |
| DrPep | 0.038 | 0.0349 | 0.0012 | 0.003 | 0.217 | DrPep | 37.64 | 20.429 | 417.36 | 0.00 | 85.23 |
| MtDew | 0.031 | 0.0233 | 0.0005 | 0.005 | 0.111 | MtDew | 39.44 | 21.422 | 458.88 | 0.10 | 85.15 |
| PrivLab | 0.076 | 0.0464 | 0.0022 | 0.002 | 0.264 | PrivLab | 29.80 | 14.079 | 198.21 | 1.09 | 68.57 |
| AllOthr | 0.250 | 0.0702 | 0.0049 | 0.107 | 0.450 | AllOthr | 29.63 | 9.459 | 89.47 | 9.48 | 56.54 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Relative Natio |  |  |  |  |  |
| Price: |  |  |  |  |  | Advertising: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coke | 3.72 | 0.3072 | 0.0943 | 2.80 | 4.93 | Coke | 0.897 | 0.1515 | 0.0229 | 0.557 | 1.000 |
| Pepsi | 3.66 | 0.3826 | 0.1464 | 2.67 | 5.46 | Pepsi | 0.843 | 0.1962 | 0.0385 | 0.486 | 1.000 |
| RC | 3.30 | 0.4187 | 0.1753 | 2.25 | 5.14 | RC | 0.046 | 0.0426 | 0.0018 | 0.003 | 0.119 |
| Sprite | 3.63 | 0.3130 | 0.0980 | 2.79 | 4.92 | Sprite | 0.314 | 0.1488 | 0.0221 | 0.028 | 0.505 |
| 7-Up | 3.79 | 0.3593 | 0.1291 | 2.85 | 5.05 | 7-Up | 0.298 | 0.1644 | 0.0270 | 0.095 | 0.567 |
| DrPep | 3.99 | 0.4245 | 0.1802 | 2.85 | 5.36 | DrPep | 0.252 | 0.1348 | 0.0182 | 0.013 | 0.481 |
| MtDew | 3.93 | 0.4210 | 0.1773 | 2.86 | 5.32 | MtDew | 0.071 | 0.0536 | 0.0029 | 0.001 | 0.185 |
| PrivLab | 2.34 | 0.2516 | 0.0633 | 1.66 | 3.19 | PrivLab | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---- |
| AllOthr | 3.60 | 0.4019 | 0.1615 | 2.10 | 5.01 | AllOthr | 0.015 | 0.0075 | 0.0001 | 0.006 | 0.032 |
| Feature Ads: |  |  |  |  |  | Units per Volu |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coke | 6.99 | 4.999 | 24.987 | 0.26 | 31.84 | Coke | 2.26 | 0.330 | 0.1090 | 1.16 | 2.84 |
| Pepsi | 7.30 | 5.278 | 27.862 | 0.34 | 40.47 | Pepsi | 2.25 | 0.333 | 0.1107 | 1.10 | 2.87 |
| RC | 6.44 | 6.792 | 46.133 | 0.00 | 38.31 | RC | 2.47 | 0.363 | 0.1321 | 1.29 | 3.78 |
| Sprite | 12.08 | 7.253 | 52.606 | 0.61 | 44.23 | Sprite | 2.35 | 0.275 | 0.0756 | 1.43 | 3.35 |
| 7-Up | 7.37 | 5.981 | 35.768 | 0.00 | 29.54 | 7-Up | 2.52 | 0.250 | 0.0627 | 1.49 | 3.28 |
| DrPep | 8.48 | 7.476 | 55.897 | 0.00 | 41.98 | DrPep | 2.36 | 0.289 | 0.0838 | 1.27 | 2.82 |
| MtDew | 13.95 | 9.157 | 83.847 | 0.00 | 60.82 | MtDew | 2.28 | 0.342 | 0.1171 | 1.09 | 2.85 |
| PrivLab | 11.98 | 9.018 | 81.324 | 0.00 | 55.30 | PrivLab | 5.70 | 2.142 | 4.5894 | 2.73 | 13.24 |
| AllOthr | 12.63 | 6.395 | 40.894 | 0.91 | 42.48 | AllOthr | 3.61 | 0.836 | 0.6995 | 2.17 | 7.10 |
| ExpenditureX | 4.45 | 0.928 | 0.862 | 2.48 | 7.57 | Sweetner: | 20.73 | 3.092 | 9.56 | 14.40 | 25.50 |
| Temperature: | 58.09 | 15.605 | 243.52 | 18.80 | 91.64 | Population: | $3.1 \mathrm{E}+6$ | $2.9 \mathrm{E}+6$ | $8.4 \mathrm{E}+12$ | $6.8 \mathrm{E}+5$ | $1.6 \mathrm{E}+7$ |
| SpMkt/GrcSale: | 77.17 | 5.977 | 35.72 | 64.50 | 95.30 | CokeCaptive: | 0.437 | 0.496 | 0.246 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Market CR4: | 62.86 | 13.580 | 184.41 | 23.90 | 88.10 | PepsiCaptive: | 0.522 | 0.500 | 0.250 | 0.0 | 1.0 |

Table 3. Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) Estimation Results: Error Components Model (3SLS) with Homogeneity and Symmetry Restrictions.

*Coefficients for All Other category were obtained by using the adding-up condition of the AIDS model.

Table 4. Own and Cross Price Elasticities for Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks ${ }^{1}$

|  | Coke | Pepsi | RC | Sprite | 7Up | DrPep | MtDew | PrivLab | AllOther |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Coke | -1.496** | $0.355^{*}$ | $0.063^{+}$ | -0.090** | $0.078{ }^{+}$ | -0.009 | -0.021 | 0.031 | 0.016 |
| Pepsi | $0.353^{*}$ | -1.868* | 0.009 | $0.052^{+}$ | $0.120^{*}$ | 0.102** | $0.076{ }^{+}$ | -0.002 | 0.049 |
| RC | $0.909^{*}$ | 0.251 | $-2.508^{\prime \prime}$ | 0.205 | $0.457{ }^{+}$ | -0.121 | $0.394^{+}$ | -0.758** | $0.636^{*}$ |
| Sprite | -0.555** | $0.338^{+}$ | 0.095 | -1.248* | 0.051 | -0.015 | 0.047 | $0.151^{\circ}$ | 0.108 |
| 7Up | $0.440^{\circ}$ | $0.637^{*}$ | $0.172^{+}$ | 0.048 | -1.881* | -0.015 | -0.083 | -0.190 | 0.077 |
| DrPep | -0.032 | $0.685^{*}$ | -0.073 | -0.013 | -0.030 | -1.453** | -0.313 ${ }^{\circ}$ | 0.131 | 0.125 |
| MtDew | -0.186 | $0.598^{+}$ | $0.247^{+}$ | 0.056 | -0.158 | $-0.393^{\circ}$ | -1.307** | $0.183^{\circ}$ | $-0.179^{*}$ |
| PrivLab | 0.163 | 0.062 | -0.207** | $0.086{ }^{\text {a }}$ | -0.132 ${ }^{\circ}$ | $0.071^{+}$ | $0.083^{\prime \prime}$ | -0.918" | -0.037 |
| AllOther ${ }^{2}$ | 0.050 | $0.090^{\circ}$ | $0.044^{*}$ | $0.021^{+}$ | 0.009 | $0.020^{+}$ | -0.016 | -0.020 | -1.134" |

${ }^{1}$ Elasticities are read from left to right;
$"=1 \%$ significance level

- $=5 \%$ significance level
$+=10 \%$ significance level
${ }^{2} t$ statistics for "All Other" are approximated in that covariances between expenditure and price coefficients are not accounted for in calculating standard errors of the elasticities. These approximations are reasonable because the covariances between expenditure and price coefficients for the other brands are quite small (the significance levels in these other equations do not change if these covariances are excluded in the calculation of the standard errors of the elasticities).

Source: University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center; Computations from IRI Infoscan data base.


Figure 2. Coke profitability under different collusive arrangements

Table 5. Correlation Matrix of Regular Carbonated Soft Drink Prices, 1988-1990

| Coke | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Pepsi | 0.815 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| RC | 0.437 | 0.458 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sprite | 0.794 | 0.652 | 0.364 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7-Up | 0.694 | 0.663 | 0.482 | 0.689 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| DrPep | 0.626 | 0.681 | 0.624 | 0.579 | 0.670 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |
| MtDew | 0.726 | 0.890 | 0.460 | 0.642 | 0.644 | 0.712 | 1.000 |  |  |  |
| PrivLab | 0.047 | 0.124 | 0.288 | 0.058 | 0.052 | 0.088 | 0.126 | 1.000 |  |  |
| AllOthr | 0.659 | 0.657 | 0.538 | 0.575 | 0.590 | 0.609 | 0.608 | 0.209 | 1.0000 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Coke | Pepsi | RC | Sprite | 7-Up | DrPep | MtDew PrivLab AllOthr |  |  |  |

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Considerable prior research on the relationship between market share and price has reported that a positive share price relationship exists and that it is evidence of the existence of market power. For manufactured food products see Wills (1985). Recent work by Cotterill and Haller (1994) resolves the apparent contradiction between these approaches explaining that the positive share price relationship is primarily an interfirm effect and that across local market and time for a particular brand the share price relationship is negative reflecting demand factors. Also see Haller (1994) for supporting evidence from the catsup industry.

[^1]:    ${ }^{\bullet}$ The price index $\left(P^{*}\right)$ used is Stone's linear approximate price index, $\ln P^{*}=\Sigma \operatorname{Shr} \cdot \ln P_{i}$.

