@article{Akerman:115848,
      recid = {115848},
      author = {Akerman, Anders and Larsson, Anna and Naghavi, Alireza},
      title = {Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of  Two Elites},
      address = {2011-09},
      number = {829-2016-55246},
      series = {ES},
      pages = {36},
      year = {2011},
      note = {Current version uploaded April 2013.},
      abstract = {This paper studies how comparative advantage and the  political elites endowments shape long-run performance in  an economy with imperfect political institutions. In a  capital-scarce
economy, an autocrat catering to the needs  of landowners favors openness to trade at an early stage of  development, while an autocrat complying with the  preferences of capitalists chooses to shelter the economy  from trade. The resulting trade regime interacts with  economic institutions, and with policies on capital  mobility, to govern capital accumulation. A landed autocrat  neglects to improve institutions and blocks foreign capital  to maximise extractable rents, leading the economy towards  stagnation. By contrast, a capitalist autocrat strengthens  the institutional quality, which over time shifts the  comparative advantage towards manufacturing and renders the  economy attractive to foreign investors. Trade and capital  market liberalisation are thus complementary policies that  provide an environment of growth and development in the  capital autocracy.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/115848},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.115848},
}