000010893 001__ 10893
000010893 005__ 20180122194118.0
000010893 037__ $$a1318-2016-103496
000010893 041__ $$aen
000010893 084__ $$aH21
000010893 084__ $$aH23
000010893 084__ $$aQ2
000010893 245__ $$aMarket Power and Output-Based Refunding of Environmental Policy Revenues
000010893 260__ $$c2003
000010893 269__ $$a2003
000010893 300__ $$a25
000010893 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000010893 446__ $$aEnglish
000010893 490__ $$aDiscussion Paper 03-27
000010893 520__ $$aOutput-based refunding of environmental policy revenues combines a tax on emissions with a subsidy to output. With imperfect competition, subsidies can discourage output underprovision. However, when market shares are significant, endogenous refunding suffers compared to a fixed subsidy. Refunding the emissions tax according to market share reduces the incentive to abate, and marginal abatement costs will not be equalized if market shares differ. In a Cournot duopoly, endogenous refunding leads to higher output, emissions, and possibly costs compared to a fixed rebate program. These results hold whether emission rates are determined simultaneously or strategically in a two-stage model.
000010893 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000010893 6531_ $$aemissions tax
000010893 6531_ $$aearmarking
000010893 6531_ $$atradable performance standards
000010893 6531_ $$aimperfect competition
000010893 6531_ $$aCournot
000010893 6531_ $$aduopoly
000010893 6531_ $$arefunding
000010893 6531_ $$asubsidy
000010893 700__ $$aFischer, Carolyn
000010893 8564_ $$s349839$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10893/files/dp030027.pdf
000010893 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/10893
000010893 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:10893$$pGLOBAL_SET
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  Previous issue date: 2003
000010893 982__ $$gResources for the Future>Discussion Papers
000010893 980__ $$a1318