@article{Bréchet:10270,
      recid = {10270},
      author = {Bréchet, Thierry and Gerard, Francois and Tulkens, Henry},
      title = {Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational  Appraisal},
      address = {2007},
      number = {826-2016-55115},
      series = {CCMP Nota di Lavoro 21.2007},
      pages = {26},
      year = {2007},
      abstract = {Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by  Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics  2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the  respective merits of two competing notions of coalition  stability in the standard global public goods model as  customarily applied to the climate change problem. After a  reminder of the model structure and of the definition of  the two game theoretical stability notions involved -  namely, core stability and internal-external stability, the  former property is shown to hold for the grand coalition in  the CWS model only if resource transfers of a specific form  between countries are introduced. It is further shown that  while the latter property holds neither for the grand  coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless  verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed  'potential internal stability') for most small coalitions.  The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely  the differing rationale that inspires the transfers in  either case. Finally, it is shown that the stable  coalitions that perform best (in terms of carbon  concentration and global welfare) are always composed of  both industrialized and developing countries. Two  sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of all these  results.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10270},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.10270},
}