000102502 001__ 102502
000102502 005__ 20210819132824.0
000102502 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.22004/ag.econ.102502
000102502 037__ $$a838-2016-55727
000102502 041__ $$aeng
000102502 084__ $$aC6
000102502 084__ $$aD0
000102502 245__ $$aOptimal Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Multi-cell Aquifers
000102502 260__ $$c2011-03
000102502 269__ $$a2011-03
000102502 270__ $$msheriff.glenn@epa.gov$$pSheriff,   Glenn
000102502 300__ $$a43
000102502 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000102502 490__ $$aSD
000102502 490__ $$a28.2011
000102502 520__ $$aStandard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we derive regulatory mechanisms for inducing the socially optimal extraction path in Markov perfect equilibrium for aquifers in which these assumptions do not hold. In spite of the complexity of the underlying system, we identify an interesting case in which a simple linear mechanism achieves the social optimum. To illustrate potential problems that can arise by erroneously imposing simplifying assumptions, we conduct a simulation based on data from the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.
000102502 546__ $$aEnglish
000102502 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000102502 6531_ $$aCommon Property Resource
000102502 6531_ $$aDifferential Games
000102502 6531_ $$aGroundwater Extraction
000102502 6531_ $$aImperfect Monitoring
000102502 6531_ $$aMarkov Perfect Equilibrium
000102502 700__ $$aAthanassoglou, Stergios
000102502 700__ $$aSheriff, Glenn
000102502 700__ $$aSiegfried, Tobias
000102502 700__ $$aTim Huh, Woonghee
000102502 8564_ $$91bb3a3bf-daed-498f-a4a5-a8f9c13c69cf$$s799256$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/102502/files/NDL2011-028.pdf
000102502 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/102502
000102502 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:102502$$pGLOBAL_SET
000102502 912__ $$nSubmitted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2011-04-11T13:28:13Z
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000102502 913__ $$aLicense granted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2011-04-11T13:24:33Z (GMT):

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000102502 980__ $$a838
000102502 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Sustainable Development Papers