@article{Fraser:100550,
      recid = {100550},
      author = {Fraser, Rob W.},
      title = {Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in  Agri-Environmental Policy},
      address = {2011},
      number = {422-2016-26965},
      pages = {18},
      year = {2011},
      abstract = {This paper extends the multi-period agri-environmental  contract model of Fraser (2004)
so that it contains a more  realistic specification of the inter-temporal penalties for  noncompliance,
and therefore of the inter-temporal moral  hazard problem in agri-environmental
policy design. On this  basis it is shown that a farmer will have an
unambiguous  preference for cheating early over cheating late in the  contract period based
on differences in the expected cost  of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can
make  use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring  resources intertemporally,
and in so doing, to encourage  full contract duration compliance.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/100550},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.100550},
}