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Abstract
The paper presents a political economy analysis of the present and
future CAP reform induced under different policy scenarios regarding
future EU enlargement and future WTO agreements. Theoretically,
the analysis is based on a political exchange model suggested
by HENNING (2000). Main results are: (i) Both present and future CAP
reforms are significantly biased by the political influence of farmers'
lobby. (ii) In quantitative terms an EU enlargement would induce a
much stronger shift in the future CAP when compared to increased
WTO restrictions. (iii) The timing of the reform is important, given
the fact that induced CAP reforms would be supported by a qualified
majority within the EU-15, but within the EU-25 these reforms would
be defeated by coalition of the new Eastern European member
states using their common veto-power. (iv) The majority of political
actors within the EU-15 including both politicians and interest
groups evaluate induced CAP reforms negatively in comparison to
the status quo, while from society’s perspective these imply a positive
shift of total economic welfare within EU-15.