000096841 001__ 96841
000096841 005__ 20171115172817.0
000096841 037__ $$a838-2016-55776
000096841 041__ $$aen
000096841 084__ $$aC78
000096841 084__ $$aD74
000096841 084__ $$aJ52
000096841 245__ $$aGroup Bargaining and Conflict
000096841 260__ $$c2010-11
000096841 269__ $$a2010-11
000096841 270__ $$mn.querou@qub.ac.uk$$pQuerou,   Nicolas
000096841 300__ $$a42
000096841 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000096841 490__ $$aSD
000096841 490__ $$a125.2010
000096841 520__ $$aWe consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative statics that highlight the influence of changes in the internal composition of groups and in their relative size on the profitability of negotiated agreements.
000096841 542__ $$fLicense granted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2010-11-19T08:40:19Z (GMT):

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000096841 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000096841 6531_ $$aBargaining
000096841 6531_ $$aConflict
000096841 6531_ $$aAgency Problem
000096841 700__ $$aQuerou, Nicolas
000096841 8564_ $$s362095$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96841/files/NDL2010-125.pdf
000096841 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/96841
000096841 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:96841$$qGLOBAL_SET
000096841 912__ $$nSubmitted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2010-11-19T08:42:51Z
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  Previous issue date: 2010-11
000096841 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Sustainable Development Papers
000096841 980__ $$a838