On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources

Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.


Issue Date:
2010
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/94619
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/94619
Total Pages:
26
JEL Codes:
Q25; C73; C61
Series Statement:
SD
101.2010




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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