Using the Law to Change the Custom

We build a simple model of legal dualism in which a pro-poor legal reform, under certain conditions, causes the conflicting custom to go some way toward producing the change intended by the legislator. It then acts as an "outside anchor" that exerts a "magnet effect" on the custom. We illustrate this insight using examples on inheritance, marriage, and divorce issues in Sub-Saharan Africa and India. We also characterize the conditions under which a moderate pro-poor reform is more effective than a radical reform.


Issue Date:
2010-06
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/90946
Total Pages:
43
JEL Codes:
K40; O17; D74
Series Statement:
GC
60.2010




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-25

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