Tariff-Rate Quotas, Rent-Shifting and the Selling of Domestic Access

Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) have replaced quotas at the end of the Uruguay Round. We analyze TRQs when a foreign firm competes against a domestic firm in the latter’s market. Our benchmark is the strategic rent-shifting tariff. We show that the domestic price-equivalent TRQ is a better instrument welfare-wise, as it can extract all of the rents from the foreign firm. We show that different pairs of within-quota tariff and quota can support full rent extraction. The implication is that reduction of the former and enlargement of the latter, holding the above-quota tariff constant, may have no liberalizing effects. The first-best TRQ and the strategic tariff generate different prices. When firms have identical and constant marginal cost, the first-best TRQ entails selling a subsidy to the foreign firm and forcing the exit of the domestic firm.


Issue Date:
May 19 2010
Publication Type:
Journal Article
DOI and Other Identifiers:
1496-5208 (Other)
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/90591
Published in:
Estey Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Volume 11, Number 1
Page range:
213-226
Total Pages:
14
Series Statement:
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy
Volume 11, Number 1, Winter 2010




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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