QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF CONSERVATION AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT

Building on available theory, this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed-price schemes only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions quickly lose their edge. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic.


Issue Date:
2007
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/7616
Total Pages:
11
Series Statement:
Conference Paper, 47th Annual Conference, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), Freising/Weihenstephan, Germany, September 26-28, 2007




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-23

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