000007485 001__ 7485
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000007485 037__ $$a1702-2016-139834
000007485 041__ $$aen
000007485 245__ $$aDemocracy, rent seeking, and growth: Is there a U curve?
000007485 260__ $$c1997
000007485 269__ $$a1997
000007485 300__ $$a42
000007485 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000007485 446__ $$aEnglish
000007485 490__ $$aBulletin Number 97-1
000007485 520__ $$aA simple two-sector endogenous growth model of government spending and growth is developed with a producing and a lobbying sector.  Lobbyists divert government spending for private gains.  One key innovation is this: With democratization, information (and power) becomes more diffused (public), allowing more lobbyists to lobby but reducing gains per lobbyist.  Thus, aggregate rents rise with the number of lobbyists but fall with increasing competition among them.  This simple mechanism produces a "U" curve in which growth falls with early democratization but rises later, and a related "inverted U" curve in which rents rise with early democratization but fall later.  Extensive empirical test of the interrelationship between growth, government spending, corruption (Proxy for rents) and democracy for 61 countries verify the key structural aspects of the model.
000007485 650__ $$aInternational Development
000007485 650__ $$aPolitical Economy
000007485 700__ $$aMohtadi, Hamid
000007485 700__ $$aRoe, Terry L.
000007485 8564_ $$s1661294$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7485/files/bu970001.pdf
000007485 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/7485
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  Previous issue date: 1997
000007485 982__ $$gUniversity of Minnesota>Economic Development Center>Bulletins
000007485 980__ $$a1702