000007446 001__ 7446
000007446 005__ 20181003052030.0
000007446 037__ $$a828-2016-55183
000007446 041__ $$aen
000007446 084__ $$aC61
000007446 084__ $$aC71
000007446 084__ $$aC78
000007446 245__ $$aA Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin
000007446 260__ $$c2007
000007446 269__ $$a2007
000007446 300__ $$a39
000007446 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000007446 446__ $$aEnglish
000007446 490__ $$aETA Nota di Lavoro 101.2007
000007446 520__ $$aThe objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players' strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players' objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.
000007446 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000007446 6531_ $$aBargaining
000007446 6531_ $$aNon-Cooperative Game Theory
000007446 6531_ $$aSimulation Models
000007446 6531_ $$aUncertainty
000007446 700__ $$aSgobbi, Alessandra
000007446 700__ $$aCarraro, Carlo
000007446 8564_ $$s310666$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7446/files/wp070101.pdf
000007446 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/7446
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  Previous issue date: 2007
000007446 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers
000007446 980__ $$a828