000007198 001__ 7198
000007198 005__ 20180122192823.0
000007198 037__ $$a1557-2016-132723
000007198 041__ $$aen
000007198 245__ $$aA Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach
000007198 260__ $$c1992
000007198 269__ $$a1992
000007198 300__ $$a47
000007198 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000007198 490__ $$aCUDARE Working Paper
000007198 490__ $$a620
000007198 520__ $$aThis paper extends the Stahl-Rubinstein model of bilateral bargaining to incorporate many players and multidimensional issue spaces. A central feature of our framework is that in each round of negotiations, a proposer is selected randomly. Our bargaining model consists of a sequence of finite-horizon games, in which the horizon increases without bound. A solution to our model is a limit of equilibrium outcomes for the finite horizon games. A necessary condition for existence of a deterministic solution is that the limit outcome belongs to the core of the underlying bargaining problem. Solutions, if they exist, are generically unique. Two sets of sufficiency conditions for existence are presented. The paper concludes with examples and applications. In particular, we consider bipolar negotiations between two factions, and show that there is a positive relationship
between the cohesiveness of one faction relative to the other and its effectiveness in securing the common goals to its members.
000007198 542__ $$fLicense granted by Louise Letnes (lletnes@umn.edu) on 2008-02-27T22:43:07Z (GMT):

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000007198 650__ $$aResearch Methods/ Statistical Methods
000007198 700__ $$aRausser, Gordon C.
000007198 700__ $$aSimon, Leo K.
000007198 8564_ $$s2723930$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7198/files/wp920620.pdf
000007198 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/7198
000007198 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.tind.io:7198$$pGLOBAL_SET
000007198 912__ $$nSubmitted by Louise Letnes (lletnes@umn.edu) on 2008-02-27T22:44:26Z
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  Previous issue date: 1992
000007198 982__ $$gUniversity of California, Berkeley>Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics>CUDARE Working Papers
000007198 980__ $$a1557