Statutory Rewards to Environmental Self-Auditing: Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs? Evidence from a Cross-State Panel

State-level statutes provide firms that engage in environmental self-audits, and that self-report their environmental violations, with a variety of different regulatory rewards, including "immunity" from penalties and "privilege" for information contained in self-audits. This paper studies a panel of State-level industries from 1989-2003, in order to determine the effects of the different statutes on toxic pollution and government inspections. We find that, by encouraging self-auditing, privilege and limited immunity protections tend to reduce pollution and government enforcement activity; however, more sweeping immunity protections, by reducing firms' pollution prevention incentives, raise toxic pollution and government inspection oversight.


Issue Date:
2008
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/6204
Total Pages:
37
Series Statement:
Selected Paper
467771




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-23

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