Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments

A number of agri-environmental conservation policies are faced with the problem of imperfect monitoring. This provides farmers an incentive for noncompliance, in which they receive subsidies without implementing the conservation scheme. In this article, bidding behaviors and auction performances are compared for discriminatory-price (DP) and uniform-price (UP) auction in an imperfect monitoring environment. Our laboratory experiments show that although DP has certain advantages in terms of reducing policy costs, UP results in a superior overall performance when compliance behavior is taken into account.


Issue Date:
May 01 2010
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
DOI and Other Identifiers:
10697 (Other)
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/61188
Total Pages:
2
JEL Codes:
C91; D44; Q24
Note:
Poster prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, 2010.
Series Statement:
Selected Poster
10697




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-25

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