SURE Impact? An Empirical Investigation of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Behavior

The Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) program, enacted under the 2008 Farm Bill, is intended to provide indemnity payments to producers whose crop losses exceed 50% of their historical average yields. However, indemnification does not require that the farm is located in a region designated a disaster relief area -- a provision that can create significant moral hazard incentives. This study is the first to perform an empirical analysis of possible moral hazard behavior in corn, soybean, and wheat markets in response to the SURE program. Results suggest that an increase in crop insurance demand after the enactment of SURE may be due to the program's moral hazard incentives.


Issue Date:
2010
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/61154
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/61154
Total Pages:
2
Series Statement:
Selected Poster
10991




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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