Coordenação vertical e contratos informais na agricultura irrigada: um estudo de caso com aplicação do modelo Tobit

The theory of contracts assumes that human nature is essentially opportunistic, and economic agents protect themselves against adverse selection and moral hazard by elaborating contracts. In the case of irrigated areas in the Brazilian northeast, such contracts are not necessarily formal. That is, arrangements based on economic agent’s word are common. The data used are from acerola producers in the Petrolina-Juazeiro irrigation project. The empirical model was tobit, given that the dependent variable was characterized by a truncated distribution. The results showed that the decision to engage on contractual relations is fundamentally defined by the degree of dependence of the farmer in respect to the processing industry. Furthermore, past experience of contractual relationship with the processing industry is a strong determinant of the individual’s behavior.


Variant title:
Vertical coordination and informal contracts in irrigated agriculture: a case study with application of Tobit model
Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Journal Article
DOI and Other Identifiers:
ISSN 1679-1614 (Other)
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/56813
Published in:
Revista de Economia e Agronegócio / Brazilian Review of Economics and Agribusiness, Volume 02, Number 1
Page range:
51-64
Total Pages:
13




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-11-15

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)