Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.


Issue Date:
2009-10
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/54365
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/54365
Total Pages:
28
JEL Codes:
C71; C72
Series Statement:
SD
83.2009




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)