CEO Compensation in Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms

A multiple activities principal-agent model regarding CEO compensation in cooperatives is presented, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and that they have to bring the enterprise to value as well as to serve member interests. A cooperative dominates a publicly listed firm in terms of efficiency when either activities are sufficiently complementary, or additional information is considered in the performance measure.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
2009
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/51619
Total Pages:
34
Series Statement:
Contributed Paper
474




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-25

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