Social Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism

Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented.


Issue Date:
Jul 18 2008
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/51132
Total Pages:
41
JEL Codes:
C91; C92; D64; D72; H41
Series Statement:
Working Paper
WP 2008-12




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-11-23

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