BARGAINING FOR EUROPEAN UNION FARM POLICY REFORM THROUGH U.S. PESTICIDE RESTRICTIONS

Future trade negotiations will incorporate environmental concerns. This study presents a framework to evaluate whether the United States would be willing to adopt a pesticide restriction in exchange for European Union liberalization of producer support. It outlines the conditions that must be met if a bargain is to occur. Partial equilibrium commodity models test whether the conditions for a bargaining solution are satisfied. The research results indicate that a potential bargain is possible for stricter U.S. environmental regulations in coarse grains if there is a sufficiently large positive EU externality. Conditions in the oilseed market preclude a bargain.


Issue Date:
1999-10
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31292
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/31292
Published in:
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Volume 28, Number 2
Page range:
137-146
Total Pages:
10




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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