A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TURKISH ACCESSION TO A EUROPEAN CUSTOMS UNION

The entrance of additional countries into a European customs union, in this case Turkey, and its impact on agriculture are examined. Results from a trade simulation model are used as components of a Political Preference Function and utilized within a game theoretic framework to identify the optimal strategies for Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. Turkey's best interest, from an agricultural perspective, involves adoption of agreements made in the Uruguay round of GATT as a developing country rather than applying EU protection. Although free trade is not the optimal solution, simulations indicate that the solution does involve the reduction of agricultural protection levels.


Issue Date:
1999-10
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31289
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/31289
Published in:
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Volume 28, Number 2
Page range:
147-157
Total Pages:
11




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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