Cooperative Mergers and Acquisitions: The Role of Capital Constraints

Several explanations for merger activity exist for publicly traded firms, but none consider the unique aspects of cooperatives. This study develops a test for the hypothesis that cooperative consolidation occurs primarily in response to capital constraints associated with a lack of access to external equity capital. An empirical model estimates the shadow value of long-term investment capital within a multinomial logit model of transaction choice in a panel data set of the 100 largest U.S. cooperatives. The results substantially confirm the capital-constraint hypothesis. Thus, the primary implication is that internal growth may be a more viable alternative to consolidation if new forms of cooperative financing are developed.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
2003-04
Publication Type:
Journal Article
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/30718
Published in:
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Volume 28, Number 1
Page range:
152-168
Total Pages:
17




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)