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ABSTRACT

This paper is about the field of development management (previously development administration) and its continuities with the processes of imperial rule known as colonial administration. Development administration/management represents itself as a subset of public administration/public sector management. However, this conceals its status as First World discourse about how the Third World should be managed. Moreover, while development management recognizes the continuity between itself and post-1945 development administration, its advocacy of participatory methodologies, the cause of the poor and the marginalized, and democratization are seen as new, and as implying a clear break with colonial/neo-colonialist administrative practice. This paper challenges this orthodoxy on the basis of three overlapping arguments. First, understandings of the benefits of participation presented by advocates of development management are naïve and fail to understand its potentialities as a control mechanism. Second the so called "governance agendas" of First World development agencies not only promote a particular, neo-liberal version of democratization, which includes the extension of the market vis-à-vis the state, and in their implementation replicate imperial power relations. Third the methods and rhetoric surrounding participation and empowerment themselves have colonial roots, and developed as a consequence of the late colonial approach to administration known as indirect rule. Thus, the paper concludes, while metaphors of colonization have been used to describe the development of management and organization theory there is also a more literal relationship between colonialism and management.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper

This paper is about the continuities between colonial administration, development administration, and development management. It begins, in this introduction by defining the terms imperialism and colonialism, and setting out a prima-facie case that these continuities exist. In section 2, ‘Development Administration Then?’, the paper looks at the how development administration defines itself, and its accounts of the ideas and practices associated with it as they have changed over time. This consideration of the orthodoxy culminates in section 3, ‘Development Management Now?’, in a review of the principles currently claimed underpinning development management. While generally accepted as a recent version of development administration, development management does make particular claims for distinctiveness in relation to participation and empowerment.

Section 4, ‘Colonial Administration Then and Now’ challenges this orthodoxy, first by giving an account of what colonial administration involved, specifically in its later forms employing ‘indirect rule’. It argues that imperial concerns about governing colonies are replicated in contemporary First World governance agendas for the Third. This is notwithstanding, first, the supposed development management concern with democratization. This it is argued, is more about a neo-liberal economic agenda, and lacks credibility given the role of development administration in the Cold War. It is also despite, second, the claims made by development management for empowerment and participation. These, it is demonstrated, are based on language and methodologies inspired by indirect rule, and in their practice are always subservient to First World political and economic agendas, not least in relation to debt relief.

The paper concludes by arguing that proponents of development management have been naïve in their understanding of management, and accepted at face value simplistic definitions of it being about a means to an end, about getting the job done. Instead, note recognition should be given to a critical management understanding of management, which sees management’s supposed technocratic neutrality as both concealing and perpetuating its role in maintaining existing structures of power.

Imperialism and Colonialism

Clearly, before we move on, it is important to be clear about what is meant by the terms colonialism and imperialism. Debates about the meanings, significances and relationships between these terms have existed for as long as the processes that they are supposed to describe themselves, and any definition here inevitably will not do justice to these debates. The usage chosen, proposed by Edward Said (1994) has two advantages; first, its association with the recent resurgence in analyses of the consequences of
imperialism and colonialism; and second its recognition of interweaving economic, political and cultural dimensions.

In Said’s usage of the terms, “imperialism” means, the practice, theory and attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory: "colonialism", which is almost always a consequence of the implanting of settlements on distant territory (1994: 8). Said then quotes Doyle (1986: 45): ‘Empire is a relationship, formal or informal in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by social, economic or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process of maintaining an empire’. Said continues (1994: 8):

In our time colonialism has largely ended; imperialism ... lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere, as well as in specific political, ideological and social practices ... Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination ...

Said goes on to state (1994: 9-10) that while profit was a ‘tremendously important’ motive of imperial expansion,

[t]here was a commitment ... over and above profit, a commitment in constant circulation and recirculation, which on the one hand allowed decent men and women to accept the notion that distant territories and their native peoples should be subjugated, and on the other, replenished metropolitan energies so that people could think of the imperium as a protracted almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior or less advanced peoples.

The argument in this paper, in short, then, is that the continuity between colonial administration, and then development administration and now development management confirms development management’s status as, using Said’s term, ‘a form of knowledge affiliated with domination’.

The prima-facie case

Development administration (and subsequently development management) does depict itself as relatively new. Its beginning, we are told, is in the post-1945 era of colonial independences, and the consequent need for nation building and development. Thus, a leading figure in the field, Milton Esman is able to claim ‘I was present at the creation of the field of development administration’ now in its ‘fourth decade’ (1991: 1). He continues with its origin story:
While the field’s pioneers confronted the dilemmas of the declining colonial era with its hesitant and post-World War II commitment to development, the subject was transformed by the precipitous expansion of US imperium into terra incognita in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These encounters through technical assistance with the realities of Third World governments revealed that the conceptual equipment of Western, particularly American, public administration was inadequate to the task at hand. This challenge produced several nodes of activity among them … Indiana … Michigan State … Syracuse … Southern California … Harvard … Pittsburgh.

In this brief paragraph Esman presents a received view, which contains three key premises which the development administration and management orthodoxy uses to distance itself from its imperial and colonial past. Having located itself in a post-colonial, development era (‘the hesitant commitment to development, it represents itself, first as technocratically neutral, with the term ‘technical assistance’ (and elsewhere ‘technical cooperation’) suggesting parity of power between the helpers and helped. Second, it suggests that the ideas underpinning development administration were innovative (existing ‘conceptual equipment’ was inadequate) and, third, that likewise the institutional apparatus through which it operated was new (e.g. new university institutions emerged in the US, which apparently previously didn’t have much of an Empire (‘imperium’) in Asia, Latin America, and Africa).

To be fair, Esman doesn’t make this separation absolute, in his acknowledgement that the colonial era was declining, rather than had ended, and in his hint that US had some imperial status. However, the claim that the orthodoxy makes is one of novelty and newness – not least in the assertion of a ‘birth’. In this paper this claim is challenged. It is argued instead that, notwithstanding the changes there have been in the various versions of administration and management over the years, there are direct historical continuities between the ideas and practices of colonial administration, and those associated with what was known as development administration, and we now are more likely to call development management. These continuities are far stronger than has hitherto been acknowledged. This means that development administration/management, far from constituting a new set of relations between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries has continued to serve as a means of replicating and sustaining imperialist power relations in the world, and the (neo-) colonial status of certain nations and their populations.

Even the briefest historical review suggests that the claims made by Esman, and the orthodoxy more generally, are tenuous, and that there is a prima-facie case for examining the continuity in colonial and development administration/management practices. First, the US ‘imperium’ was more extensive pre-1945 than Esman’s ‘terra incognita’ suggests. It is important to recall (as we will see) that the US is a country created by white settler colonialism, and the genocide of its indigenous population within what is now its own borders, which were extended by imperial annexations in the 19th and
20\textsuperscript{th} centuries (e.g. California, New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Hawaii). LaFeber (1993) notes that during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century ‘US military forces consolidated white power over the entire country; by destroying the last major opposition in the late1890s white Americans were using this continental empire as a base from which to create a new empire of commerce and insular possessions in the Caribbean and across the Pacific ocean’ (1993: 53-54).

US subsequent development as a colonial power was comparatively late, and to some extent depended on the extension of economic power rather than the formal acquisition of territory. However, it did, as LaFeber (1993) sets out, acquire possessions in the Pacific including the Philippines in 1898. The US also annexed, occupied and established protectorates in the Caribbean, including Cuba, where it still has a military base, Panama (handed back in 1999) and Puerto Rico (still a US possession). US anti-colonialist credentials are also compromised by its foundations as a slave state, and its formal institutionalization of racist segregation at all levels of society, not least in Federal government, for the majority of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century (and certainly beyond the 1940s/50s ‘birth’ of development administration), (see King, 1995). As Munene (1995a) points out, the Pan-Africanist movement which brought together many African and African American leaders, and reached its pre-independences zenith with its 5\textsuperscript{th} congress in Manchester in 1945 saw the fight for African independence and against racism in the USA as a common struggle. For many, US imperialism continued through the post-1945 cold war era, which saw US military interventions most (in)famously in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and CIA inspired overthrow of democratically elected governments in Iran, Brazil, and Chile.

Second the start of the development era was, more generally, decidedly hesitant, and the decline of colonialism has been slow. In relation to the British Empire some countries became independent soon after 1945 (e.g. India and Pakistan). Others had to wait for decades later (e.g. Ghana and Malay states until 1957, Cyprus, Nigeria and Somalia until 1960, Tanzania in 1961, Kenya 1963, Zambia 1964 and Botswana, Guyana, and Barbados 1966, Papua New Guinea 1975, Brunei 1984), (See Hadjor, 1992 for a full list). Thus colonialism’s institutions, ideas and practitioners persisted during Esman’s ‘four decades’.

Third, development administration has always had its proponents in the traditional imperial power of Britain. At least fourteen of the approximately 100 Universities in Britain run postgraduate programmes which fall under the umbrella of ‘development administration and management’. With the exception of Glasgow Caledonian Universities development management is taught in separate ‘development’ institutes, faculties or departments rather than management or business schools (CDSC, 1999). Many of these were founded at the start of the post-1945 era, and according to Kirke Greene (1999) employed former colonial administrators (as did, he states, NGOs including Oxfam). As the years progress, the numbers have declined; but in one case at least, the Institute for Development Policy and Management, at the University of Manchester (where the author works at the time of writing) ex-colonial officers were teaching as full time staff members in the late 1990s.
An established link

My linking of imperialism/colonialism and development is by no means original. For example Escobar (1989, 1995), Cowen and Shenton (1995) Crush (1995), and Williams (2000) are among those who make a case for the continuity between the colonial and development eras and/or the discourses associated with them. Others have noted specific institutional continuities between colonial administration: for example Dwivedi and Nef have noted the ‘quick turn around of colonial European officers in Africa and Asia into their ‘new’ positions as UN development administrators’ (1982: 63). More recently, the leading development administration/management journal Public Administration and Development’s 50th anniversary edition (Collins 1999) tracked its own history as the British Colonial Office publication Journal of African Administration, and contained a number of articles referred to here.

This paper has a debt to all these authors. However it differs from those who have identified the continuity between colonialism and development more generally, in that its focus is on a subset of ideas, i.e. those relating to administration and management. In so doing it does lend strength to the broader argument, and builds on the work of those who have suggested specific institutional continuities, by demonstrating just how fundamental and pervading this continuity is.

**DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION THEN?**

Definitions

We are not short of choice in definitions of development administration. For Riggs (1970: 6-7):

> development administration refers to the administration of development programmes, to the methods used by large scale organizations, notably government, to implement policies and plans designed to meet developmental objectives … (and to the improvement of development capacities).


> … persistent trends running through the evolution of the subject include a concern with the creation, maintenance and strengthening of organizational and administrative capacity – as an instrumentality of the development process – to facilitate efficiency, responsiveness, accountability and equity …

Schaffer (1973: 245) defines development administration as
development programmes, policies and projects in those conditions in which there are unusually wide and new demands and in which there are peculiarly low capacities and severe obstacles to meeting them.

Schaffer’s specification of a particular set of conditions (i.e. wide and new demands, low capacities, severe obstacles) and the particular task of development is what distinguishes development administration from administration’s other forms, particularly generic public administration. These conditions are a euphemism for ‘third world countries’. Making this point explicit, Luke argues (1986: 74) that ‘the context of the struggle for development in the Third World gives the subject … [its] peculiar status’, going on to quote Swerdlow (1975: 347) that development administration ‘… must be limited to the administration of those countries that are seeking development and are starting at low levels of economic productivity’.

Moving beyond definitions to what development administration involved as a body of theory and practice, Turner and Hulme see its early years (the 1950s and 1960s) as the ‘practical application of modernization theory’ (1997: 12). Box 2 summarizes their version of its basic tenets at its start.

**Box 1: Development administration then?**

Development administration:

1. Was based on the notion of big government ‘as the beneficient instrument of an expanding economy: and an increasingly just society (Esman, 1988: 9)’; [d]evelopment administration was synonymous with public administration, which itself was synonymous with bureaucracy.
2. Had an elitist bias: [a]n enlightened minority, such as politicians and planners would be committed to transforming their societies into replicas of the modern nation state.
3. Would tackle head on the ‘lack [of] administrative capacity for implementing plans and programmes through the transfer of administrative techniques to improve the central machinery of national government’.
4. [Used] foreign aid [as] the mechanism by which the missing tools of public administration would be transferred from the West to developing countries
5. [Early on] recognized culture as an impediment to the smooth functioning of Western tools and dominant Weberian bureaucracy: development management had to overcome such cultural obstacles which were seen as the sources of bureaucratic dysfunctions.

*Source: Summarized from Turner and Hulme (1997: 12-13)*
Perceptions of changes in development administration in the intervening years diverge. For some there was a relatively smooth sequence of development. Thus, Luke talks of ‘the evolution of the subject’ (1986: 74), while Esman talks of challenges to certain tenets of development administration by a new generation of scholars as ‘insights and contributions’ which have been ‘embraced with appreciation by their elders’ (1991: 3). For others, these challenges have been so great as to require description as episodes of ‘crisis’, ‘impasse’, or ‘deadlock’. The first episode, famously associated with Schaffer (1969) resulted from disagreements about the efficacy of state bureaucracies as a vehicle of development. Later, in 1981, Hirschmann identified three further issues. These were, first the division between practically and theoretically oriented scholars; second whether these scholars had any influence over practitioners; and third, building on Schaffer, between those who saw bureaucrats’ own class interests meaning that it was in their interests to obstruct development, and those who took the opposite view. However, even Hirschmann writing in 1999 was to state that ‘deadlock or not, the theory and practice of Development Administration (or Management as it came to be known) have continued, and with some vibrancy’ (1999: 288).
**DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT NOW?**

**Administrative continuity**

That there is, as Hirschmann suggests, a continuity between development administration and development management is not really disputed. According to Esman (1991: 1) the change in name occurred ‘for no particular reason that I can discern, with no significant changes in substance in methodology’. From the US, Brinkerhoff and Coston’s 1999 assessment of development management also acknowledges this continuity, tracking its history back to the 1950s. Like others before them Brinkerhoff and Coston identify development management as an applied discipline, and locate it within a parent field of public administration, and suggest that it has changed alongside changes in broader development strategies, particularly in its emphasis on the state as a vehicle of development. Thus:

The trend has been away from a technocratic, universalist, public-sector administrative model toward a context-specific, politically infused, multisectoral, multiorganizational model. From its initial focus on institution building for central level bureaucracies and capacity building for economic and project planning, development management has gradually expanded to encompass bureaucratic reorientation and restructuring, the integration of politics and culture into management improvement, participatory and performance-based service delivery and program management, community and NGO capacity building, and policy reform and implementation (1999: 348-9).

Brinkerhoff and Coston go on to suggest that development management’s ‘analytic and practical contents reflect four related facets’ (1999: 349). These facets, at once inter-related and sometimes the source of tensions are summarized in Box 3.

**Box 3: Development management now?**

1. *Development management as a means to foreign assistance agendas* – [it] is most often sponsored by international aid agencies, all of which have their own ... agendas; [t]ypically development management professionals enter the scene upon the request from a donor agency for a predetermined task ... development management is a means to enhancing the effectiveness to projects and programs determined and designed by donor agencies

2. *Development management as toolkit* – [it] promotes the application of a range of management and analytical tools adapted from a variety of disciplines, including strategic management, public policy, public administration, psychology, anthropology and political science ... [these] tools merge policy and program analytics with action.
3. Development management as values – development promoting activities constitute interventions in the status quo … any intervention advances some … set of interests and objectives at the expense of others [this is] expressed in two ways … first development management acknowledges management is infused with politics … second, [it] takes a normative stance on empowerment and supporting groups, particularly the poor and the marginalised, to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs.

4. Development management as process operates at three levels – [first] in terms of the individual actors involved it builds on process consultation and organization development … starting with the client’s priorities needs and values … [it] serves as a handmaiden to (1) empowering individual actors to assert and maintain control (2) building their capacity to sustain the process into the future … [second] at the organizational level, whether … individual agency or multiple organizations … as a process it is concerned with the interplay between policy, program and project plans and objectives, and the organizational structures and structures through which plans are implemented … [third] at the sector level – public, civil society, and private … as a process [it] addresses broader governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and the role of the state … this brings in empowerment in its societal and political dimensions.

Source: Summarized from Brinkerhoff and Coston (1999: 349-50)

The UK equivalent of Brinkerhoff and Coston is Alan Thomas, who is part of the team responsible for the launch of the Open University’s ‘Global Development Management Programme’ in 1997. Not suprisingly one of Thomas’ key concerns is what should comprise a development management curriculum. He states (1996: 108):

To summarize, development management should contain three types of material:

1a Development studies; and

1b conventional management theory in a development context

2. New areas arising from viewing development management as the management of intervention aimed at ‘progress’ in a context of conflicts over goals and values.

3. Radical participative management methods aimed at enabling and empowering, arising from cases where development management may be viewed as the management of interventions on behalf of the relatively powerless.

There are clear differences between the early incarnations of development management and contemporary versions of development management. First,
according to both Thomas and Brinkerhoff and Coston, development management incorporates more of conventional management, which Thomas accepts at face value as being about getting the job done by the best means possible. Second, there is an emphasis on the use of participatory management approaches (e.g. process consultation and organization development), and its associated language of empowerment. Third, for Brinkerhoff and Coston at least, the remit of development management is extended beyond the public sector into the private sector and ‘civil society’, which is usually a euphemism for NGOs. Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, both recognize that what ‘development’ means, and that how it should be carried out are contested. This is evident in Brinkerhoff and Coston’s point 3, and in Thomas’s argument (1996: 102) that the goals of development are for social change, and that these are ‘strongly subject to value based conflicts, derived from different conceptions of ‘progress’ and development, and differences of interests’.

Here Brinkerhoff and Coston and Thomas take a particular side, that of the powerless and the poor, going so far in Thomas’s case to argue for the application of the ‘radical’ ideas of Freire, Chambers, and others. Brinkerhoff and Coston present a version of development management where, implicitly this is what actually happens, although they acknowledge ‘tensions’ between the four facets summarized in Box 2. Thomas is even more cautious, and makes the distinction between the ‘management of development’, the generic management of ‘deliberate efforts at progress, i.e. ‘development interventions’, and subsequently (2000: 46) ‘management for development’, where development is seen ‘as an orientation towards progressive social change’. For Thomas, authentic development management is the progressive management for development (2000: 42), but he is ultimately uncertain about whether or how this progressive orientation is maintained in practice: ‘… the majority of cases will be … ambiguous, with value based conflicts, contestations over the definition of development and power struggles. Development management will often remain an ideal rather than a description of what takes place’ (2000: 51).

**First world agendas first: empowerment last**

Thomas is correct in his view that this explicit stand for the empowerment of the powerless, the poor, and the marginalised in societies as a whole goes well beyond mainstream management versions of empowerment (which he nonetheless accepts at face value), and distinguishes development management from conventional management. It is also, apparently, the clearest difference between development management and its development administration predecessors. More, in its claims to seek to increase the power of those in the Third World (not least, it is implied, in relation those in the First), development management is apparently enabled to distance itself from parallels with colonial administration.

But how can we judge whether those parallels exist if we have no understanding of what colonial administration is/was? Thus far, this paper has followed the general example of development administration and
management texts, and not examined how colonial administration actually operated. This deficiency is remedied in the next section, which will then go on to show that at the level of basic principles, participation and empowerment and all, development management and colonial administration have more in common that is different.

Underpinning this case is a recognition that both colonial administration and development management are fundamentally about First World interventions in the operations of Third World states and societies. While development management may now be ‘multi-sectoral’, and, supposedly unlike development administration, focus on more than government, its primary concern has always been to shape the operation of nation states, as Ferguson (1990) has pointed out in relation to development more generally. This simultaneous continuity and blurring of focus is symbolized by the increased use of the term ‘governance’, partly government but partly not, the ‘structures and mechanisms that are used to manage public affairs according to accepted rules and procedures’ (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 602).

More, against claims of being ‘multi-sectoral’ we also have to set the continuing assertion that development management, like development administration before it is still synonymous with, or a subset of the discipline of Public Administration or sometimes nowadays, Public Sector Management. However, this discipline, development management aside, is otherwise a First World discourse about First World states. The location of development management within it serves to conceal fundamental truth of its different status as a First World discourse about, and structuring relationships with, the Third.

Brinkerhoff and Coston to their credit do make this truth clear in relation to contemporary development management (‘development management as a means to foreign assistance agendas’, in Box 2). But, they suggest, and Thomas similarly implies, that these agendas can be negotiated through the use of the participatory/empowering facets or strands of development management. What this conceals is the primacy of the ‘foreign development agenda’ facet, and participation and empowerment’s status as subservient to these agendas, without which there would be nothing to ‘participate’ in. Going back to Luke’s (1986: 74) definition of development administration cited at the start of section 2 above, development management’s use of empowerment is as ‘... an instrumentality of the development process ...’ as specified in the First World.

This is not to say that the dynamics of the relationship between First World agendas and what actually takes place as ‘development’ are complex and cannot be negotiated and even subverted. However, participation and empowerment cannot be in the gift of the First World, nor a requirement it makes of the Third, unless there is some imbalance of power between First and Third to begin with. This imbalanced power relationship means that any negotiation or subversion that there is shaped by First World agendas, and empowerment and participation in practice always takes place within First World boundaries which prescribe genuinely empowering options (e.g.
unconditional Third World Debt relief). But what the next section shows is not just a replication of colonial power relationships at this broad level. Rather it sets out the replication, and indeed the continuities, in the priorities, rhetoric and practices of development management, particularly as they relate to ideas of governance at the macro-level and the related instrumental uses of participatory interventions at the micro-level.

**COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION THEN AND NOW**

The permanence of governance

Some contemporary continuities with colonial administration have not gone unnoticed. Turner and Hulme (1997) for example note that administrative structures in some Third World nations are still those established by colonial powers. These colonialist remnants are real, and significant, for example the continuing existence in some countries of District Commissioners, who were once imperial rulers incarnate on the ground, and who now are more likely to be Heads of States’ local personification, keeping an eye, and more, on local government. However, this does not tell us about contemporary manifestations of colonial administration in terms of the relationship between the First World and the Third. Others have done this, however, in relation to particular aspects of current development agendas. Thus Hailey (1999) has reviewed colonial administrators’ support for NGOs, currently reprised in the calls for multi-sector/civil society capacity building, and Blore (1999) notes colonial administration’s emphasis on decentralized local government, currently the concern of governance interventions.

But what has not been recognized explicitly, and certainly not dealt with in any detail is development’s, and development management’s concern with governance per se, in which the continuity between colonial administration and development management has its strongest and most significant manifestation. As a term governance has come to be widely used in different situations: but in international development contexts its primary meaning is in terms of how nations are governed. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) governance is a neologism. If that is the case, one of the earliest institutionally significant users of the term was the World Bank in the mid to late 1980s. George and Sabelli (1994: 150) suggest that the term was attractive to the Bank because ‘“[g]overnment" would have been a bit too blatant, since the Bank according to its papers, is not allowed to intervened in politics at all …’

George and Sabelli’s book does not explicitly explore continuities in theories and practices. However, their discussion of World Bank governance prescriptions which the Bank singularly fails to apply to itself, and indeed the book’s subtitle, ‘The World Bank’s Secular Empire’ makes clear their view that the governance agenda’s concern with how Third World nations are ruled, and attempts to control how this happens are, as noted earlier, a defining feature of imperialism. It is in relation to this concern that the continuity
between colonial administration and development management has its strongest manifestation.

**Indirect rule as governance**

As with imperialism and colonialism more generally there are dangers in seeing colonial administration as a homogeneous set of ideas and practices. But certainly there were widespread approaches which dominated large parts of the world at certain points in history. The particular parallels and continuities that this paper identifies are with the concepts and practices of indirect rule, which are typically associated with late colonial rule in Africa, but were to be found elsewhere in the Imperial world. Its principles were most famously set out in the British colonial administrator Lord Lugard’s 1922 *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, which according to Perham (1965: xlii) was a ‘canonical book’ for British Colonial Administrators in the 1930s.

In the Dual Mandate, Lugard argued that British colonial rule could only be sustained ‘indirectly’ by co-opting (or in reality, creating) ‘native’ (sic) institutions. Hence indirect rule, the essential feature of which was that ‘native chiefs are constituted as an integral part of the machinery of the administration’ … however, the ‘chief himself must understand that he has now right to place and power unless he renders his proper services to the state’. More, there were limitations on ‘chief’s’ powers – they could not raise or control armed forces, raise taxes, appropriate or redistribute land, and ‘in the interests of good government the right of confirming or otherwise the choice of the people of the successor to a chiefship and deposing any ruler for misrule is reserved to the Governor’ (1965: 207). Hence Mamdani’s description of a ‘separate but subordinate state structure for natives’ (1996: 62).

As Mamdani points, the idea of indirect rule did not ‘spring full blown from the mind of a colonial architect, for although Lugard theorized it as the British colonial system, its origins predated Lugard’s reflection on it; also the practice it summed up was not confined to British colonies’ (1996: 62), in Africa or elsewhere. Mamdani also noted the pejorative and offensive nature of the terms ‘native’ and ‘tribes’, and argued that the investing (not to mention invention) of ‘chiefs’ with administrative power led to forms of decentralized despotism.

The need for imperial rule to be sustained, was described in terms of obligation first, exploitation second. Thus the first part of the dual mandate typifies the ‘almost metaphysical obligation to rule’ described by Said, consisting of:

… moral obligations to the subject races … such matters as the training of native rulers; the delegation to them of the responsibility as they are fit to exercise; the constitution of Courts of Justice free from corruption and accessible to all; the adoption of a system of education which will assist progress without the creation of false ideals; the institution of free labour
and a just system of taxation; the protection of the peasantry from oppression and the preservation of their rights, etc. (Lugard, 1965: 58).

Here we see themes that have current development management parallels – the need to train to build capacity, the importance of the rule of law and the absence of corruption, the role of education in progress, flexible labour markets, fair revenue collection, and espoused support for the rural poor. Together, they form what might now be called a governance agenda, although what is missing, and what we come to below, is any mention of politics, and particularly, democratization. Having apparently given moral and ethical issues primacy, the second part of the mandate went on to address economics, concerning ‘material obligations … [the] development of natural resources for the mutual benefit of the people and mankind in general’ (1965: 58). Lugard was clear that there was self interest involved here; but argued that both the colonizers and the colonized would benefit. Fundamentally, he asserted ‘[w]e hold these countries because it is the genius of our race to colonize, to trade, and to govern’ (1965: 618-9).

Indirect rule was subsequently endorsed by, among others, the British liberal imperialist Huxley, (who was to become the first Director-General of UNESCO in 1946). In *Africa View* (1931) he states:

> Indirect rule, in fact, means the employment of the existing institutions of the country for all possible purposes to which they are adequate, their gradual molding by means of the laws made and taxes imposed by the Central [i.e. colonial] Government and of the guidance given by administrative officers, into channels of progressive change, and the encouragement within the widest limits of local traditions, local pride and local initiative, and so of the greatest possible freedom and variety of local development within the territory (1931: 103).

Huxley gives the colonial officer a technocratic status, claims them as agents of ‘progressive change’ (compare with Thomas, above, 60-odd years later). More, his use of the term ‘development’ as a concern of colonial administration is not coincidental. Lee (1967: 54), in *Colonial Development and Good Government* sees this the advocacy of development as gathering strength in the 1930s, and increasing colonial administrators’ technocratic power vis-a-vis indigenous structures permitted by indirect rule:

> In many colonies the D.C. [District Commissioner] became the spearhead of development, a chairman of a ‘district team’ of technical officers, an embryo development committee … ‘indirect rule’ had laid a stress on the natural and organic growth of native authorities. The new philosophy meant a shift away from the this aspect of colonial government towards the ‘administration’ and a more positive role for the field service of colonial officers; what the ‘new deal’ achieved was to place the Colonial Office is a position to reassert the new version of the
The doctrine of native paramountcy – a doctrine of ‘public interest’ interpreted by the ‘administration’ – and to provide the money and specialist personnel for making every district commissioner aware of opportunities for economic development and social welfare.

Lee also notes that by the start of World War II ‘the term "colonial development" excluded the "white dominions", and the Indian continent' (1967: 43), although recognizing earlier (1967: 37) that India ‘in many respects was the original experimental ground for the "development idea" in colonial administration’. He also produces evidence that this concern for development did not arise from any desire to establish a foundation for independence.

The resonances that even this briefest of considerations of colonial administration have with the contemporary rhetoric of development management are so strong that it is tempting to ignore the cold war era. However, there was a strong governance agenda promoted through development administration from the late 1940s through to the early 1980s (and the current day for Cuba) albeit one which was not described using this term. In this period, the concern was about who should not rule, and the desire of the US to maintain its sphere of influence around the world. According to Turner and Hulme (1997: 12), ‘Development administration would wage an unarmed managerial struggle against communism in the underdeveloped nations by engineering the transformation to capitalist modernity and the good life’.

Dwivedi and Nef (1982: 60) argue that ‘national development' was as aspect of US counterinsurgency, ‘which was to be achieved through administrative development ...’; quoting Fall in 1965 (277), ‘When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought, it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign’.

Later, they continue:

Traditional societies had to be saved, if not from the appeals of communism, then at least from themselves. In this context it is not surprising to find a close association between military assistance on the one hand and technical and economic development on the other ... South Vietnam, Korea, Malaysia and Iran are examples where defense and development considerations went hand in hand . Administrative modernization often became an attempt at building the capabilities of the security forces. AID [the US Agency for International Development] public safety programmes in Iran, Korea and Latin America operated as a conduit through which the CIA expanded the repressive capabilities of client states. All of these components were part of a single ‘development package’ whose real and main concern was stability ... (63).
It should also be noted that the cold war ‘development assistance’ provided the rationale for First World loans to kleptocrats, and illegitimate and puppet regimes which today forms a substantial proportion of Third World debt. Thus for example the debt Vietnam ‘owes’ includes that accrued by the puppet Thieu regime of South Vietnam; that of Zimbabwe that of the illegal white supremacist Smith dictatorship; and even the ANC in government in South Africa are being compelled to agree to repay loans made to the illegitimate Apartheid state (Chossudovsky, 1997; Ransom, 1999; Hanlon, 1999).

And so to ‘democratization’ …

Thus while development management’s concern for governance is not new, its concern for a democratic version (epitomized in Brinkerhoff 2000) of it is, post-dating the end of the cold war (Cuba excepted). A number of different authors have pointed out that this, combined the failure to deal with the consequences of earlier eliminations of democratic government, and financial support of murderous dictators undermines both the credibility and legitimacy of First World good government agendas, as has the ability of a number of leaders who have come to power by non-democratic means to manipulate democratic processes to secure their own election (Muriuki, 1995; Munene, 1995b; Hippler, 1995; Vashee, 1995; Baker, 1998).

Current development management practice reinforces this undermining. To illustrate a recent advertisement in *The Economist* (April 8th, 2000: 137), for a ‘Chief, Office of Democracy and Governance’, in Kenya sought someone to provide ‘intellectual leadership in the design, implementation, management and evaluation of programs needed to support democratic local governance …’. Required qualifications included:

"1. Experience in providing leadership in the following areas: rule of law, elections and political processes, civil society and governance;

2. Ability to carry out analyses of Kenyan democratic development and formulate appropriate Mission’s objectives, targets and strategies for achieving them;

3. Ability to design and manage the implementation of programs and projects through which the strategies are implemented;

4. Ability to evaluate the results of projects and their effect on the related objectives in the democracy and governance sector in Kenya …"

Combining managerialist language, for example of ‘objectives, targets and strategies’ this advertisement is for a technocrat specializing in political processes. According to Brinkerhoff (2000: 602), the word ‘democratic’ in the term ‘democratic governance’ denotes ‘features of a political regime in which citizens hold the right to govern themselves …’. However the role of ‘intellectual leadership …’ as advertised is open only to ‘a US citizen or US resident alien’. It is a post with a US AID Mission for which the selected individual ‘will be required to obtain a US government secret security
clearance’. While she or he will have to have ‘excellent communication skills in English …’, ‘fluency in Swahili …’ is only ‘recommended’.

This advertisement typifies a relationship between development management and the third world which replicates those of indirect rule. Nowadays an American or quasi-American with US secret security clearance is required to provide ‘self government’ for Kenya; and there is more than an echo of indirect rule’s ‘separate but subordinate state structures for natives’ (Mamdani, 1996: 62, emphasis added). Again to their credit, Brinkerhoff and Coston’s discussion of ‘development management as means to foreign aid agendas’ acknowledges:

First and most obviously foreign assistance agendas at a minimum compromise some degree of self determination in pursuit of socio-economic reforms; and sometimes these externally-derived reform agendas strongly limit the ability of countries to modify the reform package in ways that would support local empowerment.

Day to day managerial minutiae reinforce this neo-colonial relationship:

Second, donor programming requirements and incentives – such as loan disbursement schedules, project timetables, and compliance with pre-determined indicators – can further inhibit the ability of groups in the recipient country, whether inside or out of government to play an active role in the assistance provided (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 349).

The apparent aims of development management interventions in governance may locate themselves above question - for example ‘high levels of transparency and accountability … increased citizen participation, particularly of marginalised groups … the equitable delivery of public services … [respect for] human rights and the rule of law’. But not only are these aims redolent those claimed for indirect rule: agendas that these high level aims conceal are, at the very least, contestable. From many perspectives, ‘Democratic governance structures’ are not one and the same as those sought in development management interventions which ‘redefine the role of the state (less direct service provision, creation and maintenance of a "level playing field" for economic activity, and empowerment of nonstate actors’ (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 602). Even more telling is Brinkerhoff’s conflation of democracy and the market: ‘democratic governance creates a broad institutional framework that enables market led economic growth to occur …’ This is the agenda that ‘sectoral level interventions’ promotes. It is thus a particular, neo-liberal variant of democratic governance, identified by Hippler (1995: 18) as ‘market democracy’ that development management promotes, serving, according to Leys, as ‘essentially an exercise in restabilization through improved circulation of elites to lend legitimacy to economic deregulation’ (1997: 15).
Participation then and now

As we have noted in relation to the examples of Brinkerhoff and Coston and Thomas, participation is apparently development management’s current talisman against accusations of neo-colonialism. However, recently questions have been raised about whether participation works on its own terms (e.g. Cooke, 2001), and critical accounts of contemporary participatory development (see Cooke and Kothari, 2001) have also explored how participatory interventions which focus on poverty elimination at the micro level (of, say, individual communities), or even that of specific nations, can mask, and indeed perpetuate social and economic structural inequalities (Cleaver, 2001; Hildyard et al., 2001; Mosse, 2001).

Directly relevant to this paper, though, is Stirrat’s, analysis of the use of colonialist language in participatory rural development in particular. Terms central to participatory development which came into vogue through colonial anthropology ‘like “community”, “village”, “local people” and so on are all elements in colonial and post-colonial discourses which depict the world in terms of a distinction between “them” and “us”’ (1997: 70). We might add that these terms were often made real by indirect rule, which (c.f. Mamdani) which required and often constructed tribes, villages, communities for ‘native authorities’ to govern. Stirrat then goes on to argue, among other things, that the seductive yet ultimately vague rhetoric of ‘empowerment’ associated with participation serves to justify the activity (or interventions in Brinkerhoff and Coston’s terms) of outside agencies, ignores the extensive literature which stresses autonomous forms of organization, resistance and self-empowerment, and is based on naïve assumptions about power, which some have and others don’t. Consequently, according to Stirrat, contrary to participatory rhetoric, ‘in practice new forms of dependency are also encouraged in which "motivators" and "mobilisers" form the new elite’ (1997: 76).

Stirrat’s case is strengthened when we recognize that the application of participation in development processes per se has colonialist roots. In the managerialist literature, the inventor of participatory processes is usually identified as the social-psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890-1947); and some participatory development texts (e.g. Fals-Borda and Rahman (1991)) also track their approaches back to his work on action research. However, in one managerial case (French and Bell) a certain John Collier is mentioned as a simultaneous, but apparently separate inventor of the same process. Collier was Commissioner for the US Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) between 1934 and 1945, and architect of the so called ‘New Deal for Indians’ (‘Indians’ here in the sense of Native Americans). However, far from working separately Lewin and Collier were actually collaborators (see Cooke, 1999); and in an earlier paper (Cooke, 1998) I showed how Collier’s concerns were those of contemporary development management, and how he, and his colleagues at the BIA applied participatory methodologies. I also noted Collier’s use of ‘development management’ terminology (e.g. ‘technical cooperation’) to describe the BIA’s work in the 1930’s, and argued that the principles Collier...
guided his work at the BIA paralleled contemporary development management practice, for example:

... working with established and regenerating new communities with democratic control over land use; sustaining cultural, civil and religious liberties ... support which passes responsibility to tribes in organization, education, the provision of cooperative credit and the conservation of natural resources (Cooke, 1998: 40).

But what this work did not acknowledge is Hauptmann's (1986) research, which reveals Collier's frequent identification of himself as a 'colonial administrator'. Particularly telling here is Hauptmann's revelation that Collier's advocacy of participatory approaches, and espousal of self government was inspired by the British model of indirect rule. As Hauptman points out, the very paragraph quoted above from Huxley's Africa View on indirect rule is cited approvingly in Collier's memoirs (Collier, 1965: 345), which also discusses British indirect rule in Fiji, India, and well as Africa. While Collier is far from uncritical of certain manifestations of indirect rule, and its manipulation by white settlers, he was clearly an advocate. According to Hauptmann, Collier made 'Africa View' required reading for BIA employees, and agreed with the liberal imperialist view that 'British responsibility to the Africans will take a century' (Hauptmann, 1986: 367). Hauptman also cites a BIA employee in Collier’s time claiming Collier set up participatory experiments because ‘he believed that students of group activities among exotic peoples might demonstrate some skill in manipulating them’ (1986: 371).

Compared to both his predecessors and successors Collier was a comparatively liberal figure, and the debate continues about his real significance. However, even those who see Collier engaged in a 'decolonization' in his espousal of Indian autonomy, recognize that his was 'a non-Indian model for Indian self government' (Biolsi, 1992: 148). Collier made a significant, if historically underplayed contribution to the methodologies underpinning the management field of Organization Development, which subsequently metamorphosed into change management. Strongly associated with this is the idea of 'psychological ownership', that employees should feel a high level of belief in and commitment to what their work organization is doing, and take responsibility for ensuring that it operates effectively. But psychological ownership never translates into literal ownership, or control beyond the most micro levels of organizational processes; broader managerial goals are always taken as given and immutable, and, moreover the desire and strategies the achievement of such 'ownership' are always externally, i.e. managerially, impelled (see for example Willmott, 1993).

The rhetoric of ‘ownership’

This managerial language of ‘ownership’ has now found its way into the discourse of development and of development management. However, as is development management's wont, ‘ownership’ is a prerequisite of nations rather than individuals. Hence the UNDP Management Development
Programme Manual on ‘Systemic Change in the Public Sector: Process Consultation’ takes as uncontested the requirement for a particular form of Public Sector Reform (e.g. ‘as the pace of change accelerates, governments with administrative processes designed for routine operations and agencies geared to the performance of distinct and separate functions will have difficulties. Bureaucratic organizations are not design to cope ... administrations need to develop flexibility, creativity ...’ (Joy and Bennett, n.d.: 9) While the manual uses the managerialist language of process consultation, to achieve ‘ownership’ this has to be at the level of a nation’s government as a whole. Hence ‘systemic improvements must be internalized ... fully assimilated and owned by the system ...’ (n.d. 5), the requirement of a ‘national programme for action’ which ‘has to be owned by those who implement it’ (n.d: 21).

Perhaps more telling, though are requirements of nations regarding ‘ownership’ in relation to debt relief. Current International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank policy, supported by donors like Britain’s DfID, multilaterals like UNICEF and some First World NGOs like Oxfam is that nations must ‘qualify’ for fairly limited reductions in debt repayments by demonstrating the money thus saved will be spent on poverty reduction (IMF/IDA 1999a). Nations seeking debt relief are required to produce a ‘PRSP’, a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. According to the IMF/World Bank:

[c]ountry-ownership of a poverty reduction strategy is paramount. Broad based participation of civil society in the adoption and monitoring of poverty reduction strategy tailored to country circumstances will enhance its sustained implementation’(IMF/IDA, 1999b: 6).

Later, it is stated '[b]road participation of civil society, other national stakeholder groups, and elected institutions is expected ...’. There is then a list of ‘Factors Governments may wish to consider in Drawing Up their Participatory Process’ (1999b:12). Of course, ‘ [m]ajor multi-lateral institutions – including the bank and the fund – would need to be available to support the process, as would other donors ...’ (1999b: 13).

Thus Fund/Bank ‘teams will need to cooperate closely’ (with one another) ‘and seek to present the authorities with a coherent overall view, focusing on their traditional areas of expertise ...’:

[For IMF staff] this would include prudent macroeconomic policies; structural reforms in related areas such as exchange rate, and tax policy; and issues related to fiscal management, budget execution, fiscal transparency and tax and customs administration. The Bank staff will take the lead in advising the authorities in the design of poverty reduction strategies ... the design of sectoral strategies, reforms that ensure more efficient and responsive institutions, and the provision of social safety nets; and in helping the authorities to cost the priority poverty reducing expenditure through Public Expenditure Reviews and
the like and in other structural reforms such as privatization and regulatory reform. Many areas will need to be shared between the two staffs, such as the establishment of an environment conducive to private sector growth, trade liberalization, and financial sector development (1999b: 13-14).

Once completed, the ‘owned’ PRSP’s have to be assessed by IMF/World Bank staff, and then approved by World Bank/IMF boards before debt relief is agreed. Nowhere, however, is there a recognition of the contradictions in requiring a country to own a poverty reduction strategy as a condition of debt relief, in creditors telling nations how their participatory processes should work, and in making an ‘owned’ strategy the outcome of detailed IMF/Bank ‘advice’ and conditional on their approval.

Likewise there is no recognition of the Bank/IMF’s failure to deliver its commitments thus far in relation to debt relief, or in the contradiction in calling for democracy and at the same time demanding that nations incorporate unelected ‘stakeholders’ and ‘civil society’ of unproven legitimacy and accountability. Although, having said that, according to a press report, ‘full consultation with civil society over PRSP’s has proved to be a bit of a joke. The IMF told Mozambique and Mauritania that they could only obtain rapid approval for debt relief … only if they did not put the PRSP out for public consultation’ (Elliot, 2000: 25).

In his analysis of the activities of international development agencies in Lesotho in the 1980s Ferguson described their operation as a technocratic ‘anti-politics machine’, stating ‘[B]y uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of the powerless, and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of “development” is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized’ (1990: 256). Development management is a 21st century model of this machine, incorporating many repackaged features from the past. And behind its participatory façade, it still precludes any questioning of how poverty is caused beyond the neo-liberal model, let alone the IMF/World Bank being held to account for its own complicity in the extension of poverty, through their imposition of this model in practice, and their lending to kleptocrats and illegitimate regimes.

**CONCLUSION – FACILITATORS OF POVERTY ?**

This paper began by defining its terms, setting out the received view on the history of development administration/management, and the prima-facie case for challenging this view. In sections two and three, it summarized the development administration and development management orthodoxy, noting the accepted continuity between the two on the one hand, and the differences in the espoused multi-sectoralism and the rhetoric surrounding participation and empowerment on the other. Section four set out a basic picture of indirect rule, and then to argue that in its contemporary concern for governance, and
in the participatory ideas and practices invoked in associated with it
development management not only reproduced, unacknowledged, colonial
relationships and interventions, but that there was, as the case of participation
demonstrated, a direct historical link.

Thus, against Esman’s claim that the change of name from development
administration to development management happened ‘for no reason at all’,
we should set the view of Williams (2000: 4), writing on development more
generally:

[n]ames have consequences. They define and legitimate the
terms of public debates and carry their assumptions into the
framing and implementation of policies, behind the backs of
those who use them ... hence our need to be aware of
‘keywords’, to find out where they come from, and the recognize
the baggage that they bring with them ... [r]enaming [emphasis
added] covers up the continuities of institutional forms and
functions.

The process of covering up development management’s colonial heritage that
this paper has outlined has been helped not only by renaming per se, but in
the choice of the word ‘management’, which apparently signifies an ongoing
modernization of the field itself, while maintaining a self-representation of
technocratic neutrality. This neutral meaning of the term is that supported by
the orthodoxy of management more generally, what we can call the
mainstream management, or the managerialist view. This is of management,
as Thomas puts it, ‘getting the work done by the best means available’ (1995:
10). But this is a particularly narrow understanding. Not everyone who
researches or theorizes within the field of management and organization
studies is looking for ever better means of getting the work done, any more
than those in development studies are all seeking better processes of
development. Management and organizational theorists include those who
subject management per se – its ideas, its discourses – to critique.

Thus, well known in development studies are writers on development who go
beyond, and challenge its orthodoxy to locate it in within a range of critical
sociological, political and or historical analyses. Some of these have been
cited in this paper (Escobar, 1989, 1995; Ferguson, 1990; Cowen and
Shenton, 1995; Crush, 1995, and Williams, 2000). Notably ignored by those
who write on development management, is the equivalent literature which
does the same for ‘management’ (see for example Braverman (famously),
1974; Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; and Alvesson and Willmott, 1996). These
analyses have been around for some time; but recently, as Grey and Fournier
(2000) have suggested, they have come collectively to be seen as ‘critical
management’ approaches.

While these writers and others form a management literature, it is not one
which is managerialist. This literature is substantial, diverse, and can also be
contradictory. If it has anything in common, though, it is a recognition that
managerialist representations of management as a neutral, technical means-
to-an-end set of activities and knowledge conceal its status as a product of broader social (at every level from the global to the personal) power relations, and in particular, its role in sustaining these. As Alvesson and Willmott (1996:12) put it: [r]epresenting management as an essentially technical activity creates an illusion of neutrality. Management theory is sanitized and management practice is seemingly distanced from the structures of power and interest, that inescapably are a condition and consequence of its emergence and development, having earlier stated ‘a moments reflection makes it obvious that the technical functions of management do not exist and cannot exist in a social or historical vacuum ...’ (1996: 10).

As we have already noted in the case of Ferguson, this analysis is directly paralleled in accounts of development interventions. It also can be found in relation to development administration. Thus Dwivedi and Nef noted in 1982 that ‘development administration was supposed to be based on ... technically-competent, politically and ideologically-neutral bureaucratic machinery’, before going on, as we saw in section 4 above, to set out its role as a cold war weapon. However, that this claim for neutrality is bogus has apparently now been recognized by development management, in acknowledging its value laden nature, and of the potential for conflict over these values and consequent goals in and of development which development management must deal with.

But in its limited engagement with management, development management has ignored other disconcerting parallels. Thus Alvesson and Willmott discuss the relatively recent development of ‘progressive’ (the word now recurs for a third time, after Thomas and Huxley above) conceptions of management which do recognize intra-organizational political processes, so called micro-politics; and then state that ‘received wisdom is now beginning to assimilate the understanding that managerial behaviour is now mediated by organizational, societal cultures and contexts …’ (1996: 30).

The key word here is assimilate – political and social analyses are being incorporated into managerialism on managerialist terms, in order to make management a better ‘means of getting the job done’. Alvesson and Willmott argue ‘all too often attention is focussed on the ideological and political dimensions of organizing simply as a means of smoothing the process of top-down change. Established priorities and values are assumed to be legitimate’ (1996: 31). Moreover, they suggest managerial uses of participatory processes and the rhetoric of empowerment can actually be about deliberately managing values. Emphasis on psychological ownership can ‘portend a more totalizing means of management control that aims to produce an internalization of the means and norms selected by senior managers’ (1996: 32).

The examples in this paper, of the UNDP’s use of process consultation, and the IMF/World Bank use of participatory methodologies show how it is possible to see the now supposedly more nuanced and sophisticated versions of development management as actually setting out how this internalization is to be operationalised at the level of nations, rather than work organizations.
Both cases show use of the rhetoric of participation, and espousal of the cause of the poor can serve to delude well meaning development management practitioners and theorists (this author included) into supporting interventions which do not actually challenge ‘established priorities and values’, which date back to the colonial era.

Thomas’ aspiration for a radical development management is worthy, and has this author’s support. However, as Thomas himself acknowledges, how it is achieved and maintained is not clear. Thomas case is certainly not helped in his citation of the best known proponent of participatory development, Robert Chambers as an example of the radical approach, when Chambers (1997) himself has approvingly identified parallels between his own work and the managerialist participation espoused by Peters and Waterman, whose ‘In Search of Excellence’ (1982) helped legitimize Thatcherite assaults on the Public Sector in the UK (see Butler, 1992: 6), and whose work is amongst that ‘portending a more totalizing means of management control’.

What those who aspire to a radical version of development management come up against, therefore, apparently unawares, is the longstanding debate within mainstream management and organization studies around paradigm incommensurability. This followed Burrell and Morgan’s landmark 1979 ‘Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis’, which categorized theories of organization according to fundamental, paradigmatic assumptions. The first category was assumptions about the nature of social science (the subjectivist/objectivist dimension). The second, more pertinent, here was theories’ location within either the ‘sociology of regulation’ or the ‘sociology of radical change’, with managerialist approaches to organization falling in the former. Discussions around paradigm incommensurability focus on whether paradigms were mutually exclusive, and the dynamics of relationships between them.

However, Burrell and Morgan recognize that managerialism, and the sociology of regulation has been good at assimilating ideas from radical paradigms. A directly relevant example is the construction of managerialist approaches to participation from the assimilated work of political leftists (including John Collier, ironically (see Cooke, 1999)). This appropriation by the managerialist orthodoxy of radical ideas is, appropriately enough, labeled ‘colonization’ within mainstream management (e.g. Grey 1999). What this paper demonstrates is that the claims made by development management for the empowerment of the poor, participation, and for poverty elimination are not an example of the radical prevailing over the orthodox, but of this metaphorical colonization. The strongest and saddest irony is that this metaphorical process both maintains, and is maintained by, a literal perpetuation of colonization processes on the part of development management.


