000271298 001__ 271298
000271298 005__ 20180412233215.0
000271298 037__ $$a2068-2018-2594
000271298 041__ $$aeng
000271298 084__ $$aC72
000271298 084__ $$aD71
000271298 245__ $$aImplementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium
000271298 260__ $$c2009-04-28
000271298 269__ $$a2009-04-28
000271298 300__ $$a29
000271298 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000271298 490__ $$aWERP 902
000271298 520__ $$aA mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of Nash implementation in that it does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium. We show that the condition of weak set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskin’s monotonicity, is necessary for implementation. We provide sufficient conditions for implementation and show that important social choice correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic can be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium.
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000271298 546__ $$aEnglish
000271298 650__ $$aFinancial Economics
000271298 6531_ $$aimplementation
000271298 6531_ $$aMaskin monotonicity
000271298 6531_ $$apure and mixed Nash equilibrium
000271298 6531_ $$aweak set-monotonicity
000271298 6531_ $$asocial choice correspondence
000271298 700__ $$aMezzetti, Claudio
000271298 700__ $$aRenou, Ludovic
000271298 8560_ $$fsheeh247@umn.edu
000271298 8564_ $$s299134$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/271298/files/twerp_902.pdf
000271298 8564_ $$s1650070$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/271298/files/twerp_902.pdf?subformat=pdfa$$xpdfa
000271298 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:271298$$pGLOBAL_SET
000271298 980__ $$a2068