A UNANIMOUS CONSENT SOLUTION TO THE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS: Getting PPI Rules from a PI Process

I model a cooperative bargain for the supply of non-rival goods. The model departs from cooperative games generally by accepting a second best framework and core reducing behavior by the implementation. problem. The solution admits the Kaldor-Hicks hypothetical consent efficiency rules as decision rules to a unanimous consent game.


Issue Date:
Aug 04 1991
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/271197
Language:
English
Total Pages:
15




 Record created 2018-04-11, last modified 2018-04-11

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