Temptation with Uncertain Normative Preferences

We model a decision maker who anticipates being affected by temptation but is also uncertain about what is normatively best. Our model is an extended version of Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2001) where there are three time periods: in the ex-ante period the agent chooses a set of menus, in the interim period she chooses a menu from this set, and in the final period she chooses from the menu. We posit axioms from the ex-ante perspective. Our main axiom on preference states that the agent prefers to have the option to commit in the interim period. Our representation is a generalization of Dekel et al.’s (2009) and identifies the agent’s multiple normative preferences and multiple temptations. We also characterize the uncertain normative preference analogue to the representation in Stovall (2010). Finally, we characterize the special case where normative preference is not uncertain. This special case allows us to uniquely identify the representations of Dekel et al. (2009) and Stovall (2010).


Issue Date:
Dec 06 2013
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/270423
Language:
English
Total Pages:
24
Series Statement:
WERP 1036




 Record created 2018-04-02, last modified 2018-04-02

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