The Transition to Democracy: Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict

This paper studies how intra-elite conáict results in transition to democracy, characterized as both franchise extension to, and lowering the individual cost of collective political action for, an initially disorganized non-elite. Two risk averse elites compete for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus with initial uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power. Both elements of a democracy are necessary to ensure that the two elites credibly commit to a mutually fairer share of the surplus and we derive su¢ cient conditions for democracy to emerge in equilibrium. Our formal analysis accounts for stylized facts that emerge from an analysis of Indian and West European democracies.


Issue Date:
Jul 07 2007
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269757
Language:
English
Total Pages:
37
JEL Codes:
D74; O12; H11




 Record created 2018-03-21, last modified 2018-03-21

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