Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and Bargaining

Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as insurance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes in the bargaining power of non-elites, conditional on enfranchisment, via coalition formation, constrains the bargaining power of the stronger elite and result in discontinuous changes in equilibrium surplus division. Our results are robust to public good provision following enfranchisement when there is preference heterogeneity over the location of the public good across the di┬žerent elites. We conclude with a comparative analysis of Indian democracy and show that our model is able to account for some of the distinctive features of Indian democracy.


Issue Date:
Jun 06 2006
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269643
Language:
English
Total Pages:
25
JEL Codes:
D72; D74; O57




 Record created 2018-03-20, last modified 2018-03-20

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