000269414 001__ 269414
000269414 005__ 20180308232124.0
000269414 037__ $$a2068-2018-1374
000269414 041__ $$aeng
000269414 084__ $$aC72
000269414 084__ $$aC73
000269414 084__ $$aD62
000269414 084__ $$aD71
000269414 245__ $$aDynamic Club Formation with Coordination
000269414 260__ $$c2002
000269414 269__ $$a2002-05-05
000269414 300__ $$a21
000269414 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000269414 520__ $$aWe present a dynamic model of jurisdiction formation in a society of identical people. The process is described by a Markov chain that is de¯ned by myopic optimization on the part of the players. We show that the process will converge to a Nash equilibrium club structure. Next, we allow for coordination between members of the same club, i. e. club members can form coalitions for one period and deviate jointly. We de¯ne a Nash club equilibrium (NCE) as a strategy con¯guration that is immune to such coalitional deviations. We show that, if one exists, this modi¯ed process will converge to a NCE con¯guration with probability one. Finally, we deal with the case where a NCE fails to exist due to indivisibility problems. When the population size is not an integer multiple of the optimal club size, there will be left over players who prevent the process from settling down. We de¯ne the concept of an approximate Nash club equilibrium (ANCE), which means that all but k players are playing a Nash club equilibrium, where k is de¯ned by the minimal number of left over players. We show that the modified process converges to an ergodic set of states each of which is ANCE.
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000269414 546__ $$aEnglish
000269414 650__ $$aInstitutional and Behavioral Economics
000269414 650__ $$aPublic Economics
000269414 6531_ $$aClub formation
000269414 6531_ $$aCooperation
000269414 6531_ $$aBest-reply dynamics
000269414 6531_ $$aLearning
000269414 6531_ $$aApproximate Nash club Equilibrium
000269414 6531_ $$aApproximate core
000269414 700__ $$aArnold, Tone
000269414 700__ $$aWooders, Myrna
000269414 8560_ $$fweidm015@umn.edu
000269414 8564_ $$s307833$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269414/files/twerp640.pdf
000269414 8564_ $$s1622788$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269414/files/twerp640.pdf?subformat=pdfa$$xpdfa
000269414 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:269414$$pGLOBAL_SET
000269414 980__ $$a2068