Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies

Using consistency properties, we characterize the cost-sharing scheme arising from the ratio equilibrium concept for economies with public goods. The characterization turns out to be surprisingly simple and direct. In contrast to most axiomatic characterizations based on reduced games and consistency properties, our characterization requires that in the reduced game, the players take as given the proportions of the costs paid by the members of the complementary player set, rather than their utility levels


Issue Date:
Feb 26 2001
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269356
Language:
English
Total Pages:
19




 Record created 2018-03-07, last modified 2018-03-07

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