Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payo® set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty "-core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-e®ective small groups is assumed, then all payo®s in the "-core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between "-core payo®s of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small e®ective groups have the properties of competitive markets.


Issue Date:
May 05 1999
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269257
Language:
English
Total Pages:
23
JEL Codes:
C7; D7




 Record created 2018-03-05, last modified 2018-03-06

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