A Variational Approach to Network Games

This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not assume particular functional forms on players' payoffs. By exploiting variational methods, we show that the uniqueness, the comparative statics, and the approximation of a Nash equilibrium are determined by a precise relationship between the lowest eigenvalue of the network, a measure of players' payoff concavity, and a parameter capturing the strength of the strategic interaction among players. We apply our framework to the study of aggregative network games, games of mixed interactions, and Bayesian network games.


Issue Date:
Feb 26 2018
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/268732
Language:
English
Total Pages:
51
JEL Codes:
C72; D85; H41; C61; C62
Series Statement:
05.2018




 Record created 2018-02-26, last modified 2018-03-13

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