Reputation Effects in Dynamic Games

The solution of a reputational equilibrium is given for a class of linear, quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. Although there is imperfect monitoring, a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent, there is no sudden switch in agents' strategies; a common feature of reputation models. Reputation effects are temporary in the infinite horizon case for positive discount rates, as the discount factor tends to unity there is a permanent reputation.


Issue Date:
Oct 10 1989
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/268363
Language:
English
Total Pages:
28




 Record created 2018-02-14, last modified 2018-02-15

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