We develop a theoretical model to understand the progress of Land Titling initiated based on the Household Responsibility System in China since 1979. Land Titling has heterogeneous progress across different villages. We argue that farmers' resistance could hinder the implementation of the land title, but the homogenization of farmland quality and the farmers’ private agricultural investments in the village can help farmers to accept the policy in the following mechanisms. The homogenization of farmland quality can reduce the unfair cost of Land Titling; also the farmers’ private agricultural investments can evoke the need of farmers to protect property rights in the village where only partial farmers have engaged in agricultural investment. The theoretical model developed in the paper is supplemented by empirical analyses of farm household data collected from Guangdong provinces in China. We analyze data using Random Effect Generalized Ordered Probit models. Results indicate that, (1) the difference degree of farmland quality (traffic and fertility) within a village has a significant negative effect on the process level of Land Titling in this village; (2) the difference degree of farmers’ private agricultural investment (irrigation and mechanical usable proportion) within a village has a significant positive effect on the process level of Land Titling in this village; (3) as the Land Titling contains 5 procedures to implemented, the above two important factors mainly effect the implementation of the procedures which are about the titled land need to be recognized by the whole village community.