000264959 001__ 264959
000264959 005__ 20171114163601.0
000264959 037__ $$a1901-2017-5557
000264959 041__ $$aeng
000264959 084__ $$aC93
000264959 084__ $$aJ22
000264959 084__ $$aJ24
000264959 084__ $$aJ33
000264959 084__ $$aO12
000264959 242__ $$aProductivity in Piece-Rate Labor Markets: Evidence from Rural Malawi
000264959 245__ $$aProductivity in Piece-Rate Labor Markets: Evidence from Rural Malawi
000264959 260__ $$c2017
000264959 269__ $$a2017-09-01
000264959 300__ $$a47
000264959 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000264959 490__ $$aCEnREP Working Paper No. 17-019
000264959 520__ $$aPiece-rate compensation is a common feature of developing country labor markets, but little is known about how piece-rate workers respond to incentives, or the tradeoffs that an employer faces when setting the terms of the contract. In a field experiment in rural Malawi, we hired casual day laborers at piece rates and collected detailed data on the quantity and quality of their output. Specifically, we use a simplified Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, which provides random variation in piece rates conditional on revealed reservation rates, to separately identify the effects of worker selection and incentives on output. We find a positive relationship between output quantity and the piece rate, and show that this is solely the result of the incentive effect, not selection. In addition, we randomized whether workers were subject to stringent quality monitoring. Monitoring led to higher quality output, at some cost to the quantity produced. However, workers do not demand higher compensation when monitored, and monitoring has no measurable effect on the quality of workers willing to work under a given piece rate. Together, the set of worker responses that we document lead the employer to prefer a contract that offers little surplus to the worker, consistent with an equilibrium in which workers have little bargaining power.
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000264959 546__ $$aEnglish
000264959 650__ $$aLabor and Human Capital
000264959 700__ $$aGuiteras, Raymond P.
000264959 700__ $$aJack, B. Kelsey
000264959 8560_ $$fenviro_econ@ncsu.edu
000264959 8564_ $$s827142$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/264959/files/WP-2017-019.pdf
000264959 8564_ $$s2193668$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/264959/files/WP-2017-019.pdf?subformat=pdfa$$xpdfa
000264959 980__ $$a1901