Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted.


Issue Date:
Jul 13 2017
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Language:
English
Total Pages:
43
JEL Codes:
C70; C78
Series Statement:
34.2017




 Record created 2017-07-13, last modified 2017-08-29

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