Towards a Theoretical Framework for Policy Behavioral Equations

A game-theoretic framework unifies the revealed preference approach to government objectives· and the policy behavioral equation methodology. Public policies are the equilibrium outcome of a cooperative game among interest groups and the policy maker. This study stresses the interdependencebetween policies and players' bargaining strength, and derives their comparative statics with respect to a changing economic environment. ·rt provides a specification of behavioral equations consistent with the underlying bargaining process. An analysis of the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in Senegal illustrates the proposed framework.


Issue Date:
Oct 01 1988
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Language:
English
Total Pages:
21




 Record created 2017-07-12, last modified 2017-08-29

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)