Price-Matching Policies: Cut-Throat Competition or Oligopolistic Coordination?

Promises by retailers to match the prices of their competitors give an impression of fierce price competition. On the other hand, these policies may deter rivals from cutting prices because the threat of price-matching makes it more likely that market share will not be gained. This paper empirically tests these two conflicting theories using data collected from grocery stores. in a market where several stores had announced that they would match the prices of the low-price supermarket. The evidence supports the theory that pricematching policies help supermarkets avoid price competition and therefore lead to generally higher prices.


Issue Date:
Jun 01 1988
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Language:
English
Total Pages:
34




 Record created 2017-07-12, last modified 2017-08-29

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