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The Impact of the H-1B Cap Exemption on High-skilled Labor Markets

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
- There are competing views among researchers and policy makers on whether the US government should assign more visas to allow foreign high-skilled workers to stay in the US labor market; or make the current immigration policy stricter with the argument that immigrants displace native US workers (Borjas and Doran 2012, Moser et al. 2014 and Kerr and Lincoln, 2010).
- For newly graduated foreign-born professionals including all academic degree holders, the H-1B visa program has become possibly the only path to legally enter into the US labor market.
- The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act (AC 21) was signed into law in October, 2000 (Congress, 2000). It had one key provision to exempt the numerical cap for H-1B applicants who are employed by higher educational institutions, nonprofit research organizations, and government research organizations.
- As a result, AC 21 potentially affects the job preferences of non-citizen college graduates seeking to stay in the United States after graduation. Choosing a career in an uncapped H-1B qualified entity means to circumvent the risk of facing the fiercely competitive H-1B application process and possibly avoiding potential losses due to a visa rejection.

MOTIVATION

- In the existing literature, a crucial challenge for detecting the effect of high-skilled immigrants on domestic workers relies on overcoming the endogeneity of the behavior of immigrants in the job market.
- Also, the past literature focuses on the impact of immigration policy on natives without much attention on the potential effects on high skilled foreign labors.
- An evaluation of the effect from the external policy change of AC21 on job market preferences of high-skilled immigrants not only fills the literature gap by concentrating on foreign-born individuals, but also paves the way to accurately identify the impact of foreign workers on domestic workers in the future study.

DATA

- Licensed data from Survey of Earned Doctorate (SED)
- Repeated cross sectional data from 1995 to 2006
- It covers the population of Ph.D.
 graduates who may have been
 affected by the implementation
 of AC 21.
- o The last year of analyzed data is 2006; this is done in order to construct a clean identification and to rule out potential confounding factors generated from the Great Recession which began in 2007.





EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

- Difference-in-Difference:
- We leverage individual level variation in the visa status to identify the effects of AC 21 on job placement.
- $Y_{ifmt} = \gamma_f + \omega_m + \lambda_t + \delta D_{ft} + X_{ift}\beta + \epsilon_{ifmt}$
 - where Y_{ifmt} is a binary indicator equal to 1 if individual i with foreign nationality f obtained his Ph.D. degree in year t and worked in academia after graduation.
 - The parameters γ_f , ω_m and λ_t are nationality, major and year fixed effects, capturing all the unobserved variation in the outcome variable over citizenship, major and year.
 - And D_{ft} is our primary measure for the treatment variable, and it is equal to 1 for foreign PhDs who graduated after the adoption of AC 21.
- O Baseline model is also extended to various specifications including the major-specific linear trends, field-by-year fixed effects and individual characteristics.

RESULTS

Empirical Results:





Note: all majors aggregated and with 95% confidence interval





Table 2: Treatment Effect of AC 21 on Job Placement in Academia

Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Estimation (Cheng and Hoekstra, 2013):






Figure 4: Change in the Share of Graduates Working in Academia, Relative to the Difference in Four or More Years Before AC 21

Figure 5: Change in the Share of Graduates Working in Industry, Relative to the Difference in Four or More Years Before AC 21

ROBUSTNESS

TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY

- Inference: Besides clustering the standard errors at the doctoral field level, we implement two additional strategies.
 - One is multi-way clustering at the year and field level in the spirit of Cameron et al. (2011), which are shown in the brackets of Table 2 and 3.
 - O The other is constructing p-values using the bootstrap t-procedure suggested by Cameron et al. (2008). The p-values with 999 replications are in Table A1.

Linear Difference in Difference Estin	nation							
	(1) Academia	(2) Academia	(3) Academia	(4) Academia	(5) Industry	(6) Industry	(7) Industry	(8) Industry
Parameter estimates	0.047***	0.057***	0.047***	0.047***	-0.054***	-0.047***	-0.041***	-0.038***
P-value								
Cluster-robust	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
Wild cluster bootstrap-t	0.002	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.006	0.008
Year and Major Fixed Effects	Yes							
Field-Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Demographic Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Placebo Experiments

Placebo intervention happened at:	(1) Academia	(2) Academia	(3) Academia	(4) Academia	(5) Industry	(6) Industry	(7) Industry	(8) Industry
1995	-0.023	-0.016	-0.019	-0.018	0.026	0.021	0.022	0.022
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)
1996	-0.004	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	0.015	0.016	0.018	0.019
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
1997	0.008	0.009	0.006	0.006	-0.000	0.003	0.006	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)
1998	0.019*	0.017*	0.012*	0.012	-0.013	-0.011	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)
1999	0.008	0.011	0.009	0.009	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Observations	89188	89188	87187	87187	89188	89188	87187	87187
Year and Major Fixed Effects	Yes							
Field-Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Demographic Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

- Falsification Test
- O We further check whether PhD graduates who are exogenous to this policy intervention also change their job type preference after its implementation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variable				
A. Linear Difference in Difference Estima	tion			
Noncitizen Ph.Ds Graduated after AC 21	0.009	-0.002	-0.003	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Observations	264636	264636	258042	258042
B. Probit Difference in Difference Estimat	ion			
	-0.002	-0.006	-0.007	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Observations	264518	264518	257771	257771
Year and Major Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Field-Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends	No	No	No	Yes
Demographic Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes

CONCLUSION

- Our findings indicate that by reducing the potential risk in the process of the H-1B petition, AC 21 causes foreign PhD graduates to be 5% more likely to start a career in academia and 4% less likely to work in industry.
- Our point estimates are robust to the inclusion of various controls including individual level characteristics, differing trends in majors and idiosyncratic shocks on academic fields over time.
- A falsification test on post-doctoral participation and placebo experiments based on pre-period data further support the estimated results, excluding other possible external changes in the labor market.

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