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CATPRN

Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy And Competitiveness Research Network

A Compendium and Analysis of the Research Conducted by CATPRN

**CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2016-01
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Introduction

The Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness Network (CATPRN) was funded by Agriculture and AgriFood Canada from late 2004 until early 2013. This paper has three objectives: 1) to chronicle the published output of the CATPRN; 2) to provide an evaluation of its published output based on download data taken from *AgEcon Search*; and 3) to draw some lessons with respect to the impact of publically funded Networks such as the CATPRN.

Evaluating Economics Research¹

Economists are often asked to conduct benefit/cost analyses for various public expenditures, policies, rules and regulations. The same is true for economists focusing on agriculture where the questions now being asked are far broader than traditional domestic and trade policy, e.g. climate change, environmental rules and regulations, food safety measures, land use mandates, etc. One line of research begun 60 years ago by Griliches is to evaluate the returns to public research efforts, in his case the funding of hybrid corn research.² Griliches found a high public rate of return to hybrid corn research and his study has been followed by countless others generally echoing his finding of high benefit/cost ratios for the type of life science research conducted in agricultural colleges. This line of research has bought agricultural economists much goodwill in the offices of Dean's of Agriculture.

However, when it comes to evaluating the payback for the publicly funded research done by economists the evidence is scant. Of course, there is antidotal evidence of research having an influence on public policy such as the Laffer curve which illustrates the link between tax rates and tax revenue and provided some justification for tax cuts during the Reagan Administration in the United States. Hart gives considerable credit to University of Western Ontario economist John Whalley for providing the quantitative foundation for the Canada-United States trade deal.³ Brink credits several agricultural economists for their contributions leading to the elimination of the Crows' Nest Pass

¹ A condensed version of the material in the next few pages also appears in *FAREShare* available at: <https://www.uoguelph.ca/fare/institute/advanced-study.html>

² Griliches, Z. 1958. "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related Innovations." *J. Pol. Economy* 66(5):419-31.

³ Hart, M. 1994. *Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free-Trade Negotiations*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

freight rates.⁴ Still, when most economists are asked about the contribution their research has made to public policy they will struggle for a concrete example.

Moffitt in defending the public funding of economics research in the United States by the National Science Foundation (NSF) notes that⁵:

“...policy issues that NSF has funded represents a major intellectual achievement and has greatly informed public discussions of policy issues in a large number of areas. However, whether economic research on policy issues has had a significant impact on policy itself is a separate question and one on which views of economists differ (Moffitt, p. 219).”

Cowen and Tabarrok who take a skeptical view of NSF funding of economics research, argue that greater benefits might be had from outreach activities⁶:

“...our theme is that economists should be willing to face trade-offs when thinking about NSF Economics funding. One possible trade-off is that dissemination and outreach regarding well-accepted basic economics insights may be a more valuable public good than the support of marginal cutting-edge research (Cowen and Tabarrok, p. 243).

The difficulty of influencing public policy has not gone unnoticed. Brink has provided guidance on how to present research results so they have more impact as has Evenett for those who work in the trade policy arena.⁷ Ker in discussing academic reward systems argues that more attention has to be given to significant “impacts and contributions” and less to just counting publications, citations, etc.⁸

The advent of the internet and social media has made it far easier for academics to put their research in front of the public but at the same time it has made it easier for pamphleteers to publish claims and opinions that are not based on sound scientific research. It is a shared belief among economists that good research is required to facilitate good public policy. This belief was supported by Agriculture and Agrifood Canada in funding the North American Agrifood Market Integration Consortium (1995-

⁴ Brink, L. 2013. “Making Agricultural Economics Research Relevant for Policy Advice.” *Can. J. Agr. Econ.* 61(1):15-36.

⁵ Moffitt, R. A. 2016. “In Defense of the NSF Economics Program.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30(3):213-34.

⁶ Cowen, T. and A. Tabarrok. 2016. “A Skeptical View of the National Science Foundation’s Role in Economics Research.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30(3):235-48.

⁷ Evenett, S. J. 2007. *The Trade Policy Jungle: A Survival Guide for Academic Economists*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2007-2. February. www.catrade.org

⁸ Ker, A. P. (forthcoming). “Evaluating Agricultural Economists within Colleges and Faculties of Agriculture”. *Can. J. Agr. Econ.*

2008) and the Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness Research Network (CATPRN, 2004-2013).⁹

To provide good policy advice, at a minimum, three steps are necessary: 1) conduct the research; 2) prepare written material to explain the research; and 3) make the research available. The last point gets far more discussion than the first two. In the pre-internet days working papers were circulated informally among like minded researchers. The internet and especially *AgEcon Search* has changed all that.¹⁰ *AgEcon Search* has become, since its founding in 1995, the most important repository for working papers and other scholarly works in food, agricultural and resource economics.¹¹

The development of *AgEcon Search* has provided us with another metric of the importance of research in food, agriculture and resource economics – **Downloads**. While downloads, like citations, are a flawed measure of a papers contribution we can be pretty sure if a paper is not read it has no impact. Does a download equal a read? No, but a download might be as good a metric as a citation – yes, papers are often cited that are not read by the person citing them!

CATPRN on *AgEcon Search*

As a case study I am going to use the 82 working papers and commissioned papers written by 84 different authors for the CATPRN between 2004 and early 2014.¹² Commissioned papers resulted from projects with small budgets and were written with a general audience in mind. Working papers generally resulted from projects with larger budgets, often employing graduate students doing their dissertation research. The first paper was posted in late 2004 and the final paper in early 2014. The data on downloads shows that the 48 working papers were downloaded 16,779 times and the 34 commissioned papers 11,960 times by July 2016.¹³ The nearly 30,000 total downloads underestimates the total number of downloads because all of the papers were also available on the CATPRN web site where there was no download counter, as well as from individual authors. The following highlights the findings from an analysis of the *AgEcon Search* data.

⁹ NAAMIC (<http://naamic.tamu.edu/>); CATPRN (www.catrade.org)

¹⁰ Working papers are a typical first step in the referred publication process crucial to academic advancement. The review process used by high quality scientific journals weeds out the weakest research and provides a stamp of quality. Unfortunately, articles in scientific journals are less accessible to the general public than working papers posted on the internet.

¹¹ *AgEcon Search* <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/>

¹² CATPRN had 43 members.

¹³ The CATPRN also published 34 Trade Policy Briefs (TPB) that were mostly short summaries of working and commissioned papers although there was some original research published only in TPBs. The CATPRN trade policy briefs were downloaded about 7,000 times or about 200 downloads per brief posted.

- On average working papers were downloaded 350 times and commissioned papers 352 times. Our work has an audience.
- Our research has a long tail. About 30% of the total downloads have taken place since the last paper was posted, more than 2.5 years ago.
- It is not always easy to know which papers/topics will be popular. Papers with the most downloads tended to focus on key policy issues such as the Canada-EU trade negotiations, economic performance of the Canadian Wheat Board, the determinants of farmland values and some aspects of supply management. Yet, other popular papers seemed less central to the current policy debates, e.g. food aid and EU environmental policy.

Shown below are download statistics for the CATPRNs commissioned papers (Table 1), working papers (Table 2) and the combined total (Table 3). Concentrating on Table 3, only one paper had less than 100 downloads while four had more than 800. Papers with more than 500 downloads accounted for 17.1 percent of the total downloads. Differences between the download statistics for commissioned and working papers do not appear great although 23.5 percent of commissioned papers had 300-399 downloads compared to 12.5 percent for working papers.

Table 1: Download statistics for commissioned papers

Range of Downloads	Number of Papers	Percent of Downloads
0-99	1	2.9
100-199	7	20.6
200-299	7	20.6
300-399	8	23.5
400-499	5	14.8
500-599	2	5.9
600-699	1	2.9
700-799	1	2.9
800+	2	5.9
Total	34	100.0

Table 2: Download statistics for working papers

Range of Downloads	Number of Papers	Percent of Downloads
0-99	0	0.0
100-199	12	25.0
200-299	14	29.2
300-399	6	12.5
400-499	8	16.7
500-599	3	6.2
600-699	2	4.2
700-799	1	2.0
800+	2	4.2
Total	48	100.0

Table 3: Download statistics for commissioned and working papers

Range of Downloads	Number of Papers	Percent of Downloads
0-99	1	1.2
100-199	19	23.2
200-299	21	25.6
300-399	14	17.1
400-499	13	15.8
500-599	5	6.1
600-699	3	3.6
700-799	2	2.4
800+	4	5.0
Total	82	100.0

Figure 1 shows the cumulative total downloads for commissioned papers, working papers and their total from May 2008 when monthly download data was first made available. We would expect the total to rise over time as more papers were posted but there is little indication of the rate of growth slowing down following early 2014 when the last paper was posted.

Figure 1: Cumulative paper downloads from May 2008 through July 2016




Figure 2 and Figure 3 are constructed to further explore the timing of downloads. The papers are ordered on the horizontal axis from the oldest paper to the newest. The vertical axis shows the number of times an individual paper was downloaded after the final paper in the series was posted. Hence, we would expect to see the percent of downloads rising as you move from left to right. Indeed, for papers on the far right nearly all, or in some cases, all downloads occurred after the last paper was posted. The more interesting data is for the papers to the left in the Figures. The oldest papers were posted in 2008 and 2009. However, most of these papers are still being actively

downloaded more eight years after they were first posted. In fact, some have had more downloads recently than when they first appeared.

To better explore the timing of downloads Figure 4 was constructed. In Figure 4 the download statistics were reordered so that observation one is the first month a paper was posted, observation two, the second month, etc. To make the data in Figure 4 comparable all of the papers posted prior to May 2008 had to be deleted because monthly data was not available before then and in order to have three full years of data some of the more recent papers also had to be dropped. Data on downloads for the 50 remaining commissioned and working papers were summed by month to give the total number of downloads, by month, from a papers first posting. Not surprisingly, the early months get the most action, especially months 1-6. However after month 6 the number of downloads levels off at about 200-300 downloads per month for the next 30 months. In analysis not shown this relatively flat level of downloads appears to continue for at least another year.

The data on downloads suggests that there is a large and strong audience for economics research of the type produced by CATPRN members with a focus on trade, policy and competitiveness. Just as important this audience is not a bunch of “fly by nighters” but one that searches for and downloads research results years after it has been produced.

In conclusion, the road between reading a good research paper and ultimate policy changes is a crooked and messy one. However, our world faces many challenges and to meet those challenges in intelligent and cost effective ways requires sound economic analysis. If it is prepared – it will be read – and ultimately lead to better public policy.

In the remainder of this paper the research of the CATPRN is chronicled by title and a brief summary of the research is provided. The work of the CATPRN would have been impossible without the funding and cooperation of many staff members in Agriculture and AgriFood, in particular Tulay Yildirim. Likewise the CATPRN was guided by an able and outstanding executive committee consisting of Richard Barichello (University of British Columbia), William A. Kerr (University of Saskatchewan) and James Rude (University of Alberta. It was my honor to serve as Director of the CATPRN.

Karl Meilke, OAC Professor Emeritus, University of Guelph.

Figure 2: Percent of total commissioned paper downloads, by paper, since the last paper was posted – October 2013




Figure 3: Percent of total working paper downloads, by paper, since the last paper was posted – April 2014





Figure 4: Download statistics, by month, following the initial posting of a paper.



CATPRN Commissioned Papers

2013:

Burkitbayeva, S. and W. A. Kerr. 2013. The Accession of Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine to the WTO: What will it Mean for the World Trade in Wheat? CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2013-06. September.

<http://purl.umn.edu/158891> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 340 times through July 2016.

International trade in wheat accounts for approximately one third of world grain trade and is expected to double by 2050. The KRU (Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine) countries account for approximately a quarter of world wheat exports and are collectively considered one of the key wheat exporting regions. The Ukraine became a member of the WTO only in 2008. Russia became an official member of the WTO in 2012 and Kazakhstan is expected to follow Russia and reach an accession deal with WTO members shortly. As a result of WTO accession, all three countries will be entitled to “most favoured nation” (MFN tariffs), and hence, gain improved access to a number of important markets that have been largely inaccessible due to very high tariffs that could be charged on imports from non-WTO countries. World wheat trade liberalization, reflecting the move to the MFN tariff as a result of accession, was simulated using the global simulation model (GSIM). The KRU region’s increased market accessibility as a result of successful accession to the WTO has the potential to foster important re-alignments in world wheat trade flows, prices and changes in welfare among major wheat trading countries. The simulation results suggest that the change to MFN tariffs leads to KRU countries trading more with now freer markets such as Turkey, the EU and China. Major traditional wheat exporters such as Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US do not seem to be negatively impacted to any important degree. Their relative market access conditions, however, erode in Turkish, Middle Eastern, and North African markets with their exports being diverted and broadly distributed among other countries and regions at marginally reduced prices. Trade liberalization is not uniform across regions and, hence, leads to different net welfare changes across countries. Those welfare changes, however, appear to be modest.

Cardwell, R. and W. A. Kerr. 2013. *Reforming WTO Rules on Export Restrictions – Is there any Point.* CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2013-07. September.

<http://purl.umn.edu/158894> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 180 times through July 2016.

A number of major agricultural exporting countries responded to high food prices from 2007 to 2010 by imposing export restrictions on agricultural commodities in efforts to constrain domestic food - price inflation. These restrictions reduced the volume of internationally traded food, and exacerbated international price spikes. Net food importing countries were faced with growing import bills, and non-governmental organisations that target food security had to scale back programme commitments and appeal for increased funding. There have subsequently been a chorus of calls for the development of a formal international framework that could discipline the use of agricultural export restrictions; the agreements of the WTO have been targeted as a possible forum for such a framework. We present a framework in which the efficacy of such disciplines can be analysed, and conclude that constraints on agricultural export restrictions are not likely to be effective within the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding.

Nakuja, T. and W. A. Kerr. 2013. *Was Food Safety Declining? Assessing the Justification for the US Food Safety Modernisation Act*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2013-01. January.

<http://purl.umn.edu/145969> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 360 times through July 2016.

Food safety regulations limit trade in bioproducts. Every country, however, has a duty to protect its citizens from food safety hazards. If risks are increasing under an existing food safety system then a strengthening of the regulatory regime can be justified, with the inevitable negative impacts on international trade. Alternatively, raising food safety standards may simply be undertaken for reasons of economic protection. The US has recently enacted new food safety regulations under the Food Safety Modernisation Act (FSMA) on the basis that foodborne diseases associated with domestic and imported food were on the rise. An assessment of the official justification of the FSMA is undertaken through an examination of trends in foodborne disease incidence. The results show that while the incidence of disease have increased over recent years, suggesting legitimate reasons for concern, some of the FSMA's provisions may violate WTO commitments designed to constrain economic protectionism.

Nakuja, T. and W. A. Kerr. 2013. *Protectionism or Legitimate Regulations: What Can Trade Partners Expect from the New US Food Safety Regime?* CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2013-04. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/165920> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 114 times through July 2016.

In January 2011, the US passed the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) which represents a major legislative initiative to revise and strengthen the regulatory regime pertaining to foodborne illness and contamination. The tightening of the regulatory regime was justified on the basis of a number of high-profile foodborne disease incidents, which are claimed to have undermined public confidence in the US food safety system. While tightening food safety regulations inevitably increase barriers to trade, the central question is whether the trade inhibiting externality caused by the tightened regulations is totally legitimate or whether it contains an element of pure economic protection. This paper seeks evidence of political influence in the governance of trade measures pertaining to food safety for fruit and vegetables in the US as manifested in import refusals. The results suggest that agricultural sector unemployment and antidumping (proxies for political influence) have had a significant positive effect on import refusals for Canada and Mexico. Evidence of politically motivated refusals was not found in the case of China.

Orden, D. 2013. *The Changing Structure of Domestic Support and its Implications for Trade*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2013-02. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/146657> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 240 times through July 2016.

Movement toward the objective of undistorted world agricultural markets has been set back by the lapse since 2008 of the WTO Doha Round negotiations. In the absence of a new agreement, constraints on distortionary agricultural domestic support remain lax. One might have expected policies of subsidizing farmers to have faded in the high-price environment since 2008. But that is not the case. In both the US and EU, agricultural support policy is under review and new options are being devised. Likewise, support for agriculture has increased in key emerging economies. In the US, in particular, the next farm bill likely will contain support

measures that would have been harder to enact if a Doha Round agreement were coming into effect. This paper reviews these developments and their implications for trade and future trade negotiations. The WTO commitments of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and their levels of agricultural support are examined, including the domestic support commitments of Russia under its accession to the WTO in 2012.

Prusa, T. J. 2013. *The Great Recession and Import Protection: A Look Back at the U.S. Experience*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2013-03. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/146657> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 108 times through July 2016.

This review of US TTB activity has revealed a number of interesting insights. One important finding is methodological – what insights are sensitive to the metric for measuring TTBs. I find that the different metrics (case, unweighted product, trade-weighted product) all portray similar qualitative results with respect to the flow of new activity. However, the stock of TTBs is sensitive to choice of metric. While the merits of each metric can be debated, it is clear that the weighted metric reveals details on the scope and depth of TTBs that the easier-to-use metrics miss.

Whalley, J. 2013. *Regional Agreements: A Stocktaking Based on WTO Notifications*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2013-05. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/156228> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 90 times through July 2016.

I provide a stock taking on the profile of regional trade agreements in the global trading system over the last decade focusing heavily on the period since the 2008 financial crisis and relying heavily on WTO notifications. Regional agreements cover both regional trade agreements and broader economic cooperation agreements, but exclude bilateral investment and tax treaties. I note the continued growth in the number of regional agreements, notified to the WTO, as evidence of the lack of reduced momentum in the growth of regional agreements. I temper this by noting that some of this continued growth reflects changes to existing agreements rather than *de novo* new agreements. Much of the growth is also in agreements between small economies. Finally, I note the recent prospects for new large-country to large-country agreements; especially the TPP, US-EU and Japan-Korea-China agreements. These are yet to be concluded and notified.

2012:

Cardwell, R. 2012. *High Food Prices and International Food Assistance*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2012-02. September.

<http://purl.umn.edu/165921> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 137 times through July 2016.

High food prices in 2008 and 2010 generated concern about food security in developing countries. The number of food insecure people was estimated to have jumped significantly and food assistance donors were faced with unexpectedly high procurement bills. This paper discusses how high food prices affect the delivery of food assistance, focusing on recipient effects and on procurement decisions. Recent changes in Canadian food assistance policies are discussed in the context of high commodity prices, and food assistance flows during recent periods of high prices are reviewed. Two empirical investigations relating to high food prices

are undertaken. First, the degree of price transmission from world markets to local and regional markets, where a growing share of food assistance is being purchased, is shown to vary widely across countries and provides some insulation for food assistance against world price shocks. Second, the degree to which donors substitute between important food assistance commodities when relative commodity prices change is examined. There is significant substitution between protein sources in food assistance baskets, but not between cereals.

Viju, C., May T. Yeung and W. A. Kerr. 2012. *Geographical Indications, Barriers to Market Access and Preferential Trade Agreements*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2012-01. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/122741> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 293 times through July 2016.

Canada is currently negotiating a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union; the issue of Geographic Indications (GIs) is on the negotiating agenda and is expected to be one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations. While the exact nature of protection for GIs to be included in the agreement is not yet clear, there is a potential conflict over market access with the U.S. (and presumably the approximately 50 other countries that use trademarks instead of GIs to protect this type of intellectual property). This paper explores the wider issues surrounding differences in the protection of intellectual property and the effect on market access as well as the potential specific issues pertaining to the CETA for NAFTA members. General issues include, among others, how market access could be restricted either by *de facto* import bans or the imposition of additional costs on exporting firms; would this qualify as *nullification of impairment of a benefit* under GATT? Does the TRIPS provide any guidance for this issue and would GIs be treated in the same way as a country entering a customs union and having to pay compensation if it raises tariffs to the common level? Any potential conflict between Canada's NAFTA commitments and potential CETA provisions are also investigated.

2011:

Baddeley, Shane, P. Cheng and R. Wolfe. 2011. *Trade Policy Implications of Carbon Labels on Food*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2011-04. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/122740> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 337 times through July 2016.

Carbon labeling on food offers a short-term market-based compromise between government and business, encouraging consumer and producer behaviour towards low carbon sustainability which both buys time to make more significant carbon reductions in the future, and reduces long-term costs by building support for more efficient production practices now. If a significant proportion of companies implement an effective labelling scheme, governments could easily take over with little consumer backlash. Private standards can serve as a gap filler or supplement to government action until regulation becomes politically viable, although they have their own accountability challenges. A label can easily start as (1) a means of product differentiation, then (2) a supply chain requirement, which can become (3) a *de facto* market standard, which governments may endorse for reasons of (4) public policy, eventually translating into (5) a technical regulation.

Nakuja, T, M. Akhand, J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr. 2011. *The New Food Safety Regime in the US: How Will It Affect Canadian Competitiveness*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2011-01. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/116847> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 259 times through July 2016.

The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) which was signed into law in January, 2011 represents a major initiative to improve food safety in the US. The legislation mandates the US Food and Drug Administration with developing a regulatory system to implement the Act. As yet, the full effect of the Act cannot be evaluated because the regulatory requirements are yet to be developed. There is little doubt, however, that those firms, both domestic and foreign, that wish to supply US consumers with food will face a considerable increase in regulatory costs. This paper outlines the major requirements of the FSMA and suggests how the regulatory burden may fall on foreign versus US domestic suppliers. Areas where Canadian firms may be disadvantaged relative to US firms are outlined. Opportunities that may arise from the FSMA for Canadian agri-food firms are discussed, as are the areas where the FSMA may not conform with the international trade commitments of the United States.

Viju, C., May T. Yeung and W. A. Kerr. 2011. *Post-Moratorium EU Regulation of Genetically Modified Products: Trade Concerns*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2011-02. July.

<http://purl.umn.edu/116848> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 237 times through July 2016.

Trade in genetically modified (GM) products remains a major issue in agricultural trade policy. In particular, the European Union has sought to deny market access to GM-products. In the wake of a WTO case brought by Canada and the US, among others, against an import ban imposed on genetically modified agricultural products by the European Union (EU) – which the EU lost – the import ban was dropped and the EU put in place a new regulatory regime for GM-products. The EU suggests that the post-moratorium regulatory regime is compliant with its WTO obligations. As of June 2011, the operation of this new import regime has not been formally assessed. The first GM-crops are just now working their way through the post-moratorium regulatory system and an assessment of the operation of the regime is timely. The results of this assessment suggest that the EU's approval system is only partially based in science and thus is not in conformity with its SPS obligations under the WTO. Hence, the new EU regulatory regime could be challenged through a WTO Disputes panel.

Viju, C., May T. Yeung and W. A. Kerr. 2011. *Post-Moratorium EU Regulation of Genetically Modified Products: Triffid Flax*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2011-03. September.

<http://purl.umn.edu/116849> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 492 times through July 2016.

In 2006, a WTO Panel found that the EU's moratorium on the import of products derived from the use of modern biotechnology contravened the EU's SPS obligations. The EU said it would comply with the Panel's ruling, but that it would take time. Although the EU had established the new regime to govern domestic management and imports of GM-products by 2003, an assessment of its full implications had to wait until the system could be seen in operation. Further, the EU regulatory regime for GM-products is very much a work in progress. In particular, as the Member States of the EU learn how the system operates, some Members have taken actions to prevent outcomes they don't like. The European Commission has had to

acquiesce to considerable autonomy in Member State's regulatory regimes for GM-products. This latter phase of devolution of GM-policy to Member States is new and untested, meaning that the EU regulatory regime for GM-products is not transparent. There are two major areas of the EU regulatory regime for GM-products where there is a need for clarification. The first is the approval process for new GM-products in the EU and is discussed in detail in the companion paper by Viju et al., (2011). The second is how imports contaminated with GM-products are dealt with in the regulatory regime. Recently, a new GM-product has finally worked its way through the new EU approval process meaning that the regulatory regime for new products can be evaluated. Further, the case of Canadian flax exports contaminated by GM-flax has recently arisen and a new import regime put in place. Hence, its working can also be evaluated.

2010:

Hailu, G. and A. Weersink. 2010. *Commodity Price Volatility: The Impact of Commodity Index Traders*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2010-02. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/95803> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 651 times through July 2016.

Over the years, critics have argued that futures market prices have been either too low or too high. Speculators have often been the target for the wrath of those feeling the futures price does not properly reflect market fundamentals. Recently, the criticism has been vented toward a new type of speculator that has been blamed for the dramatic changes in agricultural commodity prices experienced over the last several years. Commodity index traders (CITs) and other large institutional traders are commonly accused of exerting a destabilizing influence on commodity prices. The intensity of the debate over the role of CITs appeared to wane with the reduction in commodity prices since 2008 but the recent release of a well-publicized OECD report on the issue by Irwin and Sanders (2010) along with the doubling of wheat prices and the claim by von Braun (2010) and others that the rise was due to speculative activity has renewed the debate. The contrasting opinions still existing highlight the lack of credible consensus that has formed on the issue of causation between index fund investments in futures markets and commodity prices.

Sawka, A. L. and W. A. Kerr. 2010. *Challenging US Country of Origin Labelling at the World Trade Organization: The Law, The Issues and The Evidence*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2010-01. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/958060> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 447 times through July 2016.

Canada and Mexico are formally challenging US country of origin (COOL) legislation at the World Trade Organization. The industries most affected by COOL are beef and pork. The effect of COOL on North American cross border supply chains is outlined. The areas of international trade law upon which a challenge could be mounted are explained and the key issues that a disputes panel would have to determine indicated. The nature of the evidence that may be required to bolster Canada's case is outlined.

Viju, C., W. A. Kerr and C. Mekkaoui. 2010. *Everything is on the Table: Agriculture in the Canada-EU Trade Agreement*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2010-03. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/95800> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 810 times through July 2016.

Given the existing set of agricultural policy constraints that exist in both the EU and Canada, only limited liberalization can be expected in the agricultural sector as a result of the CETA. The original premise of the agreement was that agricultural issues would be largely taken care of in a Doha Round agreement. For example, the list of both country's *sensitive products* would have been agreed – thus, for example, Canada's supply managed products would have been removed from the *table* in the Canada-EU negotiations. In a similar fashion, the issue of EU export subsidies would have been resolved. Further, there would have been a new regime for obligations pertaining to domestic support. With the Doha Round not yet (and maybe never) completed, all of these issues, in theory, come under the ambit of the Canada-EU negotiations – *everything is on the table*. While everything may be *on the table* it is possible to agree to disagree – to opt for something close to the *status quo*.

2009:

Cardwell, R. and R. Barichello. 2009. *High Food Prices and Developing Countries: Policy Responses at Home and Abroad*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2009-1. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/54970> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 436 times through July 2016.

Food price increases over the 2006-2008 period have raised two issues of special concern to developing countries: 1) rapidly rising food prices after 30 years of general real declines, and 2) a substantial increase in food-price variability. The latter has been emphasized by the decline in food prices between mid-2008 and the end of the year, followed by another shift upward in food prices during the first half of 2009. This situation is not necessarily new, but after a lengthy period with minimal concerns over these matters, and with real food prices now so much lower than they were 50 years ago, there is whole generation of government policy makers and aid agency personnel who must become acquainted with what are largely previously-learned lessons.

Le Roy, D., A. Elobeid and K. K. Klein. 2009. *The Impact of Trade Barriers on Mandated Biofuel Consumption in Canada*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2009-2. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/54972> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 453 times through July 2016.

This study analyzed the effects of an increase in the demand for biofuels in Canada met either solely through domestic production or through trade. The empirical analysis focused on ethanol because of the difficulty of sourcing and segregating trade flow data for other biofuels, most notably biodiesel. The results of the analysis show conclusively that import barriers favour domestic suppliers of ethanol at the expense of consumers. Import barriers injure Canadian consumers by limiting their access to supplies offered for sale at lower prices by more efficient producers, particularly those that are located in subtropical regions that face lower costs of land and labour. With freer trade, the domestic ethanol price would fall while the world price would rise as a consequence of the higher demand for ethanol in Canada. Given their comparative advantage in producing ethanol, Brazilian suppliers would respond to the higher world price by increasing production and exportation of ethanol.

2008:

Gifford, Michael, Alex F. McCalla and Karl D. Meilke. 2008. *What if the Doha Round Fails? Implications for Canadian Agriculture*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2008-1 March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/6129> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 294 times through July 2016.

Canadian agricultural policy-makers need to recognize that suspension or failure of the Doha Round negotiations in 2008 would not mean the end of multilateral negotiations and that a more likely scenario would include the resumption of the negotiations or the start of a new Round within the next several years. Preferential trade agreements are expected to continue to proliferate but are not a substitute for multilateral agricultural trade reform, especially for smaller countries like Canada. The bottom line is that the external trade policy environment will continue to condition and constrain Canada's agricultural policy options. In other words, the domestic policy *status quo* will continue to be under pressure to adapt to a more open and less distorted trading system.

Hess, Sebastian, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel. 2008. *Agricultural Trade Policy Modelling: Insights from a Meta-Analysis of Doha Development Agenda Outcomes*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2008-2. May.

<http://purl.umn.edu/43446> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 275 times through July 2016.

In a meta-analysis of trade policy models, Hess and von Cramon-Taubadel (2008) use over 5800 simulated welfare effects from 110 studies of potential Doha Development Agenda outcomes to identify characteristics of models, data and policy experiments that influence simulation results. This meta-analysis, which is recapitulated here, produces plausible results and explains a significant proportion of the variation in simulated welfare effects. However, due to insufficient documentation and the complexity of the general and partial equilibrium models in the literature sample, many explanatory variables employed in this analysis are binary. This precludes more detailed analysis of their impacts across models. Therefore, a partial equilibrium model and a single country CGE for Canada are employed to generate synthetic meta-data. Simulation scenarios are based on random combinations of base data, elasticities and tariff changes selected from plausible ranges obtained from the literature sample. The synthetic meta-data has the advantage that the values of explanatory variables are measured exactly. This makes it possible to explore more complex issues of functional form and interaction between variables in the meta-analysis. The results indicate for both models that first- and second-order polynomials provide sufficient approximations of the model response. Especially in the CGE model, interaction terms between elasticities and policy variables are important. We conclude that meta-analysis can provide insights into the behaviour of trade policy models beyond what is possible with conventional sensitivity analysis and qualitative reviews.

Meilke, Karl. 2008. *Did the WTO Play a Role in the Food Crisis?* CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2008-3. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/43467> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 343 times through July 2016.

When high prices or natural calamities result in starvation and political unrest in the developing world emergency food aid is the best short run response. However, over a longer time frame it is important to have in place international rules that allow the market to function to help alleviate

food shortages rather than making them worse. Given Canada's trading position we have a huge stake in getting these rules right. Although the future of the Doha Round is unclear there is still time to make a start on developing better rules for export prohibitions, restrictions and export taxes that would serve the world better in times of shortage. A first step would be effective disciplines on the use of export taxes, and export restrictions and embargo's.

2007:

Barichello, R., J. Cranfield and K. Meilke. 2007. *Options for Supply Management in Canada with Trade Liberalization*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2007-04. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/6124> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 500 times through July 2016.

Following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations Canada replaced its import quotas on sensitive products with tariff rate quotas. The over-quota tariffs on those products operating under domestic supply management schemes (dairy and poultry products) ranged from a low of 155 percent on turkey to a high of 299 percent on butter. These tariffs have effectively blocked over quota imports and are likely to continue to prevent imports, under most market conditions, given the likely range of tariff cuts proposed for sensitive products following a successful completion of the Doha Round. However, it's argued that tariff cuts in the post-Doha Round will severely limit Canada's ability to restrict imports and it is important to use the next 15 years to better position the supply managed industries to compete at that time. The paper reviews a number of reform options that could be pursued ranging from a full buy-out of current marketing quotas, the introduction of two types of marketing quota, to providing partial compensation of short-term income losses. The advantages and disadvantages of each option are discussed with respect to their costs and impacts on income and asset values.

Cardwell, Ryan, Brooke Fridfinnson and James Rude. 2007. *Food Aid as Surplus Disposal? The WTO, Export Competition Disciplines and the Disposition of Food Aid*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2007-3. April.

<http://purl.umn.edu/7310> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 706 times through July 2016.

The future of the DDA is shaky, at best. It is unlikely that an agreement will be ready for ratification before the US President's Trade Promotion Authority expires in July of 2007, even if negotiations are restarted immediately. This means that there will be no WTO-sanctioned disciplines on food aid, and no new disciplines on agricultural export credits or subsidies for at least several years, despite these subjects being relatively uncontroversial within the Agreement on Agriculture negotiations. What does this mean for food aid in the near term?

Evenett, Simon J, 2007. *The Trade Policy Jungle: A Survival Guide for Academic Economists*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2007-2. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/7309> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 380 times through July 2016.

The rules of the trade policy arena differ from those in academia. How can an economic researcher survive, let alone thrive, in what may appear to be a trade policy jungle? The purpose of this paper is not just to offer guidance in this respect but also to think through the factors that determine the supply and demand for timely, relevant policy-relevant insights into commercial policy matters. Understanding the latter provides much of the rationale for the

former. Advice follows analysis, as it should do. Economic researchers have certain advantages that they can make immediate use of in the jungle and maybe some baggage that they would do well to shed.

Hufbauer, Gary. 2007. *After Doha: Evolution or Revolution in the Trading System?* CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2007-1. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/7308> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 327 times through July 2016.

The Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations (often referred as the DDR) came to a halt in July 2006. This break followed several unsuccessful attempts to agree on modalities for reducing agricultural subsidies and protection. At Davos, in January 2007, world leaders pledged to resurrect the DDR talks and reach a successful agreement. Yet, in February 2007, the outcome remains in doubt. It seems most unlikely that a robust DDR agreement will be concluded – even though, with much effort, a shallow deal is still in sight. In this brief, we start with a short overview of the world trading system since the Second World War, emphasizing the contribution that trade liberalization makes to world growth. Next we summarize the causes of the DDR breakdown. This is followed by an examination of three different scenarios for the future of the world trading system, highlighting risks and opportunities associated with each. We conclude with bold predictions.

Innes, Brian G., William A. Kerr and Jill E. Hobbs. 2007. *International Product Differentiation Through a Country Brand: An Economic Analysis of National Branding as a Marketing Strategy for Agricultural Products*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2007-5. November.

<http://purl.umn.edu/6131> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 595 times through July 2016.

A country branding strategy for agricultural exports may be an effective way to promote a country's products on the international market. Using a brand logo can signal to consumers their past experiences with products bearing the brand, marketing efforts aimed at promoting branded products, and their perceptions of a country and its citizens. Using a brand rather than a country-of-origin label allows a product image to be created and conveyed that goes beyond merely representing the origins of the product. Nevertheless, significant challenges exist for a country brand due to difficulties in managing both the product-country image and product quality. Managing a brand that is applied to a multitude of different products originating from many different supply chains makes it difficult to ensure that all products use the brand appropriately. Linking the country's reputation with the reputation of the brand itself means that significant variability in brand equity is beyond the control of the licensor and the brand users. If a product using a country brand does not fulfill the brand promise then the brand can detract from rather than enhance the reputation of other products using the mark. Taken together, these factors suggest that it will be difficult for a country brand to maintain positive brand equity in the long-term and successfully promote agricultural products in the international market. Without appropriate management of the brand, it appears a consistent label signalling only the product's country of origin would be more appropriate than a country brand.

2006:

Abler, David. 2006. *Approaches to Measuring the Effects of Trade Agreements*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2006-1. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/140762> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 212 times through July 2016.

Clarity and credibility in applied trade policy analysis suggest that a single modeling approach should be chosen that is most appropriate for the problem at hand. In choosing a modeling approach the desire for broad sectoral, product, policy, and country coverage must be balanced against the need for detailed and accurate coverage of particular markets and policies. The key approaches to measuring the effects of trade agreements can be grouped into two broad categories: econometric models and simulation models. The two categories differ in regard to how values are assigned to model parameters—in econometric models the parameters are estimated statistically while in simulation models they are typically drawn from prior econometric studies, other simulation models, and analysts' intuition and judgment. Within the econometric approach, there are models designed to predict trade flows between countries (most of which are applications of the gravity model), and models designed to predict the economic impacts of trade. Within the simulation approach, there are partial equilibrium (PE) models and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.

Baylis, K., S. Peplow, G. Rausser and L. Simon. 2006. *Agri-environmental Policy in the European Union: Who's in Charge?* CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2006-4. September.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24162> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 301 times through July 2016.

The EU has argued that some agricultural subsidies are needed to provide the optimal amount of externalities (both positive and negative) produced by agriculture. The argument is that agriculture is "multifunctional" and externalities such as rural development and landscape would be underproduced, while some forms of pollution (such as nitrogen runoff) would be overproduced without government intervention. Meanwhile, the United States has raised the concern that multifunctionality is primarily an argument to transfer income to producers. One way to try and determine how much of these non-commodity payments are directed to externalities and how much is intended to distribute income to producers is to analyze the variation of the programs among the different member states of the EU. We estimate the degree to which environmental characteristics, agricultural characteristics and political economy variables determine the objective and amount of funding each member states uses to address environmental externalities (both positive and negative). Results indicate that little of the variance in agri-environmental expenditure can be explained by the difference in negative externalities, neither is there clear evidence that the payments are substituting for traditional agricultural subsidies. However, demand for environmental services and political variables seem to be the driving motivators behind a country's decision to spend money on agri-environmental programs.

Badulescu, Dan and Kathy Baylis. 2006. *Pesticide Regulation Under NAFTA: Harmonization in Process?* CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2006-6. November.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24155> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 838 times through July 2016.

Different standards in pesticides and pest protection have often been used as trade barriers, whether real or manufactured. While harmonization is often touted as a means to limit the

ability of domestic (protectionist) interests to use standards as a barrier to trade, the process of harmonization itself is subject to rent-seeking. In this paper, we explore the harmonization of standards that affect pesticide use in NAFTA and ask whether the process is benefiting any groups more than others. There is evidence that patented pesticide producers have greater access to the harmonization process and may be using harmonization to raise costs to their rivals while preserving their ability to price discriminate.

Le Roy, D., K. Klein and T. Klvacek. 2006. *The Losses in the Beef Sector in Canada from BSE*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2006-5. September.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24161> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 391 times through July 2016.

The appearance of BSE in the Canadian beef herd brought immediate financial hardship to the industry due to the immediate closure of export outlets to Canadian beef, live animals and by-products. Nobody knew how long the border would stay closed and many worried that the Canadian beef industry could not survive a prolonged disruption of markets for beef. Previously, producers in Canada had enjoyed secure access to markets for beef around the world, with most of the exports destined for the United States, Mexico, Japan and South Korea. Both federal and provincial governments quickly developed assistance programs and, over the next two years, transferred about \$2 billion to various sectors of the beef industry. Government subsidies certainly helped the beef sector but industry representatives argued that it did not cover nearly all the losses that had occurred. This is consistent with the results of this study.

Loppacher, Laura J., William A. Kerr and Richard Barichello. 2006. *A Trade Regime for Sub-National Exports Under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2006-3. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24160> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 157 times through July 2016.

The ability to create sub-national disease-free zones can provide significant economic benefits for an agricultural exporting nation such as Canada. In addition, the economic incentives created by the ability to export from certain regions of a country can encourage governments and industry to undertake substantially improved disease management practices including eradication and reporting.

Wolfe, Robert. 2006. *New Groups in the WTO Agricultural Trade Negotiations: Power, Learning and Institutional Design*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2006-2. May.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24160> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 420 times through July 2016.

Agriculture negotiations are different now. The EC and USA dominated the Tokyo Round process, and the agriculture modality was bilateral bargaining. In the pre-Uruguay Round period, the Cairns Group mobilized to ensure its members would have a voice, a particular Australian concern after their minister was left out of the key meetings during the 1982 GATT ministerial. During the early stages of the Uruguay Round, the new domestic dimension of trade policy needed new ideas, which created an opening for policy entrepreneurs. In the process of learning, frequent informal dinners among the lead negotiators were invaluable, though most participants were from OECD countries, except for Brazil. Now in the Doha round, groups have proliferated

2005:

Rude, James and Karl Meilke. 2005. Implications of the July 2004 WTO Framework Agreement for Canadian Agriculture. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2005-2.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24159> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 125 times through July 2016.

The Framework Agreement provides the basic building blocks on which a final Doha Development Round agreement will be constructed. Like any skeleton it does not describe the features or specifics of the final product, but it does give an indication of the basic structure. In terms of ambition, a final judgment must await agreement on the modalities but it appears that the Framework is ambitious enough to keep the process of liberalization going, but it also reflects as much concern among the negotiators with continuing protection for special interests as with promoting opportunities for healthy competition. What does the Framework mean for Canadians?

Whalley, John. 2005. *Pitfalls in the Use of Ad Valorem Equivalent Representations of the Trade Impacts of Domestic Policies*. CATPRN Commissioned Paper 2005-1.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24164> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 112 times through July 2016.

While all economic analysis inevitably involves a simplification from a more complex reality, and hence representing trade and other policy non-tariff interventions in *ad valorem* equivalent form is clearly wrong when judged by an absolute standard, we unfortunately usually do not know how misleading this treatment might be when we employ it (as we widely do in policy analysis). Here I present three case studies where numerical modelling results allow a comparison between the results from explicit policy representation and *ad valorem* equivalent model representation in observationally equivalent models. Significant differences in size of effect, and in some cases in sign appear in the results. I suggest these results indicate some caution when using *ad valorem* equivalent treatment both in analyzing agricultural trade liberalization and trade liberalization of other forms.

CATPRN Working Papers

2014:

Sarker, R. and S. Ratnasena. 2014. *Revealed Comparative Advantage and Half-A-Century Competitiveness of Canadian Agriculture: A Case Study of Wheat, Beef and Pork Sectors*. CATPRN Working Paper 2014-01. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/165675> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 455 times through July 2016.

While the competitiveness of the Canadian agri-food sector attracted significant research attention since the mid 1980s, no study has measured competitiveness using longitudinal data and determined empirically the drivers of competitiveness. This article contributes to the competitiveness literature by measuring the international competitiveness of wheat, beef and pork sectors in Canada using data from 1961 to 2011 and by determining the drivers of competitiveness. Our results demonstrate that Canada enjoys competitiveness in the wheat sector but not in the beef or pork sectors. Empirical results also suggest that the competitiveness of the Canadian wheat sector can be enhanced if the cost seed in Canada relative to that in the United States is lower. Similarly, if the relative labour cost of meat processing is lower, the competitiveness of both beef and pork sectors in Canada will be enhanced. Exchange rates are important drivers of international competitiveness of beef and pork sectors in Canada. The decoupled farm policies in Canada do not have a significant impact on the competitiveness of wheat and pork sectors in Canada. Our empirical results also highlight cases of significant policy failures in Canada.

2013:

Chernoff, A. W. 2013. *Between a Cap and a Higher Price: The Dairy Quota Trilemma*. CATPRN Working Paper 2013-01. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/165804> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 108 times through July 2016.

The system of supply management in the Canadian dairy sector requires that farmers acquire quota to produce milk. In Canada's largest dairy producing province, Quebec, a ceiling on the price of quotas has been in effect since 2007. Previous research established that the use of quota price ceilings create a new source of inefficiency in the Canadian dairy sector. An alternative method for lowering quota prices is to lower the rent from quotas through lowering the farm price of milk. I determine the magnitude of the decrease in the farm price of milk that would be required to reduce the valuation of Quebec dairy quotas to the current price ceiling of \$25,000 per unit. Accomplishing this task requires modeling the implicit valuation of quotas during the price ceiling era. Starting from a dynamic model of the demand for quotas, I develop an econometric model to estimate producers' discount factor. Using my econometric results and the modeled equilibrium price, I estimate the price of dairy quotas over the period 1993-2010. In 2010, I estimate that dairy quotas in Quebec would have traded at a price of \$31,955 in the absence of the price ceiling. My results indicate that lowering the valuation of quotas to \$25,000 per unit would have required an 11.83% reduction in the farm price of milk.

Elskamp, R. And G. Haliu. 2013. Do Efficient Dairy Producers Purchase Quota? CATPRN Working Paper 2013-02. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/148901> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 199 times through July 2016.

We examine the effect of farm level cost and scale efficiencies on dairy quota exchanges in Ontario. A constrained profit maximization framework is used to illustrate the role of cost efficiency in quota exchanges (i.e., sales and purchases). Using a multinomial logit model, where net quota buyers and net quota sellers are identified our empirical results indicate that variations in cost efficiency do not have a significant effect on purchases milk production quota, whereas scale efficiency does. Younger farmers, farms with underutilized barns space and farms with a recent history of quota purchase tend to buy milk production quota.

Rajsic, P. 2013. Cost Structure of the Ontario Dairy Industry Revisited: Distributional Aspects. CATPRN Working Paper 2013-03. August.

<http://purl.umn.edu/157407> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 283 times through July 2016.

The initially stated objective of the Canadian dairy supply management–farm revenue risk reduction–has been met well by the program. However, it is less clear whether the program has served all farms equally well. Namely, it is not known how successful the program was in enhancing the cost-effectiveness of smaller farms. This paper uses the 2006 Ontario dairy farm-level accounting data to compare the estimated cost structure with that identified by Moschini (1988). Next, farm size and profit distribution changes are assessed. Finally, the paper provides a simple framework for examining the relationship between current farm size and quota purchases by individual farms. The results suggest that the general cost pattern identified in the early 1980s has been retained. Average cost declines as output increases at lower output levels. However, the minimum-cost farm size has increased about threefold. Additionally, both output and profit distributions have become more skewed, with a lesser contribution by smaller farms. There is evidence that the possibility of quota exchange facilitated the greater expansion of larger farms and that the process of divergence in size and profit between small and large farms is continuing. These results have bearing on the sustainability of smaller farms.

2012:

Cairns, A. P. and K. D. Meilke. 2012. Canadian Agrifood Export Performance and the Growth Potential; of the BRICs and Next-11. CATPRN Working Paper 2012-05. July.

<http://purl.umn.edu/142372> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 119 times through July 2016.

In the mid-2000's, Goldman Sachs identified two groups of emerging economies known as the BRICs and the Next-11. Primarily selected on the basis of having large populations, these countries were heralded as the growth centres of the future with the potential to stimulate increased demand for a wide range of commodities, including food. This study uses an import demand model to estimate how income influences per capita expenditure on agrifood imports in 63 countries. The findings suggest that as groups the BRICs and N-11 do not differ from other low, middle, or high income countries with respect to their import behaviour. However, disaggregation of the two groups reveals significantly larger expenditure elasticities for China, India, South Korea and Vietnam. A forecasting exercise reveals the capacity of income and

population growth in China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Korea and Vietnam to substantially increase their expenditure on imported agrifood products.

Cardwell, R. and Pascal L. Ghazalian. 2012. *The TRIPS Agreement as a Coercive Threat: Estimating the Effects of Trade Ties on IPR Enforcement*. CATPRN Working Paper 2012-07. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/142376> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 135 times through July 2016.

Negotiators from developed countries pushed hard for the inclusion of the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO set of agreements because it was viewed as a potentially effective method of coercing developing countries to strengthen their protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). We investigate whether the threat of cross-agreement retaliation, which could be authorized in disputes regarding the TRIPS Agreement, is effective in changing countries' IPR protection regimes. The results from a panel empirical model suggest that both the TRIPS Agreement and the strength of trade ties with developed countries are important determinants of IPR protection, but that the vulnerability to potential trade losses through cross-agreement retaliation is not a uniformly significant determinant across geo-economic regions. We conclude that the threat of trade retaliation is just one important determinant of countries' institutional protection of IPR.

Grant, J. H. 2012. *Is the Growth of Regionalism as Significant as the Headlines Suggest? Lessons from Agricultural Trade*. CATPRN Working Paper 2012-06. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/142374> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 140 times through July 2016.

The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has motivated a significant number of *ex post* econometric studies investigating their agricultural trade impacts. The general conclusion is that RTAs increase members' trade by as much as 150 percent, on average. In this article, we demonstrate that previous empirical work likely misrepresents the impact of RTAs because of considerable heterogeneity in the depth of economic integration pursued by these agreements. Contrary to previous studies, the results reveal that RTAs are not universally trade creating, and some agreements appear to provide very little benefit. "Deep integration agreements", on the other hand, are largely responsible for the impressive agricultural trade flow increases reported in the literature. Testing the hierarchy of RTAs largely confirms the theory: the benefits of regionalism are an increasing function of the depth of economic integration.

Hink, Matthew, R. Cardwell and C. Lawley. 2012. *An Empirical Investigation into the Determinants of Trade Policy Bias*. CATPRN Working Paper 2012-01. January.

<http://purl.umn.edu/122739> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 156 times through July 2016.

There exists an extensive literature that attempts to identify important factors that determine trade policies. An understanding of these important factors could be useful when negotiating trade agreements, especially in agriculture, which is a relatively heavily supported industry. Limao and Panagariya (L&P, 2007) modify Grossman and Helpman's (G&H, 1994) lobbying model in an attempt to understand why anti-trade bias (as opposed to pro-trade bias, which is predicted by the G&H (1994) model) is the predominant pattern in observed trade policy. L&P (2007) propose that governments seek to reduce inequality between sectors by modifying trade

policies in a way that reallocates gross revenue from the larger to the smaller sector. We use measures of trade bias calculated in the World Bank Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008) in an effort to explain trade bias in agriculture. We find little empirical evidence that governments pursue agricultural trade policies to reduce inequality between net-importing and net-exporting sectors in agriculture. Lagged trade policies are significant determinants of current trade-distorting policy, suggesting the presence of policy persistence. We conclude that it is difficult to generalise determinants of trade-distorting policy across a wide and long panel of countries, and that specific knowledge of governments' priorities are required to explain trade bias.

Rajsic, P. and G. Fox. 2012. *Quota Prices as Indicators of Comparative Advantage in Supply Managed Industries*. CATPRN Working Paper 2012-04. August.

<http://purl.umn.edu/142370> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 230 times through July 2016.

The Canadian Farm Products Agencies Act (2012) requires that comparative advantage be used to guide the allocation of new quota under supply management. This requirement, however, has not been met in practice. Agricultural economists have proposed several ways of making this legal requirement operational. We review and evaluate these proposed approaches and find that quota prices are the only direct measure of comparative advantage in supply managed industries. We develop an agent-based general equilibrium model of quota exchange to illustrate the use of quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage. Our approach complements the proposal by Meilke (2009) to use quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage in supply managed industries and also addresses the concerns of Larue and Gervais (2008) that quota prices may not be theoretically consistent with comparative advantage. We also discuss potential practical challenges of using quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage in the Canadian supply managed industries. Finally, we provide an example of calculating provincial shares of new quota using recent quota price data according to two prototype decision rules.

Vyn, R. J., Z. Haq, J. Weerahewa and K. Meilke. 2012. *The Influence of Market Returns and Government Payments on Canadian Farmland Values*. CATPRN Working Paper 2012-02.

<http://purl.umn.edu/122738> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 202 times through July 2016.

This study estimates the impact of changes in market returns and government payments on farmland values across Canada using data from 1959 to 2009. A recursive simultaneous equation model is estimated to account for the counter-cyclical relationship between market returns and government payments. The results indicate that farmland values are more responsive to changes in market returns than in government payments, but both are important drivers of land values. The elasticity of land values with respect to government payments is lower than has been observed in the United States. In addition, the partial decoupling of government payments has not reduced their impact on farmland values.

2011:

Haq, Zahoor, K. Meilke and J. Cranfield. 2011. *The Gravity Model and the Problem of Zero's in Agrifood Trade*. CATPRN Working Paper 2011-02. August.

<http://purl.umn.edu/116851> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 472 times through July 2016.

In the analysis of bilateral trade flows, reported trade of zero or missing observations are quite common and this is a problem when estimating log-linear gravity equations. This has caused many researchers to either ignore the zero trade flows or to replace the zero with a small positive number. Both of these actions bias the resulting parameter estimates of the gravity equation. In this study we correct for this misspecification by using the Heckman selection model to estimate bilateral trade flows for 46 agrifood products, for the period 1990 to 2000, for 52 countries. In our sample, selection bias rarely affects the signs of variables but often has a substantial effect on the magnitude, statistical significance and economic interpretation of the marginal effects. Hence, treating zero trade flows properly is important from both a statistical and an economics perspective.

Li, Na and Alan Ker. 2011. *Trade Agreements, Political Economy and Endogenously Incomplete Contracts*. CATPRN Working Paper 2011-01. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/116850> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 167 times through July 2016.

We develop a political economy model of trade agreements following along the line of Grossman and Helpman (1995a) yet incorporating contracting costs, uncertainty and multiple policy instruments. We show that rent-seeking efforts do not affect tariff rates as they are offset by the substitution effect of domestic production subsidies. Similar to Horn et al (2010), we find the coexistence of uncertainty and contracting costs make optimal trade agreements incomplete contracts. Our model helps explain differential treatment on subsidies, countervailing duties, and the national treatment principle - all key provisions of the current WTO agreement.

2010:

Cairns, Alex, K. D. Meilke and Nick Bennett. 2010. *Supply Management and Price Ceilings on Production Quota Values: Future or Folly?* CATPRN Working Paper 2010-05. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/91474> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 571 times through July 2016.

Since the inception of supply management in Canada during the 1970s, milk production quota has been used to regulate output and participation in the dairy industry. In recent years, milk quota values have increased dramatically, almost tripling in value since the mid-1980s. This led to the Dairy Farmers of Ontario intervening on the milk production quota exchange on two occasions: first, in November 2006 with a progressive transfer assessment and then in July 2009, replacing the former policy with a firm price ceiling – fixing the unit price of quota at \$25,000. These policies represent a significant redistribution of economic benefits within the Ontario dairy community from milk producers approaching retirement and selling their quota to those remaining in the industry. The objective of this study is to first explore the reasons for the increase in production quota values; and second, to assess the welfare and distributional effects of each of the two quota policy schemes. Our results suggest that the increase in quota values were driven by basic economic factors expected to influence asset values and that the efficiency losses from intervention in the quota exchange are non-trivial. We conclude by suggesting there are several alternative policy options that could minimize efficiency losses while moderating the escalation in quota values.

Grant, J. H. and K. A. Boys. 2010. *Agriculture and the World Trade Organization: Does Membership Make a Difference?* CATPRN Working Paper 2010-03. May.

<http://purl.umn.edu/90886> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 597 times through July 2016.

Recent empirical studies have estimated the trade flow effect of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). One important, although largely untested, conclusion from this literature is that the GATT/WTO has worked well if we ignore trade in agriculture - one of the institution's seemingly apparent failures. This article investigates this conclusion using a large panel of agricultural and non-agricultural trade flows, the latter of which serves as our benchmark. The results are impressive: the multilateral institution has delivered significant positive effects on members' agricultural trade relative to trade between non-members. Further, despite their special and differential treatment, membership has provided important trade flow benefits for developing and least-developed country agricultural exports. These findings are robust across a large number of specifications and slices of the data. Although there are few sectors as politically sensitive, participation in the GATT/WTO appears to be a significant determinant of agricultural trade flows.

Grant, Jason H. 2010. *The Latest Wave of Regionalism: Does Outsider Status Affect the Competitiveness of U.S. and Canadian Agricultural Exports?* CATPRN Working Paper 2010-04. May.

<http://purl.umn.edu/90888> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 259 times through July 2016.

The degree to which countries are pursuing regional trade agreements (RTAs) has been nothing short of extraordinary. The latest wave of regional integration, however, is "breeding concern" among academics and policymakers as to the extra-regional effects of these agreements and their impact on North American agricultural exporters who are party to relatively few RTAs in world trade. This study constructs and uses an updated database of agricultural trade flows from 1992-2008 to shed light on the degree to which outsiders status affects U.S. and Canadian agricultural exports and its competing suppliers. Regarding outsider status, the existing dummy-variable approach is modified by incorporating region-specific extra-bloc trade flow variables to examine the degree to which RTAs divert trade from specific regions of the world, including Canadian agricultural exports. The results are quite illuminating. While RTAs may not be trade diverting on net, all RTAs considered exhibit trade diversion with respect to at least some regions. The results have important policy implications for nations that are not actively participating in the latest wave of regionalism.

Haq, Z., K. Meilke and J. Cranfield. 2010. *Does the Gravity Model Suffer from Selection Bias?* CATPRN Working Paper 2010-1. January.

<http://purl.umn.edu/90884> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 473 times through July 2016.

When analyzing bilateral trade flow data, zero trade flows are quite common and problematic when a gravity equation is estimated with a log-linear functional form. This has caused many researchers to either ignore the zero trade flows or to replace zero with a small positive number. Both of these actions bias the resulting parameter estimates of the gravity equation. In this study we correct for this misspecification by using the Heckman selection model to estimate the bilateral trade flows for 46 agrifood products, for the period 1990 to 2000, for 52 countries. In our sample, selection bias rarely affects the signs of variables but often has a substantial effect

on the magnitude, statistical significance and economic interpretation of the marginal effects. Hence, treating zero trade flows properly is important from both a statistical and an economics perspective.

Rafajlovic, J. and R. Cardwell. 2010. *The Implications of the WTO Negotiations on the Canadian Chicken Market: Two Representations of Chicken and Stochastic World Prices*. CATPRN Working Paper 2010-07. July.

<http://purl.umn.edu/95814> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 271 times through July 2016.

Current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) World Trade Organisation negotiations include proposals that would affect the trade barriers that protect Canada's chicken producers from foreign competition. This research analyses the effects of the most recent proposals to emerge from the DDA negotiation on Canada's chicken industry. We develop a partial-equilibrium model that generates welfare effects for the Canadian chicken industry supply chain. We also introduce stochastic prices to evaluate the effects of world price instability on the Canadian chicken industry. The model is also adapted to represent chicken as two distinct products; white meat and dark meat. Simulation results suggest that the welfare effects of the DDA proposals on the Canadian chicken industry would be small, providing that chicken receives the sensitive products designation. Liberalisation leads to higher total welfare in the chicken industry, which is accounted for by consumer welfare that increases by a larger amount than producer welfare decreases. These results hold across models that incorporate risk and that differentiate products.

Rude, James, J. P. Gervais and Marie-Helene Felt. 2010. *Detecting Cool Impacts On U.S.-Canada Bilateral Hog And Pork Trade Flows*. CATPRN Working Paper 2010-06. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/95811> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 301 times through July 2016.

Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) regulation has been applied in the United States meat sector since October 2008. The industry must label beef, lamb and pork (ground meat and muscle cuts) sold through retail outlets according to its country of origin. The labelling requirements create differentiation at the retail level and may impose additional costs on producers, processors and retailers in the U.S. and elsewhere. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether there has been structural change in U.S. import demand for Canadian hog/pork products. Given that COOL has been in place for a limited period of time, we implement statistical procedures that are robust to structural change occurring at the end of the sample. We find evidence that COOL has impacted U.S./Canada slaughter hog trade flows. While Canadian feeder hog prices appear to have declined concurrently with the introduction of COOL, statistical hypothesis testing found little evidence of structural change for feeder hog trade flows that could be associated with COOL.

Wolfe, R. 2010. *Endogenous Learning and Consensual Understanding in Multilateral Negotiations: Arguing and Bargaining in the WTO*. CATPRN Working Paper 2010-02. May.

<http://purl.umn.edu/90885> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 239 times through July 2016.

People at home and trade negotiators in Geneva cannot bargain what they do not understand, and what they bargain must be based on consensual understanding among the relevant actors, whether or not they agree on what to do about it. Consensual understanding is endogenous, arising in an argumentative process of learning structured by constitutive principles of a regime. In a departure from both rationalist and constructivist approaches to negotiation analysis in political science, my goal in this paper is to try to advance analysis of these questions by exploring the contribution that deliberation or arguing makes to learning. My proposition is that something happens at the multilateral negotiation table in addition to bargaining, something that alters either the understanding of themselves and their interests that participants brought to the table, or how they understand the nature of social reality in a domain. Such learning would be endogenous to the negotiations, because it happens through interaction. This approach requires distinguishing simple learning (acquisition of new information about the context, or the preferences of others) from complex learning (new understanding of cause/effect relations in a domain), which also requires distinguishing consensual understanding from a mutual adjustment of positions. I then specify how this model might be susceptible to empirical investigation. I show how individual issues within a negotiation can be treated as cases susceptible to comparative analysis at a moment in time. I explore this possibility in a comparison of the contribution of consensual understanding to the outcome of negotiation of selected issues in the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization. I then infer the results of arguing from the textual deposits left by negotiations in order to assess the presence or absence of consensual understanding. Finally, I attempt to correlate consensual understanding with the negotiation status of the issues as of the end of the failed Doha Round ministerial of July 2008.

2009:

Bakhshi, S. and W. A. Kerr. 2009. *Do Labour Standards Have a Role in International Trade? Private Standards, Preferential Trade Agreements or the WTO*. CATPRN Working Paper 2009-7. November.

<http://purl.umn.edu/90883> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 228 times through July 2016.

It is now common for producers (economic protectionism), consumers and social advocates (humanitarian motives) to urge for the inclusion of labour standards in international trade agreements. In spite of this, there has been little empirical work to determine whether low labour standards lead to trade distortions. This paper provides some empirical evidence pertaining to this question. Consumer groups, social advocates and traditional *vested interests* such as labour unions have attempted to have labour standards included in WTO disciplines. In the absence of success at the WTO, the relationship between labour standards and international trade has, however, been evolving in the areas of private standards and preferential trade agreements. Given the role that preferential trade agreements sometimes take in establishing future directions in multilateral trade agreements and the increasing dissatisfaction with the WTO's treatment of consumer issues in general, in the future labour standards may well work their way into multilateral trade agreements. The empirical results show that low labour standards lead to trade distortions. These effects appear to be small. Further research in this area is suggested.

Bakhshi, S. and W. A. Kerr. 2009. *Is There a Supply Distortion in the Green Box? An Acreage Response Approach*. CATPRN Working Paper 2009-04. May.

<http://purl.umn.edu/51093> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 290 times through July 2016.

The shift of the farm subsidies toward programs classified as being decoupled income supports in the WTO's URAA raises the question of their true impact on production and trade. In this study, we measured the acreage effects of the Canadian whole farm programs under uncertainty. Based on the theoretical discussions regarding the role of the insurance effect in acreage decisions, we extend the theoretical restrictions examined by Chavas and Holt (1990) which enables us to include this effect in our model specification. Hence, we modified the expected utility maximization framework (under the hypothesis that farmers are risk averse) developed by Chavas and Holt (1990) and derived three distinct effects: market effects, the wealth effect, and the insurance effect. Government payments are incorporated into the model through truncation of the probability distribution of profits. Specifically, the whole-farm programs truncate the total (farm) profit distribution, which affect the expected total wealth and variance of total wealth. Within this model, a system of nine crop equations, for spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola and hay, is provided and all the relevant elasticities of acreage allocation with respect to the exogenous variables are estimated.

Fridfinnson, Brooke and James Rude. 2009. *The Effects of Biofuels Policies on Global Commodity Trade Flows*. CATPRN Working Paper 2009-1. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/48119> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 570 times through July 2016.

The biofuels industry affects and is affected by government policies in countries around the globe. Government involvement takes on many forms, including petroleum fuel excise tax exemptions, production quotas, subsidized loans for capital projects, and consumption mandates, which effectively create a fixed demand for biofuels. These policies are designed to promote the domestic consumption, and perhaps in some cases, the eventual export of biofuels. The motivations behind government promotion of biofuels are complex, involving issues ranging from the environment and climate change to agriculture and farm income. Regardless of motivation, this analysis shows that increased ethanol and biodiesel production has both price and trade effects, with respect to the commodities serving as 20 inputs in the biofuel production process, as well as to other sectors, such as livestock. It is important to note that the results in this analysis are based on optimistic assumptions regarding the ability of the livestock sector to absorb by-products. The removal of trade barriers, particularly in the developed countries, would not only ease pressure on the traditional feedstocks and lower world ethanol prices, but allow countries with a comparative advantage to capitalize on the opportunity to produce low-cost biofuel. Whether the removal of these trade barriers on biofuels would affect their efficacy as a political tool remains to be seen.

Haq, Zahoor and Karl Meilke. 2009. *The Role of Income Growth in Emerging Markets and the BRICs in Agrifood Trade*. CATPRN Working Paper 2009-2. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/48122> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 361 times through July 2016.

This study develops an import demand model to explore the role of income in explaining the trade performance of low, middle and high-income countries with a special emphasis on Brazil, Russia, India and China – the BRIC economies. The study estimates the impact of the growth in per capita income on the trade of agrifood products using data for 52 countries and 20 agrifood products for the years 1990 to 2006. The results suggest that China, Russia and Brazil have more income elastic import demand than other middle-income countries. Conversely, the

income elasticities of import demand in India are similar to other low-income countries and for the most part statistically equal to zero.

Meilke, K. D. 2009. Results of a Survey of Graduate Courses in Applied Welfare Economics. CATPRN Working Paper 2009-06. May.

<http://purl.umn.edu/51095> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 166 times through July 2016.

I have provided an outline for an “applied welfare” course that includes most of the topics covered in the 13 courses surveyed. The exact topics included in any single course depends on its focus, the length of the term and the instructors preferences. However, most of the courses included topics one through six and many included some aspects of seven, eight and nine. After that there was very little commonality, with many of the topics from 10 through 20 only being covered in 1-2 courses.

Meilke, K. D. 2009. Results of a Survey of Graduate Courses in Agricultural Trade. CATPRN Working Paper 2009-05. May.

<http://purl.umn.edu/51094> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 173 times through July 2016.

I have provided an outline for “trade” courses that includes most of the topics covered in the 28 courses surveyed. The exact topics included in any single course depends on its focus, the length of the term and the instructors preferences. However, no course could hope to cover all of the topics mentioned below. Courses with a trade theory emphasis include most of the topics in section 1 and some from sections 3, 5, 8 and 9. The more typical agricultural trade course included topics 1a, 1b, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, and some portion of the topics in sections 5, 6 and 7. Many of these courses also included topics 9 and 11. Something more than 50 percent of these courses would also include some of the trade modeling topics in section 4. After that it was a bit of a dog’ breakfast of topics that individual instructors included in their courses.

Zhang, S. and W. A. Kerr. 2009. Revisiting Barriers to Trade: Do Foregone Health Benefits Matter? CATPRN Working Paper 2009-03. April.

<http://purl.umn.edu/51092> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 275 times through July 2016.

Restrictions on market access for agricultural products have, for the most part, been in place for a long time – often many decades. Multilateral liberalization of market access for the sector has, historically, shown little progress. Currently, one of the major stumbling blocks to completion of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations is the question of market access for agricultural markets. The market for agricultural products, however, is not static with new products being introduced at a rapid pace. This changing marketplace for agricultural products calls into question whether trade restrictions put in place under entirely different market conditions remain appropriate. While broader questions pertaining to liberalization of market access are caught up in the politics of trade negotiations, countries always have the right to unilaterally remove barriers to market access. The question is, under what circumstances might they want to consider the unilateral option for selected markets? This paper has examined the question of revisiting the imposition of existing trade barriers in one case of an evolving marketplace – when a traditional food product is altered to provide, or discovered to have, human health benefits that increases their value to consumers. In other words, the food becomes a *functional food*.

2008:

Clark, J. Stephen, David R. Thibodeau, K. Gary Grant, Katerina Prochazkova. 2008. *Disease Outbreaks and Agricultural Trade: The Case of Potatoes*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008-5. July.

<http://purl.umn.edu/43464> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 419 times through July 2016.

This study analyzed the impact of PVYn and potato wart disease outbreaks in PEI on the potato industry. These disease outbreaks resulted in the loss of the US seed export market to PEI producers. The effects of the disease outbreaks were mitigated through value-added processing. Price premiums for processed potatoes allowed PEI potato producers to abandon seed exports without incurring losses. Evidence is presented to suggest that other countries have also used this approach when export restrictions were placed on domestic agricultural industries. Policy response to the two disease outbreaks include: i) development of a zones policy that helped to reopen markets into the US; and ii) financial compensation to producers above the minimum levels required under the Seeds Act and Regulations. Implementation of the zones policy had beneficial impacts on the potato industry and is mirrored in other disease outbreaks. In contrast, compensation above minimum requirements may set a costly precedent for future disease outbreaks and may have caused moral hazard problems.

Coyle, Barry T., Ran Wei and James Rude. 2008. *Dynamic Econometric Models of Manitoba Crop Production and Hypothetical Production Impacts for CAIS*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008-6. July.

<http://purl.umn.edu/46630> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 415 times through July 2016.

This study analyzes the impact of the Canadian Agriculture Income Stabilization (CAIS) program. The study begins with a specification of dynamic crop production that decomposes static short run crop acreage allocation decisions and dynamic crop yield affects. The modelling framework accommodates risk aversion, price uncertainty, and applies recent aggregation theory to aggregate weather data. Using this framework an analytical model of the impacts of CAIS on crop production is developed. Hypothetical impacts of are simulated using an aggregate Manitoba data set. The results show that CAIS has a substantial impact on the shadow prices of both inputs and outputs. These shadow price effects resulted in a 4 percent increase in long run wheat and barley yields and a 2 percent increase for canola. CAIS has a small impact on nominal wealth but the impacts depend on the properties of producers' risk preferences. With constant relative risk aversion there is a wealth effect which in turn affects production decisions.

Grant, Jason and Karl Meilke. 2008. *Triggers, Remedies and Tariff Cuts: Assessing the Impact of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Countries*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008-9. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/46627> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 236 times through July 2016.

On July 30, 2008, the WTO negotiations broke down because Members could not bridge their differences on the operation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for low-income countries. This study evaluates two scenarios concerning the recent July (2008) SSM proposal – one in which low-income countries are allowed to breach their pre-Doha bound tariffs and one

in which they are not -- using a global, stochastic, partial equilibrium model of world wheat markets. We find that the July (2008) SSM proposal is not very trade distorting despite leading to sizeable SSM duties. Moreover, the question of whether developing countries should be allowed to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs depends heavily on the product under consideration, the extent of tariff cuts to bound rates, and the gap between a Members bound and applied tariffs, particularly when the volume-based SSM remedies are used.

Haq, Zahoor, Karl D. Meilke. 2008. *Differentiated Agri-Food Product Trade and the Linder Effect*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008- 7. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/46629> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 283 times through July 2016.

Using a generalized gravity equation, this study tests for the Linder effect in differentiated agri-food product trade, i.e. as the demand structures of two countries become more similar, their trade intensity increases. Two proxies of demand structure, the Balassa index and the absolute value of the difference in per capita GDPs of trading partners, are used to capture the Linder effect. In addition, two measures of bilateral trade, the Grubel and Lloyd index, and the value of bilateral trade are used as the dependent variable. The study investigates the role of the Linder effect in explaining the trade of 37 differentiated agri-food and beverage products categorized into eight product groups: cereals; fresh fish; frozen fish; vegetables; fresh fruit; processed fruit; tea and coffee; and alcoholic beverages. The data covers trade across 52 developed and developing countries from 1990 to 2000. The type of proxy used for the Linder effect and the way in which bilateral trade is measured influence the outcome of the statistical tests for the Linder effect. The Linder effect for cereals, frozen fish, vegetables, processed fruits, and tea and coffee, using the value of trade as the dependent variable, is often accepted but it is generally rejected when the GL index is used as the measure of trade intensity. In brief, the results do not provide strong support for the Linder effect in the trade of differentiated agri-food products.

Liu, Huanan, Jill E. Hobbs, William A. Kerr. 2008. *Food Safety Incidents, Collateral Damage and Trade Policy Responses: China-Canada Agri-Food Trade*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008-4. April.

<http://purl.umn.edu/43463> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 490 times through July 2016.

As markets become globalized, food safety policy and international trade policy are increasingly intertwined. Globalization also means that food safety incidents are widely reported internationally. One result is that food safety incidents can negatively impact products where no food safety issue exists as consumers lose trust in both foreign and domestic food safety institutions. While the policy framework for dealing with directly effected imported foods is well understood, how to deal with the market failure associated with indirectly affected products within the existing trade policy rules has not been explored. Using the example of China's 2007 problems with a spate of products safety incidents, a theoretical framework is developed and the response of both the Chinese and Canadian governments analyzed. A cooperative approach to the issues appears to have a number of advantages and does not contravene trade policy commitments.

Malhotra, Nisha and Andrey Stoyanov. 2008. *Analyzing the Agricultural Trade Impacts of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008-8. October.

<http://purl.umn.edu/46628> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 703 times through July 2016.

We find that the effect of the CCFTA on Chilean agricultural exports to Canada is large and positive. We estimate that approximately one-half of a 90 percent increase in Chilean exports to Canada can be attributed to trade preferences that the country received under the agreement. We found no effect of the agreement on Canadian exports to Chile. As far as we know, our paper is among the few that carries out a detailed empirical analysis of the effect of the FTA on agriculture. Most empirical papers that have studied the trade impact of FTAs rely on country-wide gravity models and aggregate trade data. These aggregate analyses can hide negative effects of FTAs on some sectors (like agriculture) where a country may have a comparative disadvantage. Our approach is industry-focused and differs from the mainstream literature analyzing FTAs.

Thibodeau, David R., J. Stephen Clark, Jinbin Yang and Petr Prochazka. 2008. *Does International Trump Domestic Trade? The Seed Potato Market in Canada*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008-1. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/43458> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 157 times through July 2016.

Bilateral agreements and RTAs with the U.S. and neighbouring countries provide the greatest potential in meeting the trade interests of Canadian producers, however, even with more integrated markets, exports of Canadian agricultural products to the U.S. are always threatened by protectionist interests. Recent trade concerns have led in part to the increased demand by the U.S. for country of origin labelling and increased health and safety testing on food and other raw materials entering the country. Policy decisions over compliance to U.S. trade requirements should be considerate of the costs and benefits associated with compliance to additional U.S. trade restrictions, because of potential impacts on domestic trade within Canada. For Canadian seed potatoes, the increased costs of compliance with the U.S. requirements will impose additional tracing and packaging costs on seed potato producers in Canada, which will not only affect bilateral trade with the U.S. but also domestic trade within Canada. The purpose of this study was to address these issues within the Canadian seed potato market. The results indicate that it may not be in Canada's interest to comply with increased import requirements suggested by the U.S.

Weerahewa, Jeevika, Karl D. Meilke, Richard J. Vyn, Zahoor Haq. 2008. *The Determinants of Farmland Values in Canada*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008-3. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/43461> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 876 times through July 2016.

This study has examined the determinants of farmland values in Canada. The empirical results for the period 1959-2004 show that farmland values seem to be disconnected from adjusted earnings per acre regardless of model specification. Differences in model specification can change the interpretation of the importance of government payments in influencing farm land values. If a time trend is included in the land value function government payments appear to have no effect on land values; when the time trend is removed they have a statistically significant positive effect on land values. With respect to the other explanatory variables, the higher the population density, the higher farmland values, indicating that urbanization increases farmland values. Furthermore, increases in real interest rates lower farmland value as the capitalization formula suggests.

Yeung, May T. and William A. Kerr. 2008. *Increasing Protection of GIs at the WTO: Clawbacks, Greenfields and Monopoly Rents*. CATPRN Working Paper 2008-2. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/43459> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 483 times through July 2016.

Currently there are proposals and negotiations regarding the strengthening of protection for geographic indicators (GIs) in the WTO. A major proponent of stronger protection for GIs has been the European Union. One of the arguments it has put forward for stronger protection has been that it will provide an avenue for economic development for agricultural producers in developing countries – a way to capture rents in the markets of developed countries. This paper first outlines the proposed changes to the international protection of geographic indicators. Second, the potential for groups of producers to generate and capture rents in foreign markets is assessed under differing assumptions pertaining to industry structure, product differentiation in the short and long run, barriers to entry reputation and the form of legal protection in importing countries. A discussion of the resource requirements to establish and maintain a GI is also provided.

2007:

Brink, Lars. 2007. *Classifying, Measuring and Analyzing WTO Domestic Support in Agriculture: Some Conceptual Distinctions*. CATPRN Working Paper 2007-2. April.

<http://purl.umn.edu/7337> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 271 times through July 2016.

Much confusion permeates discussions of the domestic support provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and in the ongoing Doha negotiations. The paper clarifies some conceptual distinctions with a view to dispelling some confusion, enhancing communication, and facilitating the representation of domestic support provisions in economic analysis. It distinguishes between classification of policy measures and measurement of support, between measures and support, among measures classified in various categories, between applied support and commitments, and between applied support that counts towards commitments and applied support that does not. It highlights certain issues, including the role of criteria in classifying policy measures (such as those labelled green box or blue box measures), the role of *de minimis* rules in measuring certain applied support (such as Current Total AMS), and how the time specificity of applied support may complicate analysis of domestic support provisions. It introduces schematic charts to complement the verbal exposition of classification and measurement rules under the Agreement on Agriculture and as suggested in the 2004 Framework of the Doha negotiations on agriculture.

Haq, Zahoor and Karl Meilke. 2007. *The Role of Income and Non-homothetic Preferences in Trading Differentiated Food and Beverages: The Case of Canada, the United States, and Selected EU Countries*. CATPRN Working Paper 2007-5. August.

<http://purl.umn.edu/7336> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 216 times through July 2016.

This study investigates the role of income in determining the agrifood exports of selected EU countries, Canada, and the United States (U.S.) by estimating per capita bilateral trade flows for 10 commodity groups across 52 countries for the period 1990–2000. About 43 percent of the

total observations of bilateral trade-flows for the selected regions and commodities are zero. Therefore, the fixed-effects Heckman two-step estimation procedure is used to account for the zero observations instead of ignoring or truncating the zeros. A number of hypotheses are tested to highlight the role of income in determining agrifood exports of differentiated agrifood products. The results show that the three regions (selected EU countries, Canada, United States) face statistically significant, positive and relatively elastic expenditure elasticities from the developing countries as compared to developed countries. Middle income developing countries, among developing countries, are the growth market of the future as growth in their expenditure on agrifood imports outpaces growth in their per capita income. However, all U.S. agrifood exports face statistically significant expenditure elasticities as compared to only a few for Canadian and EU commodities. The study also finds that Canadian exports face homothetic preferences, U.S. exports face homothetic preferences for more than one-half of the commodities, and the selected EU countries' exports face non-homothetic preferences for nine commodity groups. The study concludes that income plays an important role in agrifood trade; however, further investigation is needed to help us understand the forces that determine the divergent results.

Meilke, Karl D. and Hina Nazli. 2007. *The North American Agrifood Market Integration Consortium: A Guide to its Activities*. CATPRN Working Paper 2007-7. July.

<http://purl.umn.edu/43456> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 268 times through July 2016.

This document provides an index and a guide to the activities of the North American Agrifood Market Integration Consortium (NAAMIC) and its predecessor organization the Policy Disputes Information Consortium (PDIC). The first meeting of the group took place in Rio Rico, Arizona in March 1995 and the most recent in Cancun, Mexico in June 2007. Since 1995 the group has held an annual workshop where issues of importance to the three member nations of the NAFTA can be discussed in an open and frank forum. It is one of the few trinational activities where academics, government employees and private sector agents can meet to discuss common problems. The activities of the group are predicated on the belief that unbiased information presented to public and private decision makers can lead to more efficient and better functioning North American markets for agrifood products. This document provides a listing of the publications prepared by the PDIC and the NAAMIC as well as author, subject and participant indexes. All of the publications are available on the NAAMIC web site at: <http://naamic.tamu.edu> as well as in books published following the workshops.

Rude, James, Derek Brewin and Martin White. 2007. *Third Country Effects of Price Discrimination: The Case of the Canadian Wheat Board*. CATPRN Working Paper 2007-3. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/7338> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 855 times through July 2016.

This study considers whether the major concern with the behaviour of exporting state trading enterprises (STEs) should be the practice of price discrimination. Using a differentiated products world wheat model, the impacts of Canadian price discrimination on the welfare of competing exporters are considered. The results show that competing exporters could be better or worse off as result of price discrimination, but the impacts were small. Over a range of possible elasticities US producers were generally better off if North American arbitrage is assumed. Other wheat exporting regions could see their producer's welfare change between 2 and -0.5%.

Given these small impacts, the study suggests that explicit disciplines on discriminatory pricing exporting STEs may not be appropriate.

Rude, James. 2007. *Production Effects of the European Union's Single Farm Payment*. CATPRN Working Paper 2007-6. September.

<http://purl.umn.edu/7335> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 196 times through July 2016.

Since 1992, reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy has involved several rounds that have gradually changed the method of support from market based intervention purchases to direct producer payments. The change in the method support provides less production incentives and is less trade distorting. The Single Farm Payment (SFP) is the latest policy instrument which is the most decoupled from production decisions.

This study examines the SFP in terms of its production effects, its compliance with the Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and the implications for Canadian agricultural policy reform.

Weerahewa, J., K. D. Meilke and D. LeRoy. 2007. *An Economic Assessment of the BSE Crisis in Canada: Impacts of Border Closure and BSE Recovery Programs*. CATPRN Working Paper 2007-1. February.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24154> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 388 times through July 2016.

Using a static, multi-market, partial equilibrium model this paper assesses the economic consequences three alternative government responses to the BSE crisis in Canada: 1) expansion in slaughter capacity, 2) partial destruction of the cattle herd, and 3) deficiency payments. Each of these policies is evaluated under four different border situations 1) free trade in young beef only, the 2004 baseline situation; 2) autarky; 3) free trade in young beef and cattle; and 4) complete free trade. The results of the policy analysis are quite sensitive to the border assumptions employed making it impossible to select a "best" policy without perfect foresight with respect to the timing and the degree of border opening.

Wolfe, Robert. 2007. *Harvesting Public Policy? Private Influence on Agricultural Trade Policy in Canada*. CATPRN Working Paper 2007-4. June.

<http://purl.umn.edu/7339> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 384 times through July 2016.

My interest in this topic was first stimulated at a briefing for Canadian participants at a WTO public forum in Geneva in June 2005 where two thirds of the participants represented agriculture groups while representatives of the civil society organizations I had expected to see were a small minority. As Table 1 shows, it turns out that farm groups dominate recent public consultations on WTO negotiations. This new engagement was evident in July 2004 when some Ministers and many senior officials joined WTO ambassadors in a regular General Council meeting to hammer out the new framework for the Doha Round that had eluded them in Cancún in September 2003. Agriculture was the most contentious issue, and 37 Canadian agriculture stakeholders were in Geneva while the framework was negotiated. Canadian Ministers and officials provided these stakeholders with daily updates, and met with them individually. The same thing happened in June 2006 when ministers of about 30 Members representing all the negotiating groupings were in Geneva in a last ditch effort to craft "modalities" for the agriculture negotiations. Canadian agri-food groups were there too, and many more participated in daily

conference calls with ministers—agri-food groups represented half the participants in these calls. Such transparency can be good and bad for negotiations, and public policy.

2006:

Weerahewa, Jeevika. 2006. *Rice Market Liberalization and Household Welfare in Sri Lanka: A General Equilibrium Analysis*. CATPRN Working Paper 2006-1. December.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24156> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 432 times through July 2016.

Current trade policy pursued by the Sri Lankan government on rice can best be described as ad-hoc as it is characterized by protecting farmers during glut seasons and consumers during deficit seasons. This study examines the economy-wide impacts of various policy packages on rice and related markets, which consist of liberal as well as protectionist elements. A general equilibrium model developed for the Sri Lankan economy using the input-output table for 2000 was used for the analysis. The model consists of 5 sectors, 2 factors of production and households in 8 representative provinces. The key results of the analysis indicate that removal of the import tariff on rice along with removals of the import tariff on fertilizer and/or subsidy payments on other agricultural sectors could improve economic efficiency and household welfare across provinces. Contrary to the general belief that protectionism is pro-poor, an import ban on rice reduces household income and welfare even in agricultural provinces, including Uva and Sabaragamuwa. Further analysis indicates that broad-brush approaches may not yield expected outcomes, as the policy packages generate second best outcomes due to existence of other distortions in the economy. The key channel of transmission of trade shock to households appears to be through government transfer payments that are influenced by changes in government expenditures on subsidy payments.

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Banda, O.G. Dayaratna and John Whalley. 2005. *Beyond Goods and Services: Competition Policy, Investment, Mutual Recognition, Movement of Persons, and Broader Cooperation Provisions of Recent FTAs Involving ASEAN Countries*. CATPRN Working Paper 2005-1. March.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24153> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 361 times through July 2016.

This paper discusses the recent regional trade agreements that China has concluded rapidly following accession to the WTO in 2002. Agreements are in place with Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, and are either in negotiation or under discussion with South Africa, Chile, India, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. These agreements differ sharply in form and substance, and involve process commitments to ongoing negotiation and cooperation on a wide range of issues. Differences relating to the regional agreements negotiated by the EU and the US are emphasized, as are later potential difficulties these agreements create in moving to an Asian trade bloc centred on them.

Grant, Jason and Karl Meilke. 2005. *The WTO Special Safeguard Mechanism: A Case Study of Wheat*. CATPRN Working Paper 2005-2. April.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24158> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 692 times through July 2016.

This paper discusses the recent regional trade agreements that China has concluded rapidly following accession to the WTO in 2002. Agreements are in place with Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, and are either in negotiation or under discussion with South Africa, Chile, India, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. These agreements differ sharply in form and substance, and involve process commitments to ongoing negotiation and cooperation on a wide range of issues. Differences relating to the regional agreements negotiated by the EU and the US are emphasized, as are later potential difficulties these agreements create in moving to an Asian trade bloc centred on them.

Rude, James and Karl D. Meilke. 2005. *Canadian Agriculture and the Doha Development Agenda: The Challenges*. CATPRN Working Paper 2005-3. September.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24157> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 156 times through July 2016.

The WTO Framework Agreement negotiators accepted in July 2004 provides a guide to the commitments a Doha Development Agenda agreement may contain. These commitments will involve direct and indirect export subsidies, domestic support and market access. Commitments in each of these areas will have implications for Canadian agriculture. This paper explores these implications for supply management, the Canadian Wheat Board and domestic support programs.

2004:

Antkiewicz, Agata and John Whalley. 2004. *China's New Regional Trade Agreements*. CATPRN Working Paper 2004-1. November.

<http://purl.umn.edu/24155> Downloaded from AgEcon Search 686 times through July 2016.

This paper discusses the recent regional trade agreements that China has concluded rapidly following accession to the WTO in 2002. Agreements are in place with Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, and are either in negotiation or under discussion with South Africa, Chile, India, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. These agreements differ sharply in form and substance, and involve process commitments to ongoing negotiation and cooperation on a wide range of issues. Differences relating to the regional agreements negotiated by the EU and the US are emphasized, as are later potential difficulties these agreements create in moving to an Asian trade bloc centred on them.

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<http://www.uoguelph.ca/catprn/PDF-TPB/TPB-2012-03-Cairns-Meilke.pdf>

Cairns, A. and K. D. Meilke. 2012. *Canadian Agrifood Export Performance and the Growth Potential of the BRICS and Next-11.* CATPRN Trade Policy Brief 2012-05. December.
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