000025104 001__ 25104
000025104 005__ 20180122202920.0
000025104 037__ $$a1557-2016-133160
000025104 041__ $$aen
000025104 245__ $$aHIGHER PRICES FROM ENTRY: PRICING OF BRAND-NAME DRUGS
000025104 260__ $$c1996
000025104 269__ $$a1996
000025104 270__ $$mperloff@are.berkeley.edu$$pPerloff,   Jeffrey M.
000025104 300__ $$a36
000025104 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000025104 446__ $$aEnglish
000025104 490__ $$aWorking Paper 778
000025104 520__ $$aWhen a new firm enters a market and starts selling a spatially-differentiated product, the prices of existing products may rise due to a better match between consumers and products.  Entry may have three unusual effects.  First, the new price is above the monopoly price if the two firms collude and may be above the monopoly price even if the firms play Bertrand. Second, the Bertrand and collusive price may be identical. Third, prices, combined profits, and consumer surplus may all rise with entry.  Consistent with our theory, the real prices of some anti-ulcer drugs rose as new products entered the market.
000025104 650__ $$aDemand and Price Analysis
000025104 650__ $$aIndustrial Organization
000025104 700__ $$aPerloff, Jeffrey M.
000025104 700__ $$aSuslow, Valerie Y.
000025104 700__ $$aSeguin, Paul J.
000025104 8564_ $$s136201$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25104/files/wp778.pdf
000025104 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/25104
000025104 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:25104$$pGLOBAL_SET
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wp778.pdf: 136201 bytes, checksum: 3e74d9cd83cef333c09301ed20e6b152 (MD5)
  Previous issue date: 1996
000025104 982__ $$gUniversity of California, Berkeley>Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics>CUDARE Working Papers
000025104 980__ $$a1557