A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements

We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent’s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents’ strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding.


Issue Date:
2003
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/25014
Total Pages:
23
JEL Codes:
C79; D84
Series Statement:
CUDARE Working Paper 940




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-12-08

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