Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Examine U.S. and EU Agricultural Policy Institutions

A brief review of the history of agricultural policymaking in Europe and the U.S. reveals that major policy changes have often been brought about by major socio-political "shocks," such as the Great Depression and World War II. Such shocks also lead to the creation of institutions that tend to stay in place for long periods after the initial shock has passed. We use evolutionary game theory to model and simulate the effects of socio-political shocks on political institutions.


Issue Date:
2005
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/24538
Total Pages:
12
JEL Codes:
Q18; D72; C73
Series Statement:
Organised Session Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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